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DISABLING CONSENT,
OR RECONSTRUCTING SEXUAL AUTONOMY
JOSEPH J. FISCHEL* & HILARY R. O’CONNELL**
Abstract
Does a right to sexual autonomy criminalize the embellished pick-up line? Or does 
a right to sexual autonomy permit each and every consensual sex act, however life-
threatening, or even life-ending? This Article defends (by reconstructing) sexual autonomy 
as the governing principle of modern rape law. Powerful criticisms of sexual autonomy 
otherwise normatively opposed share an antecedent assumption: that sexual autonomy can 
be read off and as first person present active (or passive) consent (Part I). This Article argues 
against the conflation of sexual autonomy with sexual consent. Instead, and in conversation 
with competing liberal and feminist political theoretic accounts of sexual autonomy, this 
Article defines sexual autonomy as the capability to codetermine sexual relations (Part II). 
By interfacing a revised concept of sexual autonomy against and alongside State v. Fourtin, 
a 2012 Connecticut Supreme Court decision overturning a conviction of sexual assault 
against a severely mentally and physically disabled woman (Part III), the Article proposes 
three possibilities for statutory reform: refurbishing consent; expanding restrictions on 
status relations; and applying an accommodation model of disability entitlements to sexual 
relations (Part IV). After synopsizing our interventions, the Conclusion reminds readers 
that our brief for sexual autonomy, relationally reconstructed, presumes and propounds the 
ordinariness, not the extraordinariness, of sex.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court found Richard Fourtin not guilty of sexually 
assaulting a severely mentally and physically disabled woman,1 contravening his 2008 
trial conviction.2 Referred to as “L.K.” in court hearings,3 the alleged victim is wheelchair 
bound and suffers hydrocephalus and cerebral palsy.4 L.K. is nonverbal and communicates 
via a messaging board.5 She is also the daughter of Fourtin’s then-girlfriend. The trial 
jury’s decision hinged on whether L.K. is “physically helpless” and thus unable to consent 
to sexual relations.6 The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the trial jury’s conviction: 
because L.K. has a demonstrable history of registering displeasure or discomfort through 
“biting, kicking and scratching,” she could not be deemed, by any reasonable trier of fact, 
physically helpless. Acting, perhaps, as a “thirteenth juror,”7 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court affirmed the appellate decision. 
Needless to say, State v. Fourtin has infuriated feminists, anti-sexual violence activists, 
disability rights advocates, and many others.8 By most accounts, Fourtin is an unmitigated 
disaster—it declares open sexual season on persons with disabilities.9 Unless a person with 
disabilities is functionally and physiologically equivalent to someone who is unconscious, 
asleep, or blackout drunk, she is unprotected by the “physically helpless” subsections of 
the Connecticut sexual assault statutes.10 Worse still: if a person with disabilities kicks, 
bites, and scratches her assailant, this conduct will be used as evidence against her alleged 
1  State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674 (Conn. 2012). 
2  Id. at 679–80. The trial jury found Fourtin guilty of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second 
degree, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a–71(a)(3), 49(a)(2) (2015), and sexual assault in the fourth degree, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 53a–73a(a)(1)(C) (2015). As a result of the Fourtin decision, the Connecticut General Assembly revised 
Connecticut’s sexual assault statutes. See infra notes 315–322 and accompanying text. 
3  See Daniel Tepfer, Supreme Court Sets Accused Rapist Free, Conn. PoSt, Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.ctpost. 
com/news/article/Supreme-Court-sets-accused-rapist-free-3910077.php [http://perma.cc/5432-RJBP]. 
4  Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 677. 
5  Id.
6  Id. at 676. 
7  Id. at 701 (Norcott, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
8  See infra notes 299–306 and accompanying text. 
9  See infra notes 299–301 and accompanying text. 
10  See infra notes 288–293 and accompanying text.
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physical helplessness. Resistance, in this instance, is proof not of nonconsent, but of 
capacity to consent.11 
This Article  revisits  the  facts,  findings,  and  fallout  of Fourtin circuitously, by way 
of and in order to vindicate a reconstructed, relational right to sexual autonomy. For 
normative and material reasons to be elaborated below, we are cautious of liberal efforts 
to stretch the protective net of “physically helpless” or similar subsectional clauses.12 
We worry about ableism13: We worry  that  such paternalist  legislation may unjustifiably 
impede persons with disabilities’ wanted sexual relations, reflect the phobic conjunction 
of disability with asexuality or pathological sexuality, and reiterate the common, careless 
equivalence of disabled adults and children.14 Instead, we argue that sexual autonomy, 
relationally reconceived as the capability to codetermine sexual relations, might better 
protect L.K. while also better protecting sex.15 A sexual autonomy right, irreducible to first 
11  Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 683, 687; see also infra note 289. 
12  See infra Part III.C.
13  See, e.g., Fiona Kumari CamPbell, ContourS oF ableiSm: the ProduCtion oF diSability and abledneSS 6 
(2009) (“Central to regimes of ableism are two core elements that feature irrespective of its localised enactment, 
namely the notion of the normative (and normate individual) and the enforcement of a constitutional divide 
between perfected naturalised humanity and the aberrant, the unthinkable, quasi-human hybrid and therefore 
non-human.”); miChael Gill, already doinG it: intelleCtual diSability and Sexual aGenCy 106 (2015) 
(“Sexual ableism is the system of imbuing sexuality with determinations of qualification to be sexual based 
on criteria of ability, intellect, morality, physicality, appearance, age, race, social acceptability, and gender 
conformity.”); dan Goodley, diS/ability StudieS: theoriSinG diSabliSm and ableiSm 21 (2014) (“ableis[m] 
.  .  . privileges able-bodiedness; promotes smooth forms of personhood and smooth health; creates space fit 
for normative citizens; encourages an institutional bias towards autonomous, independent bodies; and lends 
support to economic and material dependence on neoliberal and hyper-capitalist forms of production.”) 
(emphasis added). Our reconstruction of sexual autonomy, we hope, enlarges the eligibility of its membership. 
An “institutional bias towards” autonomy might then promote, rather than prevent, persons with disabilities’ 
flourishing. 
14  See, e.g., Robert McRuer, Disabling Sex: Notes for a Crip Theory of Sexuality, 17 GlQ 107, 
113–14 (2011) [herinafter McRuer, Disabling Sex] (cautioning that disability may also be selectively 
championed, but for potentially chauvinist purposes); Tom Shakespeare, Disabled Sexuality: Toward Rights 
and Recognition, 18 Sexuality & diSability 159, 164–65 (2000) (cautioning against partitioning and/or 
prioritizing disability sexual politics from other disability rights activism). 
15  Our understanding of sexual autonomy as a capability, and not merely a noninterference right, derives from 
Martha Nussbaum’s extension of Amartya Sen’s Capabilities Approach. See infra note 25 and accompanying 
text and Part II.D; see also Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 ohio St. l.J. 1201 (2015). 
Our reconstruction of sexual autonomy aligns with Boni-Saenz’s definition and defense of “sexual capability.” 
Id. at 1224–25. Although first positing sexual capability as “an alternative to sexual autonomy,” id. at 1224, 
Boni-Saenz later suggests the former is elemental to the latter once relationally reconceived. Id. at 1227, 1253. 
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person present active (or passive) consent, redraws statutory lines of sexual permissibility 
and impermissibility. As a governing principle of modern rape law, this version of sexual 
autonomy would reach sexual conduct and relations heretofore unregulated, while retreating 
from conduct and relations heretofore proscribed. 
Part I critically reviews two recent, tour-de-force criticisms of sexual autonomy: Jed 
Rubenfeld’s The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy and Marc 
Spindelman’s Sexuality’s Law.16 Rubenfeld insists, and Spindelman implies, that sexual 
autonomy is a dangerously misguided principle of modern rape law. Both argue too that 
“sexual autonomy” is a contradiction in terms.17 Yet, these authors’ criticisms of sexual 
autonomy could not be further apart. Whereas Rubenfeld argues that sexual autonomy, as 
a governing principle of rape law, licenses nearly totalitarian state interference over the 
intimate lives of its citizens,18 Spindelman is equally alarmed that sexual autonomy, as a 
governing principle of rape law, licenses harmful, violent, life-destroying sex.19 Despite 
their seemingly incongruent broadsides against sexual autonomy, each author presumes 
sexual autonomy is equivalent to and fully exhausted through first person present active 
(or passive) consent.20 Once we rupture the equivalence between sexual consent and sexual 
autonomy, the force of these authors’ critiques may be recalculated, recalibrated, and 
redirected; new problems become more perceivable; and new remedies begin to present 
themselves. 
But  what  could  it  really  mean  to  suspend  consent  as  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
16  Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 yale L.J. 1372 
(2013) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Riddle]; Marc Spindelman, Sexuality’s Law, 24 Colum. J. Gender & l. 87 
(2013) [hereinafter Spindelman, Law]. 
17  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1418–21; Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 173–78. It should also 
be noted that while both authors assume “sexual autonomy” to be a triumph of modern rape law reform, the 
phrase never appears in state codes. 
18  See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. 
19  See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. 
20  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1380–81, 1403 (“[A] rape law genuinely committed to sexual 
autonomy would reject the force requirement, defining rape solely in terms of consent.”); Spindelman, Law, 
supra note 16, at 173–79. Our phrase “first person present active (or passive) consent” captures both the notion 
of  affirmative  consent  (e.g., “yes, let’s do this”) and acquiescence (the consent standard of many criminal 
sexual assault statutes). Our reference to person, tense, and voice recalls just how much current thinking about 
sex and sexual assault is really thinking about speech acts or their absence. Speech acts, this Article argues, may 
express sexual autonomy; but speech acts do not constitute sexual autonomy. 
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condition of sexual autonomy? Isn’t consent good, right, non-moralized, even sexy?21 Part 
II canvasses competing accounts of sexual autonomy to reveal a more promising, more 
feminist-inflected constitution of the term. Sexual autonomy need not be a performative 
contradiction, as it appears to be with Immanuel Kant,22 and it need not presuppose the 
fiction of the fully developed, wholly independent, adult rational actor.23 Nor, alternatively, 
must sexual autonomy be reduced simply to adult choice, as it appears to be with 
Stephen Schulhofer.24 Part II rehearses and defends sexual autonomy as the capability to 
codetermine  sexual  relations,  a  definition  developed  directly  from  Jennifer  Nedelsky’s 
relational reconstruction of autonomy and indirectly from Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach.25 Such a capability entails: a noninterference right to most, but not all, chosen 
sexual relations; restrictions on sex in certain status relations; and positive provisions 
for sexual education and information. This version of sexual autonomy accords consent 
significant but not primary  jurisdiction. And  it  is keyed,  in  the final  instance,  to human 
flourishing. 
Part III returns to Fourtin, detailing the facts of the case, subsequent criticisms, and 
legislative aftermath. We offer, respectfully, a metacritique: dominant activist and political 
responses to Fourtin peremptorily disqualify L.K., as well as those similarly situated, from 
sexual autonomy. Like Spindelman and Rubenfeld, critics of Fourtin synonymize sexual 
autonomy with  sexual  consent,  and  reserve  sexual  consent  for  the  fiction  of  the  adult, 
rational, able-bodied, able-minded actor.26 
21  See, e.g., ConSent iS Sexy, http://www.consentissexy.net [http://perma.cc/X4VU-PX9F] (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2015); see also JoSePh J. FiSChel, Sex and harm in the aGe oF ConSent (2016) (providing a broader 
critique against the consent paradigm of late modern sexuality).
22  See infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text.
23  From Kant’s œuvre, our interlocution presses most heavily on immanuel Kant, GroundworK oF the 
metaPhySiCS oF moralS (Mary Gregor & Jens Timmerman eds., 2012) [hereinafter Kant, GroundworK], as 
well as on secondary political theoretic sources. See infra Part II.A. 
24  StePhen J. SChulhoFer, unwanted Sex: the Culture oF intimidation and the Failure oF law 112 
(1998). See infra Part II.B. 
25  See generally JenniFer nedelSKy, law’S relationS: a relational theory oF SelF, autonomy, and law 
(2011). From Nussbaum’s œuvre, our interlocution presses most heavily on martha C. nuSSbaum, FrontierS 
oF JuStiCe: diSability, nationality, SPeCieS memberShiP (2007) [hereinafter nuSSbaum, FrontierS], and 
Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, in CoGnitive diSability and itS 
ChallenGe to moral PhiloSoPhy 74, 75 (Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010) [hereinafter Nussbaum, 
Capabilities]. 
26  See infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text. 
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Part IV asks: how might sexual autonomy as the capability to codetermine sexual 
relations—as a  right not  exhaustively dispatched  through first person present  active  (or 
passive) consent—govern sex and disability? How might the law, in Connecticut and 
beyond, enshrine a sexual autonomy right for persons with disabilities (which might 
be all of us)?27 Dispelling the presumptive incompatibility between “autonomy” and 
“disability,” we delineate three options for reforming sexual assault law: 1) refurbish (by 
reprioritizing  and  redefining)  consent;  2)  expand  status  restrictions  on  sexual  relations: 
prohibit sexual conduct not only between parents and their children and teachers and their 
students, but also across other relations of dependence; 3) specify persons with disabilities 
as a protected sex class: apply an accommodation model of disability—that is not merely 
an antidiscrimination model—to sex law. Thus, obligate the state to accommodate sex.28 
After summarizing the philosophic and policy interventions addressed in this Article, the 
Conclusion reminds readers that fostering sexual autonomy ultimately dedramatizes, rather 
than aggrandizes, sex. 
I. Sexual Autonomy Trashed: Overinclusive, Underinclusive29
In recent years, we have witnessed renewed popular and media attention around 
campus sexual assault,30 sexual assault in the United States military (and retaliation for 
27  See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 waSh. l. rev. 513, 
530 (2008) (“Vulnerability to disability (and other impairments) is universal and constant; we are all one curb 
step away from disability.”); Tobin Siebers, A Sexual Culture for Disabled People, in Sex and diSability 37, 
52 (Robert McRuer & Anna Mollow eds., 2012) (“Because every citizen will become sooner or later a disabled 
citizen, the struggle of people with disabilities for sexual rights belongs to everyone.”); see also don KuliCK 
& JenS rydStröm, lonelineSS and itS oPPoSite: Sex, diSability, and the ethiCS oF enGaGement 172 (2015) 
(“[I]t isn’t just that everybody is a mere car accident . . . away from disability . . . . [I]t’s that disability—the 
structure that comprises both absence and excess—is at the center of everyone’s existence.”). Kulick and 
Rydström arrive at this point via Anna Mollow, who figures sex itself as disability, a fantasy structure sustained 
through the subject’s desire for disintegration and rupture. Anna Mollow, Is Sex Disability? Queer Theory and 
the Disability Drive, in Sex and diSability, supra, at 285, 310 (“[A]ll sex is incurably, and perhaps desirably, 
disabled.”). 
28  See generally KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27. Kulick and Rydström likewise apply Nussbaum’s 
Capabilities Approach to disability and sexual flourishing. Id. at 277–95. 
29  A version of Part I appears in FiSChel, supra note 21. 
30  See, e.g., Know your ix: emPowerinG StudentS to StoP Sexual violenCe, http://www.knowyourix.
org [http://perma.cc/5QJU-ATCS] (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Ending Campus Sexual Assault Toolkit, AAUW, 
http://www.aauw.org/resource/campus-sexual-assault-tool-kit/ [http://perma.cc/JCQ4-2VB4] (last visited Dec. 
3, 2015). 
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reporting),31 sexual violence in international conflict zones,32 and legislative and judicial 
attempts to limit women’s reproductive rights.33 One might think now would be a prescient 
moment for legal scholars to carry a brief, once again,34 for sexual autonomy. Instead, 
two such scholars, Jed Rubenfeld and Marc Spindelman, took sexual autonomy to the 
junkyard, to be disposed of along with seduction laws,35 Lochner,36 and all those other 
noble ideas whose detriments were obfuscated by presentism. Both authors offer sustained, 
smart, and relentless broadsides against sexual autonomy; both see sexual autonomy as a 
contradiction in terms. Yet, their normative and consequentialist concerns are antipodal. 
31  See, e.g., Gopal Ratnam, The U.S. Military’s Continuing Sexual Assault Problem, ForeiGn Pol’y, Dec. 4, 
2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/04/the-u-s-militarys-continuing-sexual-assault-problem [http://perma.
cc/BVT5-3G2U].
32  See, e.g., Aki Peretz & Tara Maller, The Islamic State of Sexual Violence, ForeiGn Pol’y, Sep. 16, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/16/the-islamic-state-of-sexual-violence [http://perma.cc/5C9K-43UQ]. For 
an important corrective to dominant, sensational narratives of rape in conflict areas as only or even primarily 
ethnically terroristic, see Kerry F. Crawford et al., Wartime sexual violence is not just a ‘weapon of war,’ waSh. 
PoSt, Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/24/wartime-sexual-
violence-is-not-just-a-weapon-of-war [http://perma.cc/K5XQ-RNN8]. 
33  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (recognizing protected religious beliefs of for-
profit, closely-held corporations that exempt them from federal law; in this instance, a mandate for employers 
to fund certain forms of contraception for female employees under the Affordable Care Act); Erik Eckholm, 
Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass Restrictions, n.y. timeS, Jan. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/01/04/us/women-losing-access-to-abortion-as-opponents-gain-ground-in-state-legislatures.html [http://
perma.cc/53CH-V9M2]. 
34    For  earlier  legal  theoretic  advocacy  of  sexual  autonomy  (often  equated  to  an  affirmative  consent 
requirement) as a successor principle of rape law, see, for example, SChulhoFer, supra note 24; Martha 
Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. Cal. l. rev. 777 (1988); Lani 
Anne Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 u. Pa. l. rev. 1103 
(1993).
35    There  is an affinity between Rubenfeld’s criticism of  sexual autonomy as  laced with  the “defilement 
logic of traditional rape law” through rape-by-deception anomalies (spousal impersonation and medical 
misrepresentation), and (post hoc) feminist criticism of seduction laws as premised on women’s alleged 
fragility and “feminine virtue” (sexual restraint). See Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1401. For a rehearsal 
of feminist responses to, and a revisionist account of, seduction laws, see generally Jane E. Larson, “Women 
Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 Colum. 
l. rev. 374 (1993). 
36    There is an affinity between Spindelman’s criticism of sexual autonomy as authorizing unfettered sexual 
conduct, injuries notwithstanding, and progressive criticism of Lochner-era Court rulings constitutionalizing 
unfettered labor contracts, exploitation notwithstanding. See Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 173; see also 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”); infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
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Rubenfeld worries that sexual autonomy overreaches and patronizes women. Spindelman 
worries that sexual autonomy underachieves and imperils gay men. Both Rubenfeld’s and 
Spindelman’s arguments are underpinned—and ultimately undermined—by the conflation 
of sexual autonomy with sexual consent. 
A. Overinclusive: Rubenfeld’s Riddle
In The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, Jed Rubenfeld 
argues that sexual autonomy is ascending as the governing principle of rape law in the 
United States and other postindustrial nations, indexed by the substitution of nonconsent for 
force as the gravamen of sexual assault.37 In the 1970s, liberal and feminist legal scholars 
and activists spearheaded reforms to modern rape law.38 The force requirement was nearly 
impossible to prove; only the narrowest subset of sexual misconduct was actionable.39 
Presupposing that the problem of rape is the problem of the stranger-predator-in-the-
bushes-with-a-knife, the force requirement was inhospitable to cases of acquaintance rape, 
coercive sex, and even sex that was resisted (but not resisted in a form masculinist enough 
to register “force” to judges and juries).40 Nonconsent, it was hoped, would capture a wider 
range of sexual misconduct, emphasizing infringement of choice rather than the violent 
violation of the (woman’s) body.41 
It is against the backdrop of these progressive reforms and several outlier sexual assault 
37  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1392–94. 
38  See SuSan CarinGella, addreSSinG raPe reForm in law and PraCtiCe 13 (2009).
39  Id. at 14–15.
40  See generally SuSan eStriCh, real raPe (1988); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method 
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SiGnS 635, 649 (1983).
Having defined rape in male sexual terms, the law’s problem, which becomes the victim’s 
problem, is distinguishing rape from sex in specific cases. The law does this by adjudicating 
the level of acceptable force starting just above the level set by what is seen as normal male 
sexual behavior, rather than at the victim’s, or women’s, point of violation. 
Id.
41  However, initial 1970s liberal/feminist reforms to United States rape law sought to replace or relax the 
resistance requirement in favor of a force requirement, precisely to shift attention away from the behavior of 
the victim and onto the conduct of the perpetrator. See CarinGella, supra note 38, at 14–15. For accounts of 
reforms to modern rape law (and their shortcomings), see id. at 12–27; roSe CorriGan, uP aGainSt a wall: 
raPe reForm and the Failure oF SuCCeSS 21 (2014); SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 17–46. 
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convictions in its wake that Rubenfeld’s riddle surfaces.42 According to Rubenfeld, if we 
take sexual autonomy seriously, deception of any kind must be actionable, as it corrupts 
consent.43 Under the principle of sexual autonomy, “fraud is as great an evil as force.”44 
Any deception that induces sex—lying about your alma mater, your net worth, or your 
profession, or even the application of make-up—manipulates consent.45 Under a sexual 
autonomy regime, all such deceivers should be convicted of sexual assault. Rubenfeld 
warns: seventeen-year-olds who lie about their age in order to have sex with older partners 
would be both victims and perpetrators of sexual assault.46 For Rubenfeld, this outcome 
is inevitable and ridiculous. Seeing no plausible side constraint to the ambit of autonomy, 
Rubenfeld proposes that we jettison sexual autonomy from rape law, advocating instead 
a re-installment of the force requirement. Rape violates not a choice-right but “a right to 
bodily self-possession,” abrogated only by force (imprisonment, overpowering, physical 
restraint) or threat of force.47 Consent reenters sex law singularly as an affirmative defense 
against forcible subjection, transforming rape into permissibly rough, kinky, and/or 
BDSM sex.48 
 
B. Underinclusive: Spindelman’s ‘Sexual Death-Blow’
In  “Sexuality’s  Law,” Marc  Spindelman’s  attack  is  launched  not  chiefly  at  sexual 
autonomy, but rather at what he calls the “ideology of sexual freedom,” an ideology he 
42  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1375–79. 
43  Id. at 1402–04, 1416.
44  Id. at 1379. 
45  Id. at 1416; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception—A Response, 123 yale l.J. online 389, 391 
(2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/rape-by-deceptiona-response [http://perma.cc/S7CB-CBA6] 
[hereinafter Rubenfeld, Response].
46  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1414; Rubenfeld, Response, supra note 45, at 391–92, 402–03; see 
infra Part I.D.1.
47  Rubenfeld, Response, supra note 45, at 390, 403. 
48  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1437–38. For the peculiar consequences of Rubenfeld’s sole consent 
exception, see Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-Deception,” 
123 yale l.J. online 321, 326–27 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/no-way-around-consent-a-reply-
to-rubenfeld-on-rape-by-deception [http://perma.cc/H2RK-7RZG]. (“[S]uppose Jones is willing to engage in 
sadomasochistic sex with Smith only if Smith has gone to Yale. Smith lies that he has gone to Yale . . . . It is 
hard to believe that the sex is innocent up until the point at which Jones requests that Smith bind her with rope, 
at which point the encounter suddenly becomes rape.”). 
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holds responsible for the “lay[ing] waste” of gay men.49  The ideology finds its intellectual 
progenitors in writers and philosophers like the Marquis de Sade, Georges Bataille, 
Jean Genet, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault;50 it is refracted through hegemonic 
masculinity, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and homophobia;51 and its recent and contemporary 
flag-bearers—not always consciously, not without contradictions, and never univocally—
are gay male theorists like Douglas Crimp, David Chambers, Richard Mohr, Leo Bersani, 
and Tim Dean.52 
Under the ideology of sexual freedom, sex “is the value of all values.”53 Sex is life-
generating, life-destroying, subject-creating, subject-shattering, world-generating, and 
world-excluding.54 Sex obliterates social order as it catalyzes new vistas of the possible.55 
Where the ideology inexorably devolves, for Spindelman, is an “erotics of death,”56 the 
sacralization of violence that, at its limitless limit, “entails a right to die for sex and also 
a right to kill in its name.”57 On Spindelman’s account, it is gay men’s allegiance to and 
interpellation by the ideology that results in internalized homophobia, the equation of sexual 
freedom with sexual violence, the underreporting and trivializing of sexual abuse within 
gay communities, the eroticization of HIV/AIDS and seroconversion, and the censoring or 
self-censoring of dissent.58 
One might think sexual autonomy would provide a glimmer of hope in this otherwise 
grim account. As a recognizable legal limit, sexual autonomy is the liberal side-constraint 
to the ideology of sexual freedom’s corresponding injuries and violence.59 Not so, argues 
49  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 227.
50  Id. at 98–121. 
51  Id. at 98–212.
52  Id. at 98–212. See also Marc Spindelman, Review Essay: Sexual Freedom’s Shadows, 23 yale J.l. & 
FeminiSm 179 (2011).
53  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 102. 
54  See id. at 101–07.
55  Id. at 105. 
56  Id. at 117. 
57  Id. at 112.
58  Id. at 139–40, 184–85, 207–08, 214–15.
59  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 172–73, 187–88, 192.
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Spindelman, whose deep skepticism is occasioned by Richard Mohr’s defense of sexual 
autonomy in Gays/Justice.60  First, given how phenomenologically fabulous sex is, for 
Mohr, and given that sex, if done right, is supposed to break all our boundaries, sexual 
autonomy is a rearranged deck chair on the Titanic.61 
Second, though, and more pertinent for the purposes of this Article, sexual autonomy 
is immanently hospitable to an erotics of death: “If autonomy means anything, it is that one 
must be able to sacrifice oneself and one’s life for one’s deepest belief.”62 Consent grants 
“an immunity . . . to deal a sexual death blow. [One’s] partner’s underlying consent vitiates 
any notion that his death, sexually achieved as a result, is a harm. There can be no victims 
in this sex.”63 Sexual autonomy, by licensing all consensual sexual activity, licenses any 
injury attendant to sex, even death, because sex is the best. For Spindelman, HIV/AIDS 
is “sexual death” par excellence.64 Sexual autonomy permits seroconversion. A fortiori, 
sexual autonomy equals sexual death.65 By enshrining sexual death into sexual assault 
law, sexual autonomy violates the obligation of the liberal democratic state to prevent and 
punish individual harmful conduct.66 
60  Id. at 157–92; see also riChard d. mohr, GayS/JuStiCe: a Study oF ethiCS, SoCiety, and law 219–22 
(1988). 
61  Spindelman, Law, supra note  16,  at  189  (“Unlike  the  right  to  sexual  autonomy,  which  figures  the 
boundaries of the autonomous self as fully self-managed (even to the very end), the phenomenology of sex 
recognizes they need not be, and may be anything but.”).
62  Id. at 185. This predicate, however, is dubious. Many autonomy theorists explicitly reject that autonomy 
vindicates  self-sacrifice  (let  alone  self-sacrifice motored  by  belief  as  opposed  to  second-order  calculations 
[such as signing a Do Not Resuscitate order out of concerns for one’s family’s well-being]). See, e.g, Gerald 
dworKin, the theory and PraCtiCe oF autonomy 20, 128 (1997) (speculating that his conception of autonomy 
may justify voluntary slavery, but only if such servitude is based on the “second-order capacity of persons to 
reflect critically upon their first order preferences”); John Stuart mill, on liberty 87 (2002) (“But by selling 
himself for a slave he abdicates his liberty . . . . The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free 
not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.”). 
63  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 186.
64  Id. at 97–98, 174–75. 
65  Id. at 184–85.
66  Id. at 88, 223–27. More precisely, Spindelman argues that the de jure consent gravamen of sexual assault 
law combined with the de facto material reality of the ideology of sexual freedom alchemizes and authorizes 
sexual violence by and against gay men. 
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C. Sexual Autonomy ≠ Consent 
 
Despite Rubenfeld’s and Spindelman’s otherwise contrary critiques of sexual 
autonomy—overreaching and under-protective, respectively—both authors equate sexual 
autonomy with consent. If sexual assault law is premised on consent, warns Rubenfeld, 
we are obliged to send teenagers to prison for lying about their age in order to have sex.67 
If sexual assault law is premised on consent, warns Spindelman, gay men can infect one 
another with HIV with impunity, and there is no actionable harm.68 
But what if sexual autonomy denotes something other than, or something more than, 
first person present active (or passive) consent? Before elaborating that something—that 
is, before retrieving and then defending a reconstructed, relational, and feminist sexual 
autonomy—we revisit Rubenfeld’s and Spindelman’s cases of sexual autonomy gone wild. 
What inklings are there, in these authors’ own examples, of sexual autonomy theorized 
otherwise? 
D. Three Seventeen-Year-Olds 
In his gauntlet-thrown offensive, as well as in the reply to his critics,69 Rubenfeld 
repeatedly circles back to teenagers and teenage sex, and specifically to sex with and between 
seventeen-year-olds.70 The seventeen-year-old, on the eroticized precipice of majority,71 is 
the character that dramatizes the deficiencies of sexual autonomy. But each of his three teen 




67  See supra note 46.
68  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 88–89, 118, 173–78 (recognizing statutes for prosecuting HIV 
transmission, but complaining they are underutilized by gay men). 
69  Rubenfeld, Response, supra note 45. 
70  Id. at 391–92, 402; Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1414, 1435, 1441–42.
71  On the “erotic innocence” of the modern construction of childhood, see, e.g., JameS r. KinCaid, erotiC 
innoCenCe: the Culture oF Child moleStinG (1998); on adolescence as a construction differentially gendered 
and hyper-sexualized, see Kent baxter, the modern aGe: turn-oF-the-Century ameriCan Culture and the 
invention oF adoleSCenCe (2008); nanCy leSKo, aCt your aGe! a Cultural ConStruCtion oF adoleSCenCe 
(2012). 
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1. Seventeen-Year-Old #1 
If sexual autonomy is equivalent to consent, then sex-by-deception—any deception—
is, concludes Rubenfeld, equivalent to sexual assault. If a seventeen-year-old lies to have 
sex with an older partner, consent is thereby compromised, the teen therefore assaultive. 
Rubenfeld appeals to a liberal-leaning, feminist-friendly audience. Are we prepared to 
incarcerate a seventeen-year-old girl for lying about her age to have sex with an older man?72 
If not, there is but one plausible option: junk nonconsent and reinstate force requirements.73 
 
First, we should recognize the statistical infrequency of this teen lie, or mootness 
of the lie (if the lie is told to convince an otherwise law-abiding but libidinal citizen). 
Rubenfeld mistakenly (or misleadingly) presupposes that the age of consent for sexual 
conduct is eighteen, a commonly held misperception. But in nearly all states the age of 
consent is sixteen;74 so too, nearly all states include age-span provisions in their sexual 
assault codes.75 In many states, for example, it is legal for anyone of any age to have sex 
with a sixteen-year-old, but only those seventeen and under are permitted to have sexual 
relations with fourteen-year-olds.76 To the extent that this lie occurs, and occurs to convince 
a suitor of the ensuing sex’s legality, the more likely scenario would be the following: a 
fourteen-year-old lies about her age to have sex with someone eighteen or nineteen.77 To 
compete on Rubenfeld’s rhetorical plane: a high school freshman lies about her age to have 
sex with a college freshman or college sophomore. In this circumstance, we may more 
justifiably conclude  that  the high school freshman is not accountable for sexual assault, 
but because she is not accountable to sex. In other words, we do not hold her criminally 
accountable for the lie for the same reason the law proscribes sex with her: she is not as 
capable a decision maker—on account of experiential, educational, and developmental 
differences—as an older  teenager or  adult. This  legal fiction—an  incompetent  and  thus 
72  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1414; Rubenfeld, Response, supra note 45, at 391–92, 402. 
73  See Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1432–35.
74  See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the Potential for 
Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 dePaul l. rev. 800, 809 (2001).
75  See Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between 
Teenagers, 12 Cornell J.l. & Pub. Pol’y 373, 390 (2003). 
76  Id. at 390–91. 
77  See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Teenager’s Jailing Brings a Call to Fix Sex Offender Registries, n.y. timeS, 
Jul. 5, 2015, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/us/teenagers-jailing-brings-a-call-to-fix-sex-offender-
registries.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Y5UA-8DTJ]. 
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innocent fourteen-year-old—is more palatable to liberals and sex progressives than the 
fiction of the incompetent and thus innocent seventeen-year-old.78 
This observation about the extant age of sexual consent law segues to the second and 
more important criticism of the lying teenager hypothetical. In the rare jurisdictions where 
the lie would be advantageous, maybe it is the jurisdiction, not the teenager, that is in 
the wrong.79 And that wrong is a violation of sexual autonomy, both the teen’s and her 
partner’s. The seventeen-year-old lies because the law infringes on her sexual autonomy. 
In that case, the restructuring of legal relations, rather than the simple performance of 
individual consent, is componential of sexual autonomy.80 This initiates a broader, de-
dramatized (and de-eroticized) perspective unthinkable in Rubenfeld’s focus on immediate 
sexual encounters. The corrective in criminal law in the case of the lying teenager is to 
expand rather than contract the ambit of sexual autonomy, extending its normative and 
material coverage to older adolescents. 
2. Seventeen-Year-Old #2 
If we jettison sexual autonomy as Rubenfeld advises, we cannot, he concedes, convict 
a high school principal of sexual assault for coercing a seventeen-year-old into sex on the 
threat of expulsion (the principal could, though, be charged with some form of professional 
misconduct).81 Like deception, explains Rubenfeld, coercion vitiates consent. Coercion is 
thus no longer a touchstone for sexual assault once the question of consent is immaterial 
to rape. 82 But this only holds true if autonomy is equivalent to consent. If sexual autonomy 
also entails protecting choice and choice structure from undue interference, and entails 
guarantees against impermissible impediments to future decisions and decision-making, 
then the law might more strenuously regulate status relations and relations of dependence, 
regardless of consent. In other words, there might be a version of sexual autonomy that 
 
78  For a provocative counterclaim, see Judith levine, harmFul to minorS: the PerilS oF ProteCtinG 
Children From Sex 68–89 (2002) (defending a thirteen-year-old girl’s sexual relationship with her twenty-one-
year-old boyfriend, and rejecting statutory rape law as a suppressant of young female desire); see also infra 
notes 191–197 and accompanying text. 
79  In California, for example, all sex under eighteen is a criminal offense (albeit graduated by age difference), 
unless the partners are married. Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West 2015) 
80  See generally nedelSKy, supra note 25; see also infra Part II.C; Part II.D.1. 
81  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1435. 
82  Id. at 1435. But see Dougherty, supra note 48. 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law442 30.2
prohibits sexual relations between high school principals and their students, whether or not 
the sex is consensual.83 
3. Seventeen-Year-Old #3 
If the open secret of age of consent laws is that we all know seventeen-year-olds 
can consent to sex, writes Rubenfeld, then his revised rape law, tethered only to force, 
does not reach sex between minors or between minors and adults.84 But morality does, 
assures Rubenfeld.85 States are free (within the limits of other constitutional guarantees, 
like equal protection or privacy) to enact statutes proscribing sexual conduct deemed 
immoral.86 This backstop to Rubenfeld’s obliteration of modern sex law comes at an 
unacceptably high cost: the very totalitarian reach into citizens’ intimate lives that 
animated Rubenfeld’s critique from the outset.87 If morality is reintroduced as a legitimate 
basis for the regulation of sexual conduct, what is to stop the state from restricting 
sex among unattractive people, overweight people, gay people,88 or people with 
disabilities? Rather than re-open the door that Lawrence v. Texas shut,89 it is both more 
83  See infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text; infra notes 415–417 and accompanying text. 
84  Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1441–42. 
85  Id. at 1441–42.  
86  See id. at 1441.
87  Id. at 1441; see also id. at 1376 (“Many—perhaps most of us—don’t think rape-by-deception is rape at 
all. Neither, as a rule, do our courts. The problem is that we ought to think it is rape, and courts ought to so hold, 
given what we say rape is.”). 
88  Rubenfeld argues that his excision of sexual autonomy from rape law would nullify Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). This is mistaken. Just because John may permissibly infringe my sexual autonomy does 
not mean the State can do so. John might refuse Joe’s entry into his home because Joe is Jewish. The state cannot 
likewise refuse Joe’s entry into a public university. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 
yale J.l. & FeminiSm 1, 46 (2015); id. at 30–31 (“The right to sexual autonomy, as conceived of in Lawrence, is 
only a protection from government punishment of consensual sexual activity. Private actors who violate other 
people’s sexual autonomy do not abridge that right under current law.”).
 
 It is not that Lawrence is nullified by Rubenfeld’s excision of sexual autonomy from rape law. Rather, 
once sexual autonomy is excised, “morality” must clean up the questionable sex left outstanding, so Lawrence 
must be liquefied. Rubenfeld pretends that the nullification of Lawrence is a logical consequence of his critique 
of sexual autonomy, when in fact it is a normative antecedent. 
89  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (holding state sodomy laws unconstitutional); supra note 
88. For an argument extending Lawrence’s sexual rights to minors (and thereby proscribing morality as a 
constitutional basis for the regulation of minor sexual conduct), see Daniel Allender, Applying Lawrence: 
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practically feasible and normatively defensible to retain consent while reconstructing 
sexual autonomy. 
E. Other Sexual Death-Blows
 
Spindelman’s most dangerous misstep in “Sexuality’s Law” is the equation of HIV/
AIDS with death, the sine qua non predicate of Spindelman’s broadside. For Spindelman’s 
critique to find traction, for there to be an ideology of sexual freedom “laying waste” to 
gay men, Spindelman must figure HIV/AIDS, and HIV nondisclosure and transmission, in 
a particularly invidious and phobic way.90 At Spindelman’s rhetorical peak, HIV appears 
as a weapon brandished by sex-crazed, death-crazed homosexuals hell-bent on spreading, 
with impunity, their virus.91 Spindelman conjures Patient Zeroes, predators primarily 
responsible for the stubborn incidence and prevalence of HIV among United States gay 
men.92 HIV-positive men are both Spindelman’s sex victims and sex offenders. In this 
way, HIV/AIDS literalizes the “erotics of death” that sits at the heart of gay men’s alleged 
fidelity to sexual freedom.93 
Spindelman might counter that our critique performs a disavowal of gay male 
responsibility for the perpetuation of sexual injury and “sexual death” in the form of 
HIV/AIDS.94 But such a rebuttal misapprehends opposition to HIV criminalization laws. 
HIV nondisclosure and  transmission  laws were codified mostly mid-epidemic and mid-
panic.95 They overestimate risks of certain sexual activities, assume risk where none exists, 
add stigma to an already stigmatized identity category, take little or no account of risk-
reducing behavior (like taking antiretrovirals), and may very well deter HIV-testing by 
incentivizing ignorance.96 Enforcement of potential HIV exposure laws is often vindictive, 
Teenagers and the Crime Against Nature, 58 duKe l.J. 1825 (2009).
90  Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 227. 
91  Id. at 91–92. 
92  Id. at 138. 
93  Id. at 208–10. 
94  Id. at 129–33, 138–39. 
95  See Trevor Hoppe, From Sickness to Badness: The Criminalization of HIV in Michigan, 101 SoC. SCi. 
& med. 139, 140 (2014); Stan J. Lehman et al., Prevalence and Public Health Implications of State Laws that 
Criminalize Potential HIV Exposure in the United States, 18 aidS & behav. 997, 1000 (2014). 
96  See Hoppe, supra note 95, at 145–47; Lehman et al., supra note 95, at 999, 1003. 
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racially  disparate  in  impact,  and  disproportionately  targeted  against  straight-identified 
men of color.97 There is no evidence that criminalization lowers either risks or rates of 
HIV transmission.98 Meanwhile, safer sex campaigns, antiretroviral therapies, serosorting, 
harm reduction practices, and pre-exposure prophylaxis did not materialize solely so that 
men could have sex with other men without consequence.99 These are efforts to redress 
the harms of HIV without assuming maniacal evildoers and to change the medical and 
cultural import of HIV so it is not a death sentence but a manageable health condition. 
If we care about reducing HIV rates of infection and if we care (like Spindelman does) 
about generating less-toxic sexual relations, we should advocate for lowering the costs of 
treatment, making screening and treatment more accessible, and increasing funding for 
comprehensive sexuality and prevention education.100 Because Spindelman is wrong about 
the medical and cultural meaning of HIV, he is wrong to support the criminalization of HIV 
transmission. 
On the other hand, Spindelman exposits another equation: sexual autonomy as realized 
97  See Kim Shayo Buchanan, When is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent, 99 minn. l. rev. 
1231, 1294–1322 (2015); Zita Lazzarini & Robert Klitzman, HIV and the Law: Integrating Law, Policy, and 
Social Epidemiology, 30 J.l. med. & ethiCS 533, 537–40 (2002); see also Russell K. Robinson, Racing the 
Closet, 61 Stan. l. rev. 1463, 1469, 1515–16 (2009). Buchanan argues too that the state’s singling out HIV 
for compelled disclosure is discriminatory and violative of HIV-positive persons’ sexual autonomy. Buchanan, 
supra, at 1328, 1334–38.
98  See Lehman et al., supra note 95, at 998–99, 1004. Spindelman argues that HIV criminalization laws are 
ineffective because gay men underutilize them. See Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 96–98.
99  See Serosorting among Gay, Bisexual and Other Men Who Have Sex with Men, CtrS. For diSeaSe 
Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/msmhealth/serosorting.htm [http://perma.cc/9NYA-JWJC] (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2016) (“Serosorting is a practice some gay, bisexual and other men who have sex with men 
(MSM) use in an effort to reduce their HIV risk. This means they try to limit unprotected anal sex to partners 
with the same HIV status as their own.”); Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis, CtrS. For diSeaSe Control & Prevention, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/prevention/research/prep [http://perma.cc/KT3M-ZRDD] (“Pre-exposure prophylaxis 
. . . is a way for people who do not have HIV . . . to prevent HIV infection by taking a pill every day. The pill 
. . . contains two medicines . . . that are used in combination with other medicines to treat HIV . . . [and] these 
medicines can work to keep the virus from establishing a permanent infection.”). 
100 See generally Angela Perone, From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding 
to HIV Criminalization that Departs from Penalizing Marginalized Communities, 24 haStinGS women’S 
l.J. 363 (2013); unaidS, endinG overly broad Criminalization oF hiv non-diSCloSure, exPoSure and 
tranSmiSSion: CritiCal SCientiFiC, mediCal and leGal ConSiderationS (2013), http://www.unaids.org/sites/
default/files/media_asset/20130530_Guidance_Ending_Criminalisation_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/ELL7-VGZS];  
Sean Strub, Prevention vs. Prosecution: Creating a Viral Underclass, Poz bloGS (Oct. 18, 2011, 12:55 PM), 
http://blogs.poz.com/sean/archives/2011/10/prevention_vs_prosec.html [http://perma.cc/F555-TG4L]. 
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through any consensual sexual activity whatsoever.101 And this equation, not the equation 
of HIV with death, rightly troubles the good liberal’s normative priors. Hiding in the 
shadows (and the footnotes) of “Sexuality’s Law” are accounts of other kinds of injuries 
and harms, that, however consensual, may be impermissible from the liberal, democratic 
state’s point of view. They also may be intolerable from the perspective of a feminist, 
relationally reconstructed conception of sexual autonomy.102 Spindelman references the 
“German Cannibal” case, in which one partner castrated, killed, further dismembered, and 
then consumed the other partner—acts partially videotaped and demonstrably consensual.103 
He references BDSM sex more generally, questioning its advocates’ kneejerk recourse 
to consent as morally, summarily determinative.104 He worries that Lawrence, if not 
counterbalanced by some additional doctrine, authorizes same-sex sexual violence under 
the sign of “freedom.”105 And he laments, rightfully we think, that gay men underreport 
sexual harassment, abuse, and rape, and that when gay men do report sexual injury, their 
accounts are readily dismissed or trivialized.106 
We agree then that the state might have a role to play in regulating, even proscribing, 
some harms of consensual sexual conduct—but we disagree with Spindelman that HIV 
nondisclosure is one of those harms (in part because nondisclosure neither necessarily 
nor categorically violates sexual autonomy and in part because seropositive status is 
not a sexual death blow).107 And the solution to addressing these other injuries is not to 
abandon sexual autonomy but to reconstruct its meaning by reconceiving it relationally. 
One question we pose in Parts II and IV is: must sexual autonomy green-light every act of 
consensual sex, however physically or psychologically devastating? Or are there alternative 
versions of sexual autonomy that rein in the parameters of regulable consensual sex? In 
other words, might the democratic state permissibly restrict certain forms of consensual 
 
101 See Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 186–88, 186–187 n.439, 187 n.40.
102 Id. at 186–88, 186–187 n.439, 187 n.440.
103 Id. at 186 n.439. 
104 Id.
105 Id. at 226. 
106 Id. at 98, 221–23.
107 In the course of writing this Article, the authors realized they might not agree with one another on the 
legitimate scope of state intervention over adult (and some minor) consensual sexual activity. However, both 
authors agree that first person present active (or passive) consent is componential of, but not comprehensive 
for, sexual autonomy. See infra Part IV. 
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conduct, not despite sexual autonomy but because of it? Might a relationally reconstructed 
concept of sexual autonomy place less emphasis on disqualifying certain persons (like the 
disabled or minors) from consent’s eligibility and more emphasis on regulating certain 
consensual relations? This outcome is facially paradoxical—a concept of autonomy that 
relaxes competency requirements while it reins in the moral force of “choice”—but it is 
one we will come to hesitantly endorse. 
II. Sexual Autonomy Reconstructed: Feminist, Relational
But  what  could  it  really  mean  for  consent  to  no  longer  be  the  filament  of  sexual 
autonomy? Does not consent sit at autonomy’s very core?108 Is not individual choice the 
premium value under liberalism, for which autonomy provides the theoretical armature? 
In this Part we offer a grossly truncated genealogy of (sexual) autonomy, and we canvass 
some of its leading critics and revisionists. We do so to arrive at a conception of sexual 
autonomy  as  the  capability  to  codetermine  sexual  relations.  This  definition  of  sexual 
autonomy accords consent critical but not dispositive normative value. 
A. Autonomy as Self-Governance: Kant
Most liberal philosophic defenses of autonomy reach back to (and often problematize) 
Kant’s account of autonomy and his Formula of Humanity, which enjoin us to act in such 
a way that respects our humanity and the humanity of others as ends, and “never merely as 
a means.”109 Kant’s notion of autonomy derives from action in accordance with universal 
law. Such universal law is keyed to the recognition of humanity as the core of dignity; and 
the inhabitants of humanity are entitled to moral respect and equal treatment because they 
are rational beings.110 
These links of Kantian logic are not self-evident, especially to the contemporary reader 
who associates autonomy with uncoerced (adult, able-minded) choice, full stop. Thus, this 
section (partially) parses this account of autonomy, delineates why this account appears so 
incompatible—even contradictory—with sex, and then explains, in broadest stroke, why 
the account has seemed so troubling from feminist and other critical theoretic perspectives. 
Interestingly, it is these very concerns with Kantian autonomy that helped pare down the 
108 See supra Part I. Or the inverse: is not autonomy “at the center of the justificatory basis for informed 
consent”? dworKin, supra note 62, at 101. 
109 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 41. 
110 Id. at 17–18, 41–43.
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concept to consent, a thinned version of autonomy embraced by Stephen Schulhofer (and 
accepted as such by Rubenfeld and Spindelman) that we problematize in the next section.
For Kant, autonomy is indexed and achieved through obeying self-generating, not 
externally imposed, law.111 Conduct in accordance with one’s own law demonstrates a 
sovereignty  of  the  subject  steeled  from  selfishness,  the  seductions  of  one’s  appetite,  or 
others’ persuasion or compulsion.112 And the subject’s law is moral law to the degree it is 
universal law.113 Hence Kant’s categorical imperative: the law one takes as his own must 
recognize humanity as a “kingdom of ends.”114 Autonomous action respects the autonomous 
capacities of others.115  As Claire Rasmussen points out, by rendering adherence to the 
categorical  imperative as  freely chosen, Kant bridges  two conflicting understandings of 
autonomy on offer from Rousseau.116 Kant’s autonomy is neither solely generated and 
dispatched by individuals shielded from the social nor does it materialize only through 
submission to the general will. Rather, autonomy is moral law freely imposed on the self 
that “acknowledge[s] living with others.”117
Such Kantian autonomy, a property of the person yet calibrated to sociality, is a 
function of and entitled by human rationality.118 We observe moral law and we act under 
universal maxims because we are rational beings. And we are able to observe moral law, 
rather than involuntarily submit to it, because we are rational beings. This sort of human 
action  is  reflected  upon  in  light  of  reason;  reason  permits  us  to  see  the  duties we  owe 
111 Id. at 42–43.
112 Id. at 52 (“[T]he moral and hence categorical imperative says: I ought to act in such or such a way, even 
if I did not want anything else.”); see also immanuel Kant, eduCation 96–97 (Annette Churton ed., 1960) 
[hereinafter Kant, eduCation] (“Morality is a matter of character . . . . The first step toward the formation of a 
good character is to put our passions on one side.”). 
113 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 18. 
114 Id. at 45–46. 
115 Id. at 51–52. 
116 Claire e. raSmuSSen, the autonomouS animal: SelF-GovernanCe and the modern SubJeCt 4–5 (2011) 
(citing Jean-JaCQueS rouSSeau, SeCond diSCourSe on the oriGinS oF ineQuality (Donald A. Cress trans., 
1992); Jean-JaCQueS rouSSeau, the SoCial ContraCt and other later PolitiCal writinGS (Victor Gourevitch 
ed., 1997)).
117 raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 5.
118 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 57–58; see also Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and 
Autonomy of the Will, 116 ethiCS 263, 281–82 (2006). 
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to ourselves and others, and to act accordingly. We subscribe to the law freely through 
our own rational calculations, uninfluenced by God, possible consequences, or our own 
desires.119 Rationality lifts us out of slavishness to our desires. Our will is free to the extent 
it is rational; the freeness of our free will wills us to act in accordance with universal law 
and requires that we respect the same freedom in others.120 
This, then, is autonomy: acting freely, which means acting rationally, which means 
acting morally or by moral motivation, in recognition of ourselves and others as ends. 
Autonomy is thus self-governance through practical rationality: the subordination of 
emotions, impulses, and inclinations to powers of reason, deliberation, and calculation. It 
is the deferral of immediate gratification for long term plans—plans that respect others as 
ends and do not suborn or instrumentalize them.121 
The enemy of Kantian autonomy is heteronomy: conditions under which either (a) 
persons obey moral law but by some force other than their own self-originating reason 
or (b) persons are unable to self-govern (but then are they persons?).122 Under these 
lights, children are unable to self-govern but can and should be cultivated, gradually, into 
reasoning-cum-autonomous subjects.123 
In most respects, Kantian autonomy is worlds apart from autonomy as it is generally 
understood in contemporary philosophic and feminist debates.124 For Kant, autonomy does 
not moralize choice and the freedom to choose, but rather names humans’ alleged capacity 
to think and behave in accordance with law that is at once self-imposed, universalizable, 
and moral.125 Autonomy, far from being choice willy-nilly, is self-imposed constraint on 
119 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 57–58; see also Christine M. Korsgaard, Introduction to immanuel 
Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at vii, xxvii. 
120 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 56–57; see also Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 28 (“[The 
child] must be shown that he can only attain his own ends by allowing others to attain theirs.”). 
121 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 51–52; see also raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 6–7.
122 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 45, 52; see also Darwall, supra note 118, at 264. 
123 See Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 20, 77–78, 81; raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 33. 
124 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, This is Not Your Father’s Autonomy: Lesbian and Gay Rights from a Feminist 
and Relational Perspective, in FeminiSt & Queer leGal theorieS: intimate enCounterS, unComFortable 
ConverSationS 289, 293–94 (Martha Fineman et al. eds., 2009) (describing feminist theorists’ reclamation of 
emotions as ingredients for self-reflection and deliberation). But see Darwall, supra note 118, at 264.
125 See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
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choice, constraint tailored to treating others as “ends” entitled to such treatment by virtue 
of their rationality.126 To the extent that choice matters under Kantian autonomy, it matters 
because humans respect fellow humans’ life plans, as those plans are made by reasoning 
humans. Our choices and the choices others make have value because rational persons 
who see those choices as important and good made them.127 By binding ourselves to act in 
lawlike ways that can be universalized, we appreciate others by not impeding upon their 
choices. The point here is that autonomy does not materialize in choice itself, but in the 
rational capacity to restrain some of one’s own choices and behaviors to protect the choices 
and behaviors of others. 
In contemporary theoretical reconstructions of autonomy, the concept is more 
explicitly two-pronged than Kant’s original approach, premised on self-definition and self-
determination.128 Kant emphasizes internal constitution and development of the subject 
(self-definition,  autonomy  of  the  will)  over  the  availability  or  affordability  of  choices 
(self-determination, autonomy of action).129 Gerald Dworkin’s reconstruction of Kantian 
autonomy—one he thinks thins the concept130—in fact accentuates the focus on self-
definition. For Dworkin, autonomy is “conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons 
to  reflect  critically  upon  their  first-order  preferences,  desires, wishes,  and  so  forth  and 
the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and 
values.”131 Dworkin understands his notion of autonomy as thinning the Kantian concept 
126 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 49–50.
127 See Korsgaard, supra note 119, at xxv. 
128 We adopt this distinction from Kathryn Abrams, although she shelves “autonomy” in favor of “agency” 
and teases apart the two prongs as “self-definition” and “self-direction.” Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to 
Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 wm. & mary l. rev. 805, 806, 824 (1999). Autonomy, 
for Abrams,  is  a misguided  legal  and  philosophic  fiction;  “agency”  captures  better  the  fact  of  (gendered) 
socialization as well as resistive acts to (gendered) socialization. Id. at 823–24. Under a feminist constructivist 
register,  the  two prongs  of  agency,  self-definition  and  self-direction,  interpenetrate. The  social  constitution 
of the self partially governs the subject’s decisions and choices. Id. at 826. External (asymmetric, gendered) 
constraints on choice partially govern the subject’s conception of self. Id. at 830–31. In both her descriptions, 
id. at 829–40, and prescriptions, id. at 840–46, Abrams focuses more, as the essay’s title might suggest, on 
agency as “self-direction” (what we have labeled “self-determination”) than on agency as self-definition. 
129 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 62; see also Darwall, supra note 118, at 263; dworKin, supra note 
62, at 5. However, “self-definition” need not be conceived as a process undertaken solely by the self, absent 
relations and collectives. See Abrams, supra note 128, at 822. 
130 dworKin, supra note 62, at 30. 
131 Id. at 20.
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because its touchstone is procedural, not substantive, independence; whereas for Kant, no 
amount of rational reflection can render an action that violates the categorical imperative—
like making a false promise—autonomous.132 But the normative centrality of “capacity” 
and second order reflection for Dworkin, and his criticism of “more choices” as indices of 
more autonomy,133 show just how thick (i.e., premised on self-definition) Kantian autonomy 
is or was. Indeed, the modern and especially late modern shift from self-definition to self-
determination leads Stephen Darwall to suggest that while current debates surrounding 
autonomy may be rooted in Kant’s individuation of the concept, they have little to do 
facially (but everything to do, substantively134) with Kant’s original meditations. 
1. Sexual Autonomy as Performative Contradiction
On the standard reading, Kantian autonomy does not look so good for sex. Or rather, 
sex does not look so good for Kantian autonomy. Sex and autonomy are incompatible—
seriously incompatible—and for at least two reasons: 
First, sex objectifies.135 The desirer instrumentalizes the desired for purposes of sexual 
gratification;  the  desirer  objectifies  himself  in  debasing  himself  to  his  animality,  to  his 
body.136 To be treated as moral agents, humans must be treated—or rather, their “humanity” 
must be treated137—as ends. Rather than appreciate fellow humans in their complete 
humanity, sexual desire redirects our focus to humans’ various parts and commodifies them 
for our own satisfaction.138 Sex is seemingly about pursuing objects, not principles.139 Sex 
therefore contravenes the categorical imperative. Kant’s artful admonition: “Sexual love 
makes of the loved person an Object of appetite: as soon as that appetite has been stilled, 
132 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 17–19.
133 dworKin, supra note 62, at 62–81.
134 See Darwall, supra note 118, at 263–64, 284. 
135 immanuel Kant, leCtureS on ethiCS 163 (Louis Infield trans., 1930) [hereinafter Kant, ethiCS]; see also 
raJa halwani, PhiloSoPhy oF love, Sex, and marriaGe: an introduCtion 200–03 (2010); Rubenfeld, Riddle, 
supra note 16, at 1419. 
136 Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 164.
137 halwani, supra note 135, at 206–07. 
138 Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 164–65.
139 See Darwall, supra note 118, at 281.
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the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which has been sucked dry.”140 Sexual 
desire dehumanizes humans—I want you not for you, but for your (genital) parts. Kant 
singles out prostitution in particular as anathema to humanity-as-end, as it puts the body 
up for use and profit.141 
Second, sexual desire overwhelms the ability to reason.142 “What Kant feared most of 
all, because it was the prime disturber of reason, was sexuality.”143 For Kant, as for other 
theorists of political modernity, children’s reason is cultivated through the management 
of the body and its inconveniences, but the body and its propensity for indulgence also 
challenge the primacy of reason. Sex poses the greatest of these bodily dangers: “the most 
important physical capacities subject to self-limitation are sexual urges that are particularly 
threatening to the capacity to self-govern.”144 As a singularly destructive force, sexual 
desire suborns the power to deliberate and plan. It also makes us dissemble, lie, manipulate, 
and act irresponsibly.145 While Kant encourages the sexual education of children, such 
education ought to be tailored to cabining sex safely into marriage, thereby maximizing its 
societal benefit and minimizing its likelihood of anarchizing the young subject.146 
Marriage and children provide the ethical exceptions for sex, although children are 
not, for Kant, necessary to morally vindicate marital sex. Marriage itself, as a reciprocally 
140 Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 163; see also Timothy J. Madigan, The Discarded Lemon: Kant, 
Prostitution and Respect For Persons, 21 Phil. now 14 (1998), https://philosophynow.org/issues/21/The_
discarded_Lemon_Kant_prostitution_and_respect_for_persons [http://perma.cc/7CRR-MUEY]. 
141 Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 165–66. But see Madigan, supra note 140 (“[I]f one decouples Kant’s 
repulsion about sexual acts from his overall contractual emphasis, a strong case can be made in favour of 
reciprocity in sexual relations, outside of a marriage contract.”); see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142 Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 164 (“Hence it comes that all men and women do their best to make not 
their human nature but their sex more alluring and direct their activities and lusts entirely toward sex. Human 
nature is thereby sacrificed to sex.”); see also halwani, supra note 135, at 206–09; martha C. nuSSbaum, Sex 
and SoCial JuStiCe 224 (1999) [hereinafter nuSSbaum, Sex] (“The [Kantian] idea seems to be that sexual desire 
and pleasure cause very acute forms of sensation in a person’s own body; that these sensations drive out, for 
a time, all other thoughts, including the thoughts of respect for humanity that are characteristic of the moral 
attitude to persons.”). 
143 Madigan, supra note 140. 
144 raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 29. 
145 halwani, supra note 135, at 204–05, 209. 
146 Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 117–18; see also immanuel Kant, metaPhySiCS oF moralS 61–64 
(Mary Gregor ed., 1996) [hereinafter Kant, metaPhySiCS]; raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 32.
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binding partnership (of humans as ends), offers sex its alibi.147 
 All nonmarital forms of sex, especially masturbation, are proscribed. Masturbation, 
like homosexual sex,148 is unnatural, leads to nowhere better (like procreation), and 
saps all energy away from moral enterprises. Self-instrumentalizing (hence self-abuse), 
masturbation weakens the intellectual constitution of the person and thus of the political 
collective. 149 So, marital sex exempted, sexual autonomy on Kantian grounds seems to be 
senseless.150 
147 Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 118; see also Madigan, supra note 140. But see Kant, ethiCS, 
supra note 135, at 170 (condemning homosexual sex because “the end of humanity in respect of sexuality is 
to preserve the species without debasing the person”). Kant’s non-procreative, mutual-use defense of marital 
sex combined with his contra naturam view of gay sex leads one to wonder what position Kant might take on 
same-sex marriage. See generally Matthew C. Altman, Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 101 Kant-Studien 309 (2011); Lara Denis, Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent, 
in Sex & ethiCS 37, 45–46 (Raja Halwani ed., 2007) (“In sum, where same-sex marriage is possible, sex within 
such a marriage seems to be . . . in no way incompatible with virtue.”). 
148 Kant, metaPhySiCS, supra note 146, at 61–62.
Sexual union is the reciprocal use that one human being makes of the sexual organs and 
capacities of another. This is either a natural use (by which procreation of a being of the 
same kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use takes places either with a 
person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman species. Since such transgression 
of laws . . . do wrong to humanity in our own person, there are no limitations or exceptions 
whatsoever that can save them from being repudiated completely.
Id. (internal Latin translations omitted). 
149 raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 33. 
150 Rubenfeld rightly points this out, but wrongly levels the same reduction ad absurdum charge at 
Schulhoferian autonomy. See Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1419–20; infra II.B. 
 In fact, “sexual autonomy” is nonsensical even within marriage for Kant: “For the natural use that one 
sex makes of the other’s sexual organs is enjoyment, for which one gives itself up to the other. In this act a 
human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity in his own person. There 
is only one condition under which this is possible: that while one person is acquired by the other as if it were 
a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its 
personality.” Kant, metaPhySiCS, supra note 146, at 62. The non-liquidation of personhood is distinct from its 
promotion. See also Kant, ethiCS, supra note 135, at 167–68; Madigan, supra note 140 (“Marriage, in a sense, 
allows two individuals to mutually degrade each other, to treat each other as the property of the other—to use 
each other.”); Alan Soble, Sexual Use, in the PhiloSoPhy oF Sex: ContemPorary readinGS 259, 278–82 (Alan 
Soble & Nicholas Power eds., 2008). 
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2. Sexual Autonomy (Kind of) Salvaged 
 
Some scholars argue that Kant is wrong about sex as always-instrumentalizing or 
sexual desire as always-overpowering and dehumanizing.151 If rational planning for the 
realization of one’s ends, rather than impulse, dictates sexual decisions, then the agent 
might be in the clear if Kant overstated the disorganizing force of desire. For Raja Halwani, 
some sex workers might thus not fall afoul of Kantian dignity, although people who cannot 
stop looking at Internet pornography probably do.152 
Other scholars argue that Kant is not Kantian enough in his treatment of sex.153 In 
some writings, Kant more explicitly argues that emotions and inclinations are formative 
of—not simply hostile to—autonomy and reasoning capacity, but that such emotions and 
inclinations must be mastered by reason.154 
Whether the critique of Kant’s sex is empirical155 or immanent,156 temperance, rather 
than marriage, seems to be the saving liberal grace for sex. Subjects capable of moderating, 
mastering, and integrating their sexual desires into their life plans are redeemed as dignified 
and autonomous subjects.157 
151 See, e.g., halwani, supra note 135, at 200–25; nuSSbaum, Sex, supra note 142, at 224–39; Denis, supra 
note 147; Madigan supra note 140.
152 halwani, supra note 135, at 209. 
153 See Denis, supra note 147. 
154 Id. at 42–46 (citing passages from Kant’s œuvre which suggest that “Kant’s moral theory engenders 
acceptance of and concern for one’s animal nature”). 
155 See, e.g., halwani, supra note 135, at 224 (“Kant was right to detect something especially suspicious 
about  sex,  leading  him  to  worry  about  objectification.  But  Kant  exaggerated,  and,  though  we  should  not 
underestimate the power of the sexual drive, it can be controlled by reason.”); nuSSbaum, Sex, supra note 142, 
at 238–39 (“Denial of autonomy and denial of subjectivity are objectionable if they persist throughout an adult 
relationship, but as phases in a relationship characterized by mutual regard they can be all right, or even quite 
wonderful . . . . [W]e have some reasons by now to doubt Kant’s account, according to which the baneful form 
of use is inherent in sexual desire and activity themselves.”). 
156 See, e.g., Denis, supra note 147, at 46 (“A virtuous Kantian agent . . . will see her body as an extension 
and a condition of her agency; she will appreciate her animal nature for its reason-supporting role.”). 
157 See supra notes 155–156; for a Kantian-inflected but mostly Aristotelian brief on/for sexual moderation, 
see Raja Halwani, Sexual Temperance and Intemperance, in Sex & ethiCS, supra note 147, at 122, 128 
(“[P]eople become slavish by, tersely put, turning their reason into an instrument of their desires. Because 
they are ruled by their desires, they employ their reason to secure, or try to secure, pleasures. Hence, there is a 
danger to our health from excessive sexual pursuits.”). 
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This reconciliation of autonomy with sex may nonetheless offer little for women, 
people of color, minors, and persons with disabilities—those historically (if inconsistently) 
associated as categorically immoderate, overwhelmed by their desires, and too susceptible 
to  others’  influence.158 Kant, for one, states that only white Europeans are capable of 
achieving full autonomy, as all others lack the maturity and rationality to self-legislate.159 
And insofar as Kant’s writings on education focus on the cultivation of boys’ autonomy, it 
seems girls and women are mostly ineligible as well.160
Autonomy premised upon rational reflection, even emptied of substantive criteria and 
(thus) disarmed against sex, can nonetheless be invidious for persons with disabilities too. 
Consider Gerald Dworkin: “what makes an individual the particular person he is is his life-
plan, his projects. In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one’s life, one constructs its meaning. 
The autonomous person gives meaning to his life”;161 or “our conception of a person is of 
a creature who possesses this capacity [to “reflect upon” and “shape” his life] above some 
158 See, e.g., holly brewer, by birth or ConSent: Children, law, & the anGlo-ameriCan revolution in 
authority 341–43 (2005); liCia CarlSon, the FaCeS oF intelleCtual diSability: PhiloSoPhiCal reFleCtionS 
105-24 (2009) (rehearsing—and critiquing for their overgeneralizations—dominant philosophical assessments 
of intellectual disabilities); raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 46 (“Autonomy becomes an exclusive category by 
denying the political agency of the girl; she lacks autonomy and therefore must be subject to political authority 
and the management of her body.”); Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 Cardozo J.l. & 
Gender 715, 727  (2013)  (“Children are by definition excluded from the club of  liberal citizenship because 
the status of citizen  is defined  in opposition  to childhood as a place of autonomy and agency.”); Russell P. 
Shuttleworth, Disability and Sexuality: Toward a Constructionist Focus on Access in the Inclusion of Disabled 
People in the Sexual Rights Movement, in Sexual ineQualitieS & SoC. JuSt. 174, 184 (Niels Tunis & Gilbert 
Herd eds.,  2007)  (“Sexuality  as  a  reflexive project  of  the  self  relies on  the  rhetoric of  autonomy and  self-
sufficiency. Those who  fail  to find  a  sexual  partner  in  the  sanctioned  self-sufficient ways  are  thus open  to 
negative judgment.”). For a contemporary, pernicious rendering of women as heteronomous and unthinking, 
see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, 
it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once 
created and sustained . . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”). 
159 Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 4; see also raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 115–16 (“Kant’s 
anthropology divides humans into four categories of descending autonomy, from white Europeans to Native 
Americans.”). 
160 Kant, eduCation, supra note 112, at 26, 44, 53; see also raSmuSSen, supra note 116, at 31 (“[Kant] 
discusses ‘hardening the child’ to prevent him from becoming too ‘effeminate’ . . . . As the language of 
effeminacy suggests, while Kant is interested in the political education of children, boys, as the future citizens, 
are his primary concern.”). 
161 dworKin, supra note 62, at 31. 
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particular level”;162 or “moral respect is owed to all because all have (assuming we are 
dealing with normal persons, not defective or incompetent in serious ways) the capacity 
for autonomous development.”163 Notice this sort of autonomy has little to do with heeding 
self-legislated universal maxims, not instrumentalizing others, or even insuring reason 
against (sexual) inclinations. Yet still, Dworkin’s (salvaged Kantian) autonomy would 
refuse persons with disabilities moral respect (quotation #3), particularity (quotation #1), 
and even personhood (quotation #2). 
One way to rebut these categorical exclusions from the autonomy club is to argue that 
women, people of color, and persons with disabilities are morally complex, too (or, as 
Rousseau criticized Plato, to make women “men”).164 Another is to level down the criteria 
for autonomy.165 In philosophic, feminist, and critical race discourses, both strategies 
have been pursued, but when it comes to sex law and to liberal legal theory regarding the 
regulation of sex, the latter strategy has triumphed: autonomy has come to mean choice, 
as  reflected  in  and  dispatched  through  consent.166 Certainly, the shift in emphasis from 
self-definition to self-determination has not occurred because theorists and jurists believe 
people of color, women, and persons with disabilities to be nonrational and appetitive. If 
anything, the general conceit among liberal legal theorists of autonomy is that none of us 
do, can, or should reach the threshold of purified, practical rationality Kant so prized.167 
And in fact, the conflation of autonomy with consent and the subsequent normative defense 
of both have been deployed to better protect women from unwanted sex. As we will see 
in the next section though, the diminishment of autonomy to consent may leave in place, 
 
162 Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added). 
163 Id. at 111. 
164 Jean-JaCQueS rouSSeau, emile, or on eduCation 362 (Allan Bloom trans., 1979); see also raSmuSSen, 
supra note 116, at 46. For eloquent reclamations of autonomy for racially and sexually minoritized populations, 
see, e.g., m. JaCQui alexander, PedaGoGieS oF CroSSinG: meditationS on FeminiSm, Sexual PolitiCS, memory, 
and the SaCred 21–65 (2005); JaFari S. allen, ¡venCeremoS? the erotiCS oF blaCK SelF-maKinG in Cuba 14 
(2011).
165 See SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 105 (“A person can be autonomous only if she has mental competence, 
an awareness of her options, and sufficient information to be able to choose intelligently between the possibilities 
that external conditions make available.”).
166 See supra Part I; infra Part II.B.
167 Kant, GroundworK, supra note 23, at 23; see also Abrams, supra note 128, at 807–13 (rehearsing 
prominent liberal legal theorists’ glosses on autonomy, which all, to varying degrees, avow the social/relational 
constitution of the self). 
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or even buttress, the expulsion of persons with disabilities (and minors) from the ambit of 
sexual autonomy. 
So sexual autonomy, reconciled through an appeal to what we might call procedural 
over substantive moderation, no longer appears a contradiction in terms, as it seems from 
Kant’s gloss on sex. Yet, given the insistence on temperance and rationality as sex’s alibis, 
poststructuralist, feminist, queer, and disability scholars nonetheless worry about the kind 
of subject presumed eligible for autonomy: the atomistic, “unmoved mover,” uninfluenced 
by emotions, obligations, or care for others. Should autonomy even be an ideal worth 




B. Sexual Autonomy Thinned: Schulhofer 
In Unwanted Sex, Stephen Schulhofer sidesteps these enduring questions in his 
advocacy for sexual autonomy as a governing principle for rape law.170 Instead of dwelling 
on temperance and rationality, he focuses on individual choice and choice structure.171 
He seemingly—but only seemingly172—lowers or all but eliminates  the “self-definition” 
side of autonomy (who, or what kind of subject, is eligible) while valuing up the self-
determination side (who or what a subject can choose).173
Schulhofer proffers at least three reasons for his normative slide from self-definition 
to self-determination in his defense of sexual autonomy. First, his is an intervention into 
168 See infra Part IV.A.
169 For alternative abstractions of the human that ground more expansive models of social justice, see, 
e.g., martha albertSon Fineman, the autonomy myth: a theory oF dePendenCy (2004); eva Feder Kittay, 
love’S labor (1999); nuSSbaum, Sex, supra note 142; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: 
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 yale J.l. & FeminiSm 1 (2008); B. Honig, Rawls on Politics 
and Punishment, 46 Pol. reS. Q. 99 (1993); Satz, supra note 27. For a critique of these abstractions as they 
pertain to disability and debility, see Joseph Fischel, Against Nature, Against Consent: A Sexual Politics of 
Debility, 24 diFFerenCeS 55, 84–90 (2013). 
170 SChulhoFer, supra note 24. 
171 Id. at 112.
172 Id. at 99–101; see infra Part II.B.1. 
173 Id. at 108–09.
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a particular (and particularly vexed) vector of criminal law, and he contends, persuasively 
enough, that “legal and philosophical conceptions of autonomy are not identical.”174 In other 
words, autonomy as a protected right may and should mean something other than autonomy 
as a moral attribute of the human. Second, in what seems to be a direct counterclaim against 
the Kantian conception of autonomy, Schulhofer refuses the notion that the choices of 
the autonomous subject must be self-generating or uninfluenced by others.175 Our choices 
are all a bit heteronomous—autonomy is in the act of choosing, uncoerced. So too, such 
choices need not pass the categorical imperative test. By “deciding for herself what goals 
[are] valuable,” the subject performs autonomy, even if those goals entail non-marital 
sex, earning money for sex, rough sex, and so forth.176 Schulhofer defends such activities 
against certain feminist legal theorists’ (Lois Pineau and Martha Chamallas’) proposed 
reforms that would narrow the permissible motivations for consensual sex, and he likewise 
rejects Kantian, content-based criteria for autonomous action.177 Third, Schulhofer wants 
the centrality of first person choice to withstand strands of second wave feminist thought 
that, as he perceives them, implicate heterosexual sex as coercive tout court (e.g., Catharine 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin).178 While Schulhofer concedes that “background 
conditions”—conditions like economic dependency, cultural norms, and employment 
discrimination—may impede women’s sexual autonomy, he insists, convincingly, that 
only individual behavior ought to be actionable under sexual misconduct law.179 The slide 
from self-definition to self-determination suggests,  for example, permitting commercial, 
consensual sex between adults,180 while proscribing a high school principal’s conditioning 
a student’s graduation on their having sex.181
174 Id. at 105.
175 Id. at 106.
176 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 86.
177 Id. at 84–88 (citing Chamallas, supra note 34; see also Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 
l. & Phil. 271 (1989)).
178 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 109.
179 Id. at 108–10 (citing andrea dworKin, interCourSe (1987); Catharine a. maCKinnon, toward a 
FeminiSt theory oF the State (1989)). 
180 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 87.
181 Id. at 196 (“[I]f a teacher initiates contact with a minor, his advances should always be presumed 
unwelcome, and the teachers should be subject to dismissal, along with personal damage liability for sexual 
harassment.”). 
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Schulhofer’s premium on choice and the integrity of the choosing subject generates 
overlapping definitions of sexual autonomy throughout Unwanted Sex. Sexual autonomy, 
he writes, is: the “right to self-determination in matters of sexual life”;182 “every person’s 
right to control the boundaries of his or her own sexual experience”;183 the “right to 
determine  the boundaries of our own sexual  lives”  (notice  the present active  infinitives 
elemental  to  these definitions); 184 “a woman’s right to control her own sexual choices” 
(this  is  the  definition  Rubenfeld  so  handily  dismantles—who  is  in  full  control  of  her 
sexual choices, asks Rubenfeld, if full control necessitates perfect and perfectly true 
information?);185 and finally, “the  freedom of every person  to decide whether and when 
to engage  in  sexual  relations”  (this definition seems  to  relax  the  requirement of perfect 
and perfectly true information regarding one’s sexual partner, but Schulhofer’s advocacy 
of  affirmative  consent  seems  to  reinstall  the  requirement,  his  expressed  ambivalences 
about criminalizing sexual deception notwithstanding). 186 In Schulhofer’s reconstruction, 
any expressed preference (of adult, able-minded persons) is autonomous because sexual 
autonomy is expressed preference about sex. 
Schulhofer’s thinned notion of sexual autonomy as sexual self-determination propels 
three reforms to criminal sexual assault statutes. First, Schulhofer eliminates force and 
resistance requirements of rape law (or rather, he adds gradations to sexual assault law 
premised on nonconsent, rather than resistance or force; many jurisdictions both nationally 
and internationally have adopted and continue to adopt such reforms).187 Second and 
subsequently, Schulhofer’s sexual autonomy requires a more robust standard of consent 
as voluntary, freely given, and affirmative, rather than as silent, acquiescent, or coerced.188 
An affirmative consent standard better tracks persons’ expressed wants over their reluctant 
concessions;  expressed  wants  reflect  voluntary  choices  which  in  turn  reflect,  without 
remainder, sexual autonomy.189 Third, sexual autonomy demands heightened regulation and 
182 Id. at 11.
183 Id. at 15. 
184 Id. at 16.
185 Id. at 69; Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1417–18. 
186 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 99, 152–59; see Rubenfeld, Riddle, supra note 16, at 1404–05, 1407.
187 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 283–84. 
188 Id. at 267–73.
189 Id. at 269; see id. at 273 (“By requiring affirmative permission . . . we can insist that any person who 
engages in intercourse show full respect for the other person’s autonomy.”); id. at 283 (“Consent . . . means 
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sometimes prohibition of sex in relations of dependence where consent may be too easily 
coerced: bosses and employees, teachers and students, psychotherapists and patients.190 
For Schulhofer, such restrictions on sex are not premised on the fact of status differentials 
themselves, but on the likelihood of unduly polluted consent within those differentials.191 
1. Sexual Autonomy’s Stubborn Eligibility Requirements
Adult women  are  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  Schulhoferian  sexual  autonomy:  the 
purpose of the proposed reforms in Unwanted Sex is to better protect women and women’s 
sexual choices. 
Minors and persons with intellectual disabilities are not main characters in Unwanted 
Sex. More importantly, when they do appear they do not fare well. Schulhoferian sexual 
autonomy, it turns out, may be more inhospitable to minors and persons with intellectual 
disabilities than Kantian autonomy. Peppered through Unwanted Sex are  figurations  of 
minors and persons with intellectual disabilities as, perhaps unwittingly, the constitutive 
outer limits for sexual autonomy. When Schulhofer tells us, approvingly, that “only rarely 
does the law seek to punish the uncoerced choices of mature adults,” we begin to see who 
will pay the price for this newfound sexual autonomy.192 He asserts without argument that 
“teenaged prostitutes” lack the “capacity to make competent decisions.”193 He states, as if a 
predicative and not a postulate of sexual autonomy, that “if a fifteen-year-old girl initiates a 
 . . . actual words or conduct indicating affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”). 
190 Id. at 168–253.
191 Id. at 162.
A proposal that puts our rights at risk is coercive even when we have other choices . . . . 
An illegitimate sexual proposal should be considered coercive—whether or not the woman 
who is targeted has other options—if turning it down can leave her worse off . . . . If [a 
supermodel] agrees to a film producer’s proposal to exchange sex for fame and riches, she 
was, in a sense, free to do otherwise . . . . What the woman may prefer, however, is a third 
option—the chance to compete for the film role on fair terms, without sexual submission. 
The film producer constrains her decision by foreclosing this choice.
SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 162. Schulhofer carves out an exception for minors. No matter how much a 
teenager under eighteen wants to have sex with her teacher, supervisor, etc., the sex is proscribed, and not 
because consent is likely polluted, but because teenagers, he assumes, are unable to consent. Id. at 101, 283. 
192 Id. at 86. 
193 Id. at 87.
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sexual encounter with a twenty-year-old man, he violates her autonomy by having sex with 
her” because of “her incapacity.”194 And Schulhofer equates minority status with disability 
only to eject both from autonomy: “intercourse with an apparently willing fifteen-year-old 
or with a mentally incompetent woman is not prohibited because the [assailant] is a potential 
killer; it is prohibited because the preconditions for meaningful choice are absent.”195 
Moreover, Schulhofer’s Model Criminal Statute for Sexual Offenses adopts the retired 
language of the Connecticut Penal Code: “(c) Consent is not freely given . . . whenever: (1) 
the victim is physically helpless, mentally defective, or mentally incapacitated.”196 
So it appears sexual relations with teens and the disabled are categorically banned. 
These subjects are rendered incapable of meaningful choice and self-determination, and 
one gets the sense that they must be for this revisionist sexual autonomy to be cogent.197 By 
focusing exclusively on individual choice as the nexus for sexual autonomy—even while 
thinning  the  self-definition  prerequisites  left  over  from  Kant—Schulhofer  rhetorically 
and normatively relies upon a clean distinction between competence and incompetence, 
meaningful and illegitimate choice.
  
194 Id. at 111. 
195 Id. at 102.
196 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 283. 
197 Id. at 101.
Violent threats are just one possible source of a defect in consent, and the law already 
recognizes a few others in the contexts of sexual relations. The best-known example is 
immaturity: the law has long prohibited consensual intercourse with a girl who is below 
the legally prescribed age of consent. The law likewise punishes acts of intercourse with a 
woman who is sleeping, unconscious, mentally incompetent, or unaware that a sexual act is 
being performed . . . . In these instances we do not say that consent was obtained by force. 
The man’s conduct is illegal because valid consent was never obtained at all.
Id. (emphasis added). Notice the chain of equivalences from immaturity to consciousness to competence, as 
if all are binary existential categories. Notice too how the “legally prescribed age of consent” seamlessly 
reflects and summarily  resolves “immaturity.” Laws regulating sex across age have a checkered, gendered, 
and generally unsavory history, and have only recently been  justified by minors’ presumptive  incapacity  to 
consent. See, e.g., Carolyn e. CoCCa, Jailbait: the PolitiCS oF Statutory raPe lawS in the united StateS 
9–28 (2004); FiSChel, supra note 21; eStelle b. Friedman, redeFininG raPe: Sexual violenCe in the era oF 
SuFFraGe and SeGreGation 125–56 (2013); matthew waiteS, the aGe oF ConSent: younG PeoPle, Sexuality, 
and CitizenShiP (2005). 
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We want to make clear that we are not arguing that all minors and all persons with 
intellectual disabilities should have an unfettered right to wanted sex. But the ease with 
which Schulhofer writes off these characters from autonomy’s reach is troubling and 
telling. It seems as though, in order to make adult choice carry all the normative and 
morally transformative weight Schulhofer wants it to, these other characters are rendered 
immediately, unquestionably, and without any distinctions, ineligible for autonomy. 
Anything other than able-minded adult choice is heteronomous choice and can therefore 
be supervened by law. And whereas Kant sees autonomy as cultivated in and teachable to 
young (admittedly male) subjects, Schulhofer’s down-staging of background conditions, 
cultural context, and social structure ultimately dehistoricize and atomize his subjects.198 
Autonomy is thing-like, and there (or not) on arrival: either you have it or should (adult 
women) or you do not have it and cannot (minors and persons with intellectual disabilities). 
Indeed, it is this ascendancy of first person choice and its attendant binaries (rationality/
irrationality, capacity/incapacity, adult/minor, abled/disabled) that may underlie well-
intentioned but potentially regressive political campaigns to shield L.K. (the alleged victim 
of Fourtin) and similarly situated persons from sex.199 
C. Sexual Autonomy Thickened: Nedelsky
Unlike Kant’s meditations on autonomy, Jennifer Nedelsky’s Law’s Relations severs 
autonomy from both “independence” and “control.”200 Because Nedelsky understands the 
self as multidimensional, relational, and (variably) dependent on others, independence and 
control are neither possible nor desirable. Independence and control are bad aspirations. 
Independence, were it achievable, would lead to both an impoverished and isolated 
existence.201 And total control ultimately necessitates domination.202 Attempting to master 
intimate relations, social scenes, and political bodies implicates a refusal of receptivity to 
others’ creativity, spontaneity, and input; control requires the refusal of others’ autonomy.203 
And because we are relational beings, because we become autonomous through 
“constructive relations,” dependency may be exemplary of autonomy. Those relations 
198 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 108–09; supra note 112 and accompanying text.
199 See infra Part III.C.
200 See nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 118–19, 163, 285 (“[We are] embodied beings who participate in creating 
ourselves and our world but control neither.”).
201 Id. at 145. 
202 Id. at 279. 
203 Id. at 297–98. 
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that are explicitly or particularly dependent—say between a teacher and student—reflect 
acutely how intersubjectivity amplifies autonomous action.204 
And unlike Schulhofer’s Unwanted Sex, Nedelsky points to broader social restructuring 
for the realization of autonomy.205 Autonomy, like subjects themselves, is realized 
through relations, textured through emotion and care.206 This means that state-sanctioned 
relations like marriage, for example, which might otherwise be understood as a threat to 
autonomy (mandating commitments and obligations), can be reconceived as a condition 
of possibility for autonomy.207 Thus relationally reconceived, autonomy is not merely a 
right to be let alone.208 As entailing but not synonymous with the “capacity for creative 
interaction” with others, autonomy requires positive provisions and state support, not 
merely noninterference.209 
Poignantly, Nedelsky writes, “I see autonomy as the core of a capacity to engage 
in the ongoing, interactive creation of our selves—our relational selves.”210 Nedelsky 
qualifies that she takes this “capacity for creative interaction” as “just one component”211 
of autonomy, but it is nonetheless a “key”212 one. For Nedelsky, the “creative” of creative 
interaction refers to human thought and action that generate something new, unpredicted, 
and not routinized.213 The “interaction” of creative interaction nods to her notion of the self 
204 Id. at 152, 305.
205 See id. 
206 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 5, 118–19; see also marilyn Friedman, autonomy, Gender, PolitiCS 95 
(2003) (“[R]elationships of certain sorts are necessary for the realization of autonomy whereas relationships of 
certain other sorts can be irrelevant or positively detrimental to it . . . . Social relationships can either promote 
or hinder the development of autonomy competency.”). 
207 See Ball, supra note 124, at 302–03. But see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“[O]ne would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask 
the nearest hippie.”).
208 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 97, 105; see also Ball, supra note 124, at 311. 
209 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 31, 45, 74–75. 
210 Id. at 45.
211 Id. at 166. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 48. Nedelsky writes:
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 46330.2
as relational. Autonomy materializes with and because of others. Even famed inventors and 
entrepreneurs of American lore are supported by a set of “nested relations.” 214 (In Part IV, 
it will be useful for readers to think of sex itself as a form of creative interaction). 215 
Earlier, we traced the notion of autonomy as self-definition (e.g., Kant) to autonomy 
as self-determination (e.g., Schulhofer).216 Nedelsky lobbies for “self-creation” over “self-
determination.”217 The latter, she suggests, obscures the many ways we are “determined” 
by forces outside ourselves, and clings to the fiction of the rational agent whose choices 
summarily govern her life course.218 The former values up human inventiveness and 
imagination but without disavowing our social enmeshment. Nedelsky’s shift to “self-
creation” follows from her shift to the “multidimensional self.”219 As opposed to the rational 
agent presupposed by Anglo-American law (whose rational agency is the guarantor of her 
equality),220 Nedelsky’s subject is affective, embodied, and relational.221 Self-creation is not 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the intellect but registers through all sorts of human activity. 
Nedelsky’s reconstruction of autonomy resonates with Anna Yeatman’s advocacy for 
The positive dimension of the Western attachment to autonomy has to do with this capacity 
to undertake, to envision something new, to do something surprising, to shift the terms of 
relations . . . . All of that requires a capacity not to be bound by existing patterns of thought, 
institutions, or relationships. It requires a capacity . . . to be imaginative and innovative, 
to shift things slightly to create a moment of joy so that they suit one better, or improve 
things for others.
Id.
214 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 45; see also Live Smart Videos, “Elizabeth Warren on Debt Crisis, Fair 
Taxation,” youtube (Sept. 18, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htX2usfqMEs [http://perma.cc/ 
9RKK-SJFL].
215 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 45; see also LiveSmartVideos, supra note 214.
216 See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
217 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 167. 
218 Id. at 162–67. However, we recognize that “self-determination” has served as a core political value for, 
and rhetorical petition of, the disability rights movement. See JameS i. Charlton, nothinG about uS without 
uS 17 (2000). 
219 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 160. 
220 Id. at 162. 
221 Id. at 158. 
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persons with disabilities to participate more fully in their own lives.222 Like Nedelsky, 
Yeatman rejects the equivalence of autonomy with independence and rejects too 
independence as a prerequisite for participation.223 She suggests instead that “participation” 
“enables people to be and become autonomous individuals within their social words and 
connections.”224 Participation, as Yeatman understands it, refers to “whether an individual 
is invited to be and become his or her own agent . . . . ”225 Under this definition, all sorts 
of people can participate in the course of their own lives, including people “who cannot 
achieve independence . . . children and individuals whose level of intellectual disability 
means that they cannot reason on their own behalf.”226 Synopsizing the contributions of 
other disability scholars, Yeatman argues that upping the participation level of persons 
with intellectual disabilities entails, inter alia: encouraging such persons to practice making 
choices; providing “support people” to offer “appropriate guidance and information for 
choice making”;227 and specialized interpreting of persons with disabilities’ communicative 
behavior (which is too often rendered as nonsense).228 Thus, social restructuring facilitates 
participation, participation facilitates autonomous action, and autonomous action 
“facilitate[s] the individuation of individuals,” individuation Yeatman takes as morally 
paramount.229 While Yeatman’s chain of equivalences (participation = autonomy = 
individuality) is not philosophically substantiated as rigorously as Nedelsky’s reworking 
of autonomy, both authors point to autonomy as a normative ideal predicated neither on 
independence nor reason, but rather on creative capacity and participation.230 
Evidently, Nedelsky’s reconstruction (and Yeatman’s unsupported but appealing 
redefinition) of autonomy bodes far better than either Schulhofer’s or Kant’s for persons 
222 Anna Yeatman, What Can Disability Tell Us About Participation?, in exPlorationS on law and 
diSability in auStralia 181, 181 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 2000). Nedelsky aligns her 
relational autonomy with Yeatman’s appeal for social participation. nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 27. 
223 Yeatman, supra note 222, at 182, 190, 195. 
224 Id. at 182.
225 Id. at 183.
226 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 183; see also Charlton, supra note 218, at 21–22. 
227 Yeatman, supra note 222, at 191.
228 Id. at 190–92.
229 Id. at 196. 
230 However, Nedelsky cautions against collapsing autonomy into participation, as the latter can be purely 
procedural and the former is a “substantive value.” nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 149, 151. 
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with intellectual disabilities. This is in part because, as Nedelsky advises, “those who value 
autonomy (e.g., Kant, Schulhofer) must not simply posit it as a human characteristic (e.g., 
Schulhofer) but also inquire into the conditions for its flourishing.”231 
So also unlike Schulhofer, but like Kant, Nedelsky is attentive to autonomy as a 
human achievement that must be nourished through social relations. That fact—that 
autonomy requires investment, care, and “constructive relations”—explains why Nedelsky 
focuses more on administrative law (to restructure background social conditions) whereas 
Schulhofer focuses more on criminal law (to prevent or punish interference with already-
autonomous agents).232 That fact also explains why Nedelsky’s examples of statutory 
reforms that “foster autonomy” include a guaranteed annual income neither means-tested 
nor conditioned by unannounced state surveillance;233 legislation that facilitates parents’ 
greater involvement in educational policies affecting their disabled children’s lives;234 and 
revisions to Canadian sexual assault law that relaxed mens rea as an element of the crime235 
(consent or nonconsent are now determined under a “standard of reasonableness”). 236 These 
sorts of reforms, argues Nedelsky, structure social relations in such a way that permit and 
promote a greater degree of autonomy across a larger and more diverse population.237  
But contra Kant, Nedelskian autonomy is not pegged to rationality, nor is it available 
only  to  the  fiction  of  the  rational  agent.  For  Kant,  training  toward  autonomy  involves 
management of body by mind, and self-legislation through powers of reason.238 For 
Nedelsky, training toward autonomy involves supporting relations of care and dependence 
that allow persons’ capacity for creativity to flourish.239 Under a Nedelsky register (as under 
a Yeatman register), dependents—children, the elderly, and most pertinently, persons with 
intellectual disabilities—can or could, with the help of others, be autonomous to some 
231 Id. at 167.
232 Id. at 157.
233 Id. at 154–55.
234 Id. at 141–43. 
235 Yeatman, supra note 222, at 218–21.
236 Id. at 219.
237 See nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 315–17.
238 See supra notes 109–167 and accompanying text. 
239 See nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 54–56, 65–69, 167.
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degree, provided autonomy is linked to embodied creativity and delinked to disembodied 
rationality.240 So persons with intellectual disabilities may be capable of achieving some 
degree of autonomy, but that achievement is guaranteed through social, not just subject, 
transformation. While Nedelsky does not reference disabilities too often or too deeply in 
Law’s Relations, one example is telling. She recalls a colleague’s story of a quadriplegic 
Swedish law student who “was entitled to four attendants who, on a rotational basis, cared 
for her twenty-hours a day so that she was able to attend law school and did not have to rely 
on her family for care.”241 For Nedelsky, this scenario is exemplary of relational autonomy, 
of state action that structures relations so that all persons—the student, the student’s family 
members, and the student’s attendants—are institutionally buoyed to act autonomously. 
The  story  references  a  physical,  not  intellectual,  disability,  but  it  is  not  difficult  to 
imagine analogous restructuring of relations that enhance the autonomy of persons with 
intellectual disabilities. Yeatman, as we saw, calls for restructuring relations for persons 
with intellectual disabilities to enhance their autonomy in social life.242 Martha Nussbaum 
calls for restructuring relations for persons with intellectual disabilities to enhance their 
autonomy in political life.243 In Part IV, we will call for restructuring relations for persons 
with disabilities to enhance their autonomy in erotic life.
However, just as Nedelsky and Yeatman warn that we cannot assume autonomy 
as a presocial, innate fact of able-minded adults, nor can we assume that every single 
human is capable of autonomous activity, were only relations restructured accordingly. 
The “capacity for creative interaction” is a “key component” of Nedelskian autonomy, 
but not the only one.244 For Nedelsky also takes the etymology seriously, and suggests 
autonomy is “finding one’s own  law,” abiding “commands  that one recognizes as one’s 
own, requirements that constrain one’s life but come from the meaning or purpose of 
240 Id. at 162–66, 168–73.
241 Id. at 192–93. 
242 See supra notes 223–229 and accompanying text. 
243 Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 25, at 86–94. Nussbaum grounds her argument for political 
inclusion of persons with severe intellectual disabilities through recourse to “dignity” and “equal respect,” not 
“autonomy,” but the extant injustice she identifies, id. at 91, registers as a deprivation of autonomy, relationally 
reconstructed: “at present, a large group of citizens are simply disqualified from the most essential functions of 
citizenship. They do not count. Their interests are not weighed in the balance.” Id.
244 See supra notes 210–213 and accompanying text.
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one’s life.”245 This law need not be Kant’s rationally deduced categorical imperative,246 
but finding one’s own law presupposes a minimal degree of self-consciousness. To “act 
autonomously” is to “see situations clearly, make good judgments, and feel competent to 
act.”247 Even Yeatman, for whom participation cum autonomy is thinned to persons having 
a “voice,” if not complete “choice,” over their social lives and interactions,248 stipulates that 
participation is conditioned in part on the individual [achieving] a sense of self that permits 
him or her to own his or her self-action.”249 We must confront the reality that not all people 
can (ever) find their own law, make good judgments, or even achieve a sense of self.
We admit this limitation to rein in any utopic or hedonic misreading of our argument. 
We are not sure L.K. could ever conduct autonomous or sexually autonomous action; but 
the point is to build the world so that everyone at least has a shot at (sexual) autonomy, and 
is not categorically precluded from a more flourishing life. 
D. Sexual Autonomy as the Capability to Codetermine Sexual Relations
In light of our critiques of Kantian autonomy of the will and Schulhofer’s sexual 
autonomy, and in light of Nedelsky’s reconceived relational autonomy, we define sexual 
autonomy as the capability to codetermine sexual relations. Below, we defend our 
selection of the term “capability” over “capacity,” describe what we do and do not mean by 
“codetermination”, and roughly delineate the parameters of “sexual” in sexual autonomy.250 
245 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 123.
246 Id. at 403 n.16. 
247 Id. at 141. 
248 Yeatman, supra note 222, at 187–88.
249 Id. at 181.
250 Judith Butler argues that the rupturing element of what we term gender or sexuality belies any 
resignification of autonomy, even of the relational sort (i.e., what “relational autonomy” patches over is the very 
psychical dispossession that is elemental to desire/gender/sexuality/grief). Judith butler, undoinG Gender 
17–34 (2004). But Butler’s staging of vulnerability/precarity/grievability against autonomy is persuasive only 
if we retreat to Kantian autonomy. Id. at 32. This claim against autonomy might make sense as a linguistic or 
metaphysical claim. Butler’s send-up of autonomy, though, is irrelevant to, or as she might say, “beside” law. 
Id. at 20, 25. Despite her own reservations on sexual autonomy and its implications for our understandings of 
subjectivity and subject formation, Butler emphasizes repeatedly that, under liberal legal regimes, we “must” 
mobilize autonomy for the protection of minoritized genders and sexualities. Id. at 19, 20, 21, 32. This is not 
strategic essentialism; this is about surviving and thriving. Id. at 21. 
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1. Capability
Unlike other autonomy theorists, we emphasize “capability” over “capacity.” In 
common parlance this might be a distinction without a difference, but theoretical expositions 
of autonomy “capacity” veers us toward determinations of individual competencies and 
toward categorical qualifications and disqualifications; “capability” veers us to institutional 
reforms, statutory provisions, and alternative divisions of labor and play that cultivate 
human (sexual) flourishing. While Nedelsky’s conception of autonomy includes a “capacity 
for creative interaction” that can and ought to be enhanced through legal and institutional 
restructuring, capacity is more often associated with the supposed internal constitution of 
the subject.251 Despite Nedelsky’s measured reservations with the individualistic aspects 
of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach (CA) to social justice,252 it strikes us that 
“capability” as Nussbaum specifies  the  term more adequately directs us  to  the kinds of 
reforms Nedelsky’s ecological accounting of autonomy as a “key component of a core 
human value” would require.253 
 Nussbaum’s CA, developed from Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities in global 
economics, is a model of social justice offered against, although indebted to, John 
Rawls’ justice as fairness. Disability and the fact of human dependency lead Nussbaum 
to reject Rawlsian justice.254 Rawls keys the “basic structure” of society to persons who 
Moreover, although the key terms/concepts of undoinG Gender are sexual autonomy, gender violence, 
sexual difference, survival, grief, unthinkability, gender as norm, and norm as reiterative practice, Butler 
never mentions rape. The closest Butler comes to addressing sexual assault is her canvassing of “sexual 
harassment.” Id. at 53–56. Butler argues, contra Catharine MacKinnon, that sexual harassment codes, rather 
than sexual harassment, install heterosexuality as gendered subordination and gender as binary. Id. at 54. This 
is an easy target (and misconstrues sexual harassment law, Title VII, and Title IX). More importantly, perhaps 
a different form of sexual autonomy materializes when the paradigmatic form of sex/gender injury is not, 
or not only, dignitarian violence aimed against LGBTI people (and so diminished autonomy correlates as 
diminished identity integrity), but also sexual violence aimed against women (and so diminished autonomy 
correlates as the diminished capability to codetermine sexual relations). At a minimum, Butler’s idiom of the 
“unthinkable”—of violence as a way to relocate persons off the grid of cultural legibility, id. at 35, 130, is 
questioned. Subordination and erasure are nonidentical injuries. 
251 See, e.g., supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
252 nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 30, 433 n.23 (“While I am at times troubled by the Rawlsian dimensions of 
some of Nussbaum’s later work, I find the Aristotelian aspects of her work (i.e., the focus on goals and goods 
as realized in activity) to be useful.”). 
253 Id. at 159.
254 See nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 127.
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are presumptively reasonable and rational, assumes persons’ collective enterprise will be 
mutually advantageous, and indexes well-being through material redistribution alone.255 
It  is  these  three  tenets,  especially  the first  two,  that  lead Rawls himself  to  suppose  that 
“justice as fairness” might “fail” for persons with severe disabilities, persons who might 
be objects of charity but not subjects of social justice.256 This conclusion is unacceptable 
for Nussbaum, who instead argues that the purpose of political institutions and distribution 
mechanisms is not to stabilize mutual advantage, but to guarantee a set of enumerated 
capabilities that realize our common human dignity. It is dignity, not reason or rationality, 
that bestows on humans equal moral worth.257 Nussbaum’s state is thus far more robust 
than Rawls’, responsible for providing meaningful opportunities across a range of social, 
educational, political, and economic dimensions for persons to reach a minimum threshold 
of predetermined capabilities.258
Sexual autonomy is not a central human capability for Nussbaum, and when Nussbaum 
discusses persons with intellectual disabilities she is concerned primarily with their 
educational, employment, and social accommodation259 and their political integration260—
not their erotic lives.261 But there is no prima facie reason sex, sexuality, and intimacy 
should be any less important, or any less possible, for persons with intellectual disabilities, 
than, say, attending school or voting. Insofar as Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities 
do include “being able to have good health, including reproductive health”; “[being] 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault[;] having opportunities for sexual 
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction”; “being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason[;] being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid 
nonbeneficial pain”; “to love those who love and care for us”; “to engage in various forms 
of social interaction”; and “being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities,” 
there seems to be more than enough material for a composite capability in sexual 
255 Id. at 167. 
256 Id. at 118, 120 (citing John rawlS, PolitiCal liberaliSm 21 (1996)); see also KuliCK & rydStröm, supra 
note 27, at 21, 280. 
257 nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 160. 
258 For a similar comparative analysis of Rawls’ and Nussbaum’s modeling of social justice and disability, 
see Fischel, supra note 169, at 87. 
259 nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 195–216.
260 Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 25, at 86–94.
261 See KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 22. 
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autonomy.262 Syllogistically: all humans are dignified to the degree they are equipped with 
such capabilities; sexual autonomy is such a capability; persons with disabilities morally 
deserve dignity by virtue of their humanity; and persons with disabilities are entitled to 
sexual autonomy as a capability cultivated through institutional support. Enshrining sexual 
autonomy as a non-fungible central human capability also means that the sexuality and 
erotic flourishing of persons with (and without) disabilities cannot be so readily trivialized 
in relation to other human needs, rights, and aspirations.263 
As Nussbaum and Nedelsky make clear, capabilities, including sexual autonomy, 
require institutional promotion and sociolegal restructuring.264 But the realization of 
capabilities also requires certain kinds of prevention. Insofar as sexual autonomy has a 
temporal element—the capability to generate and codetermine present and future sexual 
relations—there may be more defensible grounds to restrict some consensual sex. Certain 
sexual relations—say between nieces and uncles or daughters and mothers’ boyfriends—
and certain sexual conduct—say the eroticized removal of limbs—may so impermissibly 
impede codetermination that they confound sexual autonomy as a capability.265 Some 
activities damage functioning to such a great degree that they completely or severely 
corrode capability.266 Teachers cannot have sex with their students not because students 
 
262 nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 76–77 (emphases added); see also KuliCK & rydStröm, supra 
note 27, at 286 (arguing “three of [Nussbaum’s] capabilities . . . are directly relevant to disability and sexuality.” 
These are, for the authors, Bodily Integrity, Emotions, and Affiliation.); ChriStoPher a. riddle, diSability 
and JuStiCe: the CaPabilitieS aPProaCh in PraCtiCe 80 (2014) (“According to Nussbaum, sexual or romantic 
pleasures are things all individuals ought to have a genuine opportunity to pursue.”). 
263 See KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 285, 292. In an otherwise meticulous synthesis of the 
Capabilities Approach and disability accommodations, Christopher Riddle performs just such a trivialization 
of sex and sexuality. riddle, supra note 262, at 77–85. Among other (sympathetic) criticisms he levels at 
the CA, Riddle suggests that Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities ought to be ranked by moral priority to 
give guidance to theorists and policymakers. Id. at 42–44, 85. If the denial of opportunities to realize certain 
capabilities leads to “corrosive disadvantage”—damaged functioning in other arenas of social life—those 
capabilities are more important than others. Id. at 82. This may or may not be reasonable, but to evidence the 
point, Riddle characterizes “health” as a capability of highest moral importance (because unhealthiness infects 
so many other functionings) and opportunities for sexual satisfaction as relatively morally unimportant. riddle, 
supra note 262, at 82–85. Given the ignominious history of degrading or denying the sexuality of persons with 
disabilities, one would think Riddle might have selected other examples. 
264 See infra Part IV. 
265 See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.D. 
266 See, e.g., nuSSbaum, Sex, supra note 142, at 124–27 (arguing that female genital mutilation is wrong 
because it eviscerates the capability to sexually function). 
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cannot, categorically, consent, but because students cannot reasonably extricate themselves 
from the ensuing relation.267 Autassassinophilic sex might be restricted on the grounds 
that a dead self cannot codetermine future sexual relations.268 Spindelman’s other “sexual 
death-blow[s]”269 (like erotic, consensual cannibalism) are not the unfortunate byproducts 
of sexual autonomy, but may violate sexual autonomy relationally reconceived as a 
capability. 
2. Codetermination 
Codetermination is not synonymous with equality or reciprocity. Codetermination need 
not require equal abilities, education, experience, income, strength, and so forth between or 
among sexual agents.270 “The relational approach does not require a utopia of (impossible) 
relations of perfect equality.”271 Codetermination instead approximates that all parties can 
plan the existence, directions, and trajectories of their sexual relations. “Codetermination,” 
like “capacity for creative interaction,” avows the relationality at the heart of autonomy; 
not incidentally, codetermination sounds with Kantian respect for others’ aims and goals.272 
As a “capability,” such codetermination need not be actualized, its function not required 
for sexual justice and sexual autonomy.273 But codetermination must be possible. 
 
267 See Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 yale J.l. & FeminiSm 279, 318 
(2010). 
268 But see Lisa Downing, On the Limits of Sexual Ethics: The Phenomenology of Autassassinophilia, 8 
Sexuality & Culture 3 (2004); see also FiSChel, supra note 21. 
269 See Spindelman, Law, supra note 16, at 186.
270 The stipulation comports with Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, which “recommends, as a necessary 
condition of social justice, bringing all citizens above a rather ample threshold on each of the ten capabilities, 
not complete equalizing of all the capabilities.” Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 25, at 78. 
271  nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 303. 
272 See supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
273 See nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 79–80 (“many people who are willing to support a given 
capability as a fundamental entitlement would feel violated were the associated functioning made basic . . . . 
My own view is that people should be given ample opportunities to lead a healthy lifestyle, but the choices 
should be left up to them; they should not be penalized for unhealthy choices.”); see also Boni-Saenz, supra 
note 15, at 1226. 
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3. The “Sexual” in Sexual Autonomy
Kant’s autonomy is autonomy of the will, Schulhofer’s is sexual autonomy, and 
Nedelsky’s is relational. Ours is a relational approach to sexual autonomy. We place a 
premium on sexual choice and decision-making, but also step back from the immediacy 
of the sexual (or sexually assaultive) encounter to inquire about the laws, institutions, and 
social and educative practices that cultivate or diminish sexual autonomy. 
 We are reticent to restrictively define the sexual. As feminist, queer, and disability 
studies have made clear, the borders of the “sexual” are permeable, variable, historically and 
culturally contingent, not always genitalized but too often masculinist, and eroticized if not 
necessarily saturated by social inequality.274 For our purposes, it is sufficient to (under)define 
“sexual” conduct as conduct that generates or is intended to generate erotic pleasure. To 
avoid tautology, erotic pleasure can be understood as pleasure phenomenologically distinct 
from other sorts of embodied pleasures.275 And (sometimes) excepting masturbation, what 
is sexual is relationally determined between or among parties. Thus, whipping someone 
might be a) a homosocial prank, b) assault, or c) sexual, depending on the relations and the 
relational determination. 
Part IV delineates the kinds of legal and institutional reforms regarding sex, sexual 
violence, and disability that our reconstructed principle of sexual autonomy would promote. 
Part III momentarily shelves these considerations in order to revisit the facts, findings, and 
fallout of Fourtin in greater detail.
274  On the ways disability and disability studies render sex as polysemous (as queer studies would have 
liked to), see infra notes 550–554 and accompanying text. 
275  See, e.g., Linda Martín Alcoff, Dangerous Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Pedophilia, in 
FeminiSt interPretationS oF miChel FouCault 99, 127–28 (Susan J. Hekman ed., 1996): 
[T]he phenomenology of sex itself . . . involves uniquely sensitive, vulnerable, and 
psychically important areas of the body, a fact that persists across cultural differences. 
Thus sexual experiences have the capacity to impart crucial meanings concerning one’s 
body and, therefore, one’s self . . . . It is not that social context alone that makes sexual acts 
significant, but social context in relation to the phenomenology of embodiment.
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III. State v. Fourtin (2012)
A. Fourtin
On October 2, 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court held Richard Fourtin not guilty 
of sexual assault.276 The decision was a controversial end to a drawn-out case, and the story 
briefly ballooned in regional news and social media due to the outrage of commentators 
who saw Fourtin’s acquittal as a blow to disability rights.277 
Part III delineates the facts and case history of State v. Fourtin; the precedents and 
statutes that eventuated in Fourtin’s acquittal; and the public response to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court decision. After summarizing extant criticisms and relaying the legislative 
response to Fourtin, we offer a metacritique: by proposing to safeguard disabled victims 
of sexual assault like L.K. under the shelter of “physically helpless” and/or “mentally 
defective” statutory subsections, advocates and legislators may prematurely disqualify the 
sexual autonomy of all severely disabled adults. 278
At trial, the state alleged that the defendant, Richard Fourtin, sexually assaulted 
L.K., a twenty-five-year-old woman whose mother was Fourtin’s girlfriend at the time.279 
L.K. lives with cerebral palsy, mental retardation, and hydrocephalus. She is unable to 
verbally communicate or walk without assistance, but has a history of communicating with 
others by “gesturing and vocalizing and through the use of a communication board.”280 
The alleged assault took place in February 2006, at the victim’s home, which Fourtin was 
known to visit—usually accompanying his girlfriend, L.K.’s mother, referred to as “S.” 
Appearing “‘aggravated’ and ‘scared’”281 to a staff member of her adult day care program, 
L.K. communicated through gestures and her message board that Fourtin had sexually 
assaulted her. “A subsequent medical examination disclosed physical symptoms consistent 
with the complainant’s report that she had been sexually assaulted.”282
276 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674 (Conn. 2012).
277 See infra section III.B.
278 See infra notes 317–326 and accompanying text; Part III.C. 
279 Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 677.
280 Id. at 691.
281 State v. Fourtin, 982 A.2d 261, 264 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
282 Id. 
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The state charged Fourtin with sexual assault in the second degree283 and sexual assault 
in the fourth degree.284 The applicable subsections of both statutes extend protections to 
victims who are “physically helpless,” defined as “unconscious or  for  any other  reason 
. . . physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.”285 Although prosecutors 
presented evidence suggesting L.K. was able to communicate through gestures and 
limited vocalizations, they nonetheless argued that the victim was “physically helpless” 
due to her inability to verbally communicate, her dependence on others, and her “limited 
cognitive abilities.”286
Convicted under both statutes, Fourtin appealed, arguing that the state failed to present 
sufficient  evidence  to  prove  L.K.  was  “physically  helpless.”  The  appeal  asserted  “the 
complainant could communicate [displeasure] using various nonverbal methods, including 
screeching, biting, kicking and scratching” thereby proving her physical abilities (or her non-
helplessness, as it were).287 In 2009, the Connecticut Appellate Court overturned Fourtin’s 
conviction: L.K.’s nonverbal communication in commonplace, nonsexual circumstances 
contravened a  jury finding of physical helplessness.288 The intermediary court was “not 
persuaded that the state produced any credible evidence that the complainant was either 
unconscious or so uncommunicative that she was physically incapable of manifesting to 
the defendant her lack of consent to sexual intercourse at the time of the alleged sexual 
assault.”289
In 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the state appellate court’s ruling in 
a  4-3  decision,  affirming  that  the  statutory  definition  of  “physically  helpless”  excludes 
L.K.290 Like the appellate ruling, the state supreme court majority cites as precedent State 
v. Hufford, which acquitted an emergency medical technician of sexual assault.291 Although 
283 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-71(a)(3) (West 2015).
284 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-73(a)(1)(C) (West 2015).
285 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-65(6) (West 2015).
286 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 688–89 (Conn. 2012). 
287 State v. Fourtin, 982 A.2d 261, 266 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
288 Id. at 266.
289 Id. at 267.
290 Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 689–90. 
291 State v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 866 (Conn. 1987). 
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Hufford’s alleged victim was “restrained on a stretcher” while being “transported to the 
hospital,” Hufford’s conviction was overturned because the victim was able to verbally 
“communicate unwillingness to an act” and was therefore not “physically helpless.”292 
Despite the Fourtin majority’s concession that “no one would dispute that [L.K.] is physically 
helpless in the ordinary sense of that term,” the court was bound by Hufford: “even total 
physical incapacity does not, by itself, render an individual physically helpless.”293
Dissenting from the state supreme court ruling, Justice Norcott accused the lower court 
of acting as a “thirteenth juror,” substituting its preferences over a jury’s fact-finding.294 
Justice Norcott argued that the determination of physical helplessness to communicate 
nonconsent was properly put before, and a reasonable conclusion of, the jury.295 He 
emphasized that the trial court required four full days to gather L.K.’s testimony due to 
her exhaustion.296 In a final footnote, the dissent departs from the facts of Fourtin to the 
uncertain future of Connecticut sexual assault law.297 The dissent suggests that the majority 
ruling  attests  to  the  inadequacy  of  existing  statutes  to  provide  sufficient  protection  for 
persons with disabilities from sexual assault.
B. Critics and Consequences 
Prior to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s ruling, the facts surrounding the Fourtin case 
received little public media attention.298 After the Court affirmed the reversal of Fourtin’s 
conviction, mainstream and progressive news outlets released scathing criticisms of the 
decision.299 These responses lambasted the Connecticut Supreme Court for what they 
292 Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 682. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 701 (Norcott, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
295 Id.
296 Id. at 695 (Norcott, J., dissenting). 
297 Id. at 701 n.22.
298 Although public media frenzy around Fourtin did not ignite until the 2012 Connecticut Supreme Court 
decision, legislative reform advocacy began earlier. Following the 2009 Connecticut Appellate Court ruling, 
a small group of state legislators and organizers began proposing revisions to existing statutes—especially 
Connecticut General Statute §§ 53a-71(a)(2) and -71(a)(3). See infra notes 320–326 and accompanying text. 
299 See, e.g., Tepfer, supra note 3; Zack Beauchamp, Court Requires Disabled Rape Victim to Prove 
She Resisted, Calls for Evidence of ‘Biting, Kicking, Scratching,’ thinKProGreSS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://
thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/10/03/947981/court-requires-disabled-rape-victim-to-prove-she-fought-back-
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perceived to be the injection of a “resistance requirement” for physically and mentally 
disabled victims of sexual assault.300 Titled, for example, “Court Requires Disabled Rape 
Victim to Prove She Resisted, Calls for Evidence of ‘Biting, Kicking, Scratching’” or 
“Richard Fourtin Case: Connecticut Court Sets Accused Rapist Free, Says Handicapped 
Victim Did Not Resist,” these articles opine, incorrectly, that the court affirmed Fourtin’s 
overturned conviction because of a lack of evidence that L.K. physically resisted his sexual 
advances.301 Reporters, bloggers, and activists underlined L.K.’s physical and mental 
disabilities—“she is so physically restricted that she is able to make motions only with her 
right index finger”;302 she “reportedly cannot speak and has little body movement.”303 Many 
argued that L.K.’s mental disabilities and limited communication rendered her equivalent 
to a three-year-old child (L.K. was twenty-five-years-old at the time of the alleged assault) 
and therefore unable to either consent to or appropriately understand sexual contact.304
calls-for-evidence-of-biting-kicking-scratching/?mobile=nc [http://perma.cc/8BMR-G8HF]; State Supreme 
Court Tosses Sex Assault Conviction, nbC Conn. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/
local/State-Supreme-Court-Tosses-Sex-Assault-Conviction-172269281.html [http://perma.cc/U76V-R7Q7]; 
Richard Fourtin Case: Connecticut Court Sets Accused Rapist Free, Says Handicapped Victim Did Not 
Resist, huFFinGton PoSt  (Oct.  4,  2012),  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/richard-fourtin-case-
supreme-court-accused-rapist-sexual-assault-handicapped-victim_n_1937528.html [http://perma.cc/D628-
6U37]; Charlie Wells, Connecticut Supreme Court Tosses Richard Fourtin Jr.’s Guilty Verdict for Sexually 
Assaulting Woman with SEVERE Cerebral Palsy, n.y. daily newS (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.
com/news/national/guilty-verdict-tossed-sex-assault-woman-cerebral-palsy-article-1.1175342 [http://perma.
cc/8EDB-ZCLG]; Women: Rise Up Now, State of Connecticut v. Fourtin, riSinG tide bloG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://risingtideblog.com/2012/10/05/state-of-connecticut-v-fourtin [http://perma.cc/DDR8-XAQ5]; Women: 
Rise Up Now, One More Word About Fourtin, riSinG tide bloG (Oct. 14, 2012), http://risingtideblog.
com/2012/10/14/one-more-word-about-fourtin [http://perma.cc/33S5-EYQV]. 
300 For criticisms of the resistance requirement of rape law, see supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text; 
Patricia J. Falk, ‘Because Ladies Lie’: Eliminating Vestiges of the Corroboration and Resistance Requirements 
from Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 62 Clev. St. l. rev. 343 (2014); Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination 
of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 loy. l.a. l. rev. 567 (1983). 
301 See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 299; Richard Fourtin Case, supra note 299. But see Women: Rise Up 
Now, One More Word About Fourtin, supra note 299. 
302 Tepfer, supra note 3. 
303 Richard Fourtin Case, supra note 299.
304 Neither the Fourtin majority nor dissent claims that L.K. “has the intellectual functional equivalent 
of a three-year-old,” a statement repeated by multiple news sources. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 299. 
However, the majority cites testimony from a clinical psychologist “describ[ing] the victim’s total functioning 
as akin to that of a person between the ages of two and five years old” and comparing L.K. to “a five year old 
child who has been ‘isolated’ and has ‘not had contact with anything other than a certain limited world.’” State 
v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 677 n.7 (Conn. 2012). 
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Sexual assault and disability advocates and policymakers also protested Fourtin. Anna 
Doroghazi, Director of Public Policy and Communication at Connecticut Sexual Assault 
Crisis Services (CSACS), asserted that “the court’s interpretation of what it means to be 
‘physically helpless’ jeopardizes the safety of people with disabilities[,] . . . effectively 
hold[ing] people with disabilities to a higher standard than the rest of the population when 
it comes to proving lack of consent in sexual assault cases.”305 Both anti-violence and 
disability activists warned that Fourtin leaves mentally and physically disabled persons 
unable to seek justice against sexual assault, due to the narrow statutory and case law 
meaning of “helplessness.” “Our justice system should provide [people with disabilities] 
with protection,” remonstrated James McGaughey, executive director of the Connecticut 
Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, “not require them to resist 
their attackers.”306 
Dissatisfied  with  the  popular  media misconstrual  and melodramatizing  of Fourtin, 
lawyers and legal commentators next weighed in on the ruling and its aftermath.307 
These authors decried the caricature of Fourtin feverishly rehearsed by the media and re-
directed attention to the issue at law. Rejecting progressive assails, commentators explained 
that Fourtin does not install a resistance requirement for disabled victims of sexual assault: 
 The discursive equivalence of mentally and physically disabled adults with children––both in terms of 
cognition and social/sexual propriety––is widespread and pernicious. On the infantilizing of disabled adults, 
see, e.g., eli Clare, exile and Pride: diSability, QueerneSS, and liberation 108–09 (1999) (“I think about 
the perpetual childhood many disabled people are forced into . . . pictured as passive and awkward, child-like 
without the least hint of sexuality.”). Alternatively, on the discursive construction of persons with disabilities 
as sexually unruly and predatory, see, e.g., Pamela Block, Sexuality, Fertility, and Danger: Twentieth Century 
Images of Women with Cognitive Disabilities, 18 Sexuality & diSability 239, 245 (2000). See also infra 
notes 442–444 and accompanying text. On modern and late modern constructions of children as innocent and 
incompetent, see, e.g., brewer, supra note 158; Appell, supra note 158. 
305 Richard Fourtin Case, supra note 299.
306 Wells, supra note 299. 
307 See, e.g., Gideon, Supreme Court hates disabled people and eats children for lunch. Probably., a 
PubliC deFender (Oct. 4, 2012), http://apublicdefender.com/2012/10/04/supreme-court-hates-disabled-people-
and-eats-children-for-lunch-probably [http://perma.cc/9FRZ-FB7P] [hereinafter Gideon, Supreme Court]; 
Gideon, Why we can’t just make stuff up as we go along; or, Due Process, a PubliC deFender (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://apublicdefender.com/2012/10/09/why-we-cant-just-make-stuff-up-as-we-go-along-or-due-process 
[http://perma.cc/3ZJN-8GAW] [hereinafter Gideon, Why we can’t]; Ken White, Frankly, I Don’t Care How 
Due Process Makes You Feel, PoPehat (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.popehat.com/2012/10/09/frankly-i-dont-
care-how-due-process-makes-you-feel [http://perma.cc/666X-RSA3].
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Fourtin was acquitted not because L.K. did not resist his advances, but rather because her 
history of physically and vocally expressing discontent and/or nonconsent disqualified her 
from the ambit of “physically helpless.”308 Evidence of L.K.’s resistance—like evidence of 
verbal nonconsent—would be grounds for acquittal, not conviction, as resistance disproves 
“helplessness.” Journalists and advocates were so disgusted by Fourtin’s acquittal that they 
seemed unwilling to seriously interrogate the relevant case law and precedent surrounding 
“physical helplessness.”309 No process was due process for progressive journalists and 
advocates, argued some legal commentators. The overturned conviction of a rapist—and 
one who assaulted a person with disabilities, no less—emotionally outweighed any import 
of statutory technicality.310 
Notably, the point of unanimous agreement across public responses to Fourtin is 
what seems at first blush to be dispositive: Fourtin sexually assaulted L.K. However, legal 
professionals’ criticism-of-the-criticisms begins to clarify that what is so distressing about 
Fourtin may not be the ruling itself, which neither denied nor questioned the occurrence 
of the assault. Rather, the ruling reveals the tragic bind of Connecticut sexual assault 
law for significantly disabled victims:  they are disabled enough  that assailants need not 
use requisite force for their conduct to qualify as criminal, but abled enough to class out 
of physical helplessness. L.K., then, is not victimized under the general sexual assault 
statute because her disability makes force moot, but she is not victimized under the status 
subsections either because she can resist just enough not to be helpless. Caught between 
force requirements and blanket exclusions from sexual contact, there is nowhere for L.K. 
to turn to seek redress.311  
308 See Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 688.
309 See Gideon, Supreme Court, supra note 307. 
310 Id.; White, supra note 307. 
311 This bind (too disabled for force to be necessary, too abled to be helpless) is nowhere more egregiously 
exemplified  than  in  State v. Hufford. See supra notes 291–293 and accompanying text. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of an emergency medical technician for sexually assaulting a woman 
taped to a stretcher. Hufford “had no need to exert force to effect the sexual contact. The complainant had been 
rendered immobile for transport to the hospital and the defendant had only to open her blouse and pants to 
commit the sexual assault. We are unpersuaded by the state’s argument that these actions constituted force.” 
State v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 866, 871 (Conn. 1987). On the other hand, “[w]hile [the defendant’s] testimony tends 
to show lack of consent, it contradicts the state’s assertion that the complainant was unable to communicate 
her ‘unwillingness to an act.’ The record contains no evidence tending to show that the complainant was 
physically helpless.” Id. at 873. While the Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case “for a new trial 
limited to the issue of lack of consent,” such a charge—violation of Connecticut General Statute § 53a-73a(a)
(2)––is a misdemeanor, applicable only to sexual contact (not intercourse) and is hardly ever prosecuted but for 
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Or almost nowhere. Various stakeholders rebuked the state attorneys for prosecuting 
Fourtin under two statutes that, by precedent, require total inability to communicate as 
proof of helplessness. Both the Connecticut Supreme Court and commentators posited 
that the state attorney should have charged Fourtin under Connecticut General Statutes 
§§ 53a-71(a)(2)312 and -73a(a)(1)(B), which referenced the sexual assault of victims 
determined “mentally defective.”313 As Justice Palmer wrote for the Fourtin majority: “this 
appears to be a case in which the state ultimately proceeded against the defendant under the 
wrong statute . . . . [B]y electing to prove that the victim was physically helpless rather than 
mentally defective, the state removed from the case all issues pertaining to the victim’s 
mental capacity to consent to sex.”314 Justice Norcott, dissenting, agreed on the point: “the 
state would have been far better advised” to charge Fourtin with violation of the sexual 
assault statutes “which require a victim that is ‘mentally defective.’”315 
On the other hand, post hoc recriminations—locating someone to blame—may satisfy 
emotional frustration more than fact of law. As Susann Gill, the lead prosecutor in Fourtin 
told us, case law delineating the parameters of the “mentally defective” subsection is 
even sparser than the pursued alternative, “physically helpless.”316 L.K.’s demonstrated 
resistance classed her out of “helplessness”; it may just as well have classed her out of 
“defectiveness.”  
In any event, Fourtin’s failure to protect disabled and vulnerable subjects propelled 
the pursuit for future remedy. In the months and years following the 2009 appellate 
unwanted gropes. See infra notes 360–361 and accompanying text.
312 Until 2013, Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2) read: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the 
second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and . . . such other person 
is mentally defective to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.” For 
the post-Fourtin revised statutes, see infra notes 326–328.
313 See, e.g., White, supra note 307. Connecticut General Statute § 53a-65(4) defines a subject as “mentally 
defective” if that person “suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders such person incapable of 
appraising the nature of such person’s conduct.” Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-65(4) (West 2015).
314 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 689 n.20 (Conn. 2012). 
315 Id. at 701 n.22 (Norcott, J., dissenting).
316  Interview with Susann E. Gill, Supervisory Assistant State’s Att’y, Conn. State’s Att’y’s Office, Judicial 
Dist. of Fairfield,  in Milford, Conn. (Oct. 16, 2014). However, Deborah Denno documents several cases  in 
which “mental defect” or similar statutory language has been interpreted expansively––too expansively for 
Denno (and for us)––to render persons legally unable to consent to sexual relations. Deborah W. Denno, 
Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 u. ill. l. rev. 315, 347–49; see also infra Part III.C.
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ruling, Connecticut State Representative Gerald Fox III, the Fourtin prosecutors, and 
the Connecticut General Assembly’s Permanent Commission on the Status of Women 
(PCSW) led a team of policymakers and advocates to amend state sexual assault law in 
order to extend protections over disabled persons like L.K.317 In 2010, 2011, and 2012, 
three consecutive Senate bills were brought to the Connecticut Judiciary Committee that 
would have made alterations to Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2), concerning 
victims who are “mentally defective,” and/or Connecticut General Statute § 53-73a(a)(3), 
concerning victims who are “physically helpless.”318 A wide range of state agencies and 
organizations concerned with the welfare of women, victims of violence, disabled persons, 
and others whom these statutes might impact testified in support of all three bills.319
The proposed legislative changes in 2010 and 2011 would have altered both statutes, 
eliminating the phrases “physically helpless” and “mentally defective” from the sexual 
assault laws altogether.320 Instead, perpetrators would be found guilty of sexual assault in 
the second degree if “the victim’s ability to communicate lack of consent was substantially 
impaired because of a mental or physical condition.”321 The language revisions suggest 
a  significantly  lowered  threshold  of  impairment  to  reach  a  successful  conviction  and  a 
departure from the limited (limiting) capture of “physical helplessness” as set in Connecticut 
General Statute § 53a-65(6). Neither bill passed the State House of Representatives, and 
legislators revised their amendments in 2012.322 The proposed changes in 2012, more 
317 Permanent Comm’n on the StatuS oF women, 2012 Conn. Gen. aSSemb., oFFiCial Statement re: State 
v. riChard Fourtin ConviCtion [hereinafter oFFiCial Statement].
318 Id. 
319 Supporters of the 2012 bill, S.B. 247, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013), which successfully passed 
in 2013, included: HARC, Inc.; the Susan B. Anthony Project; Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services 
(CSACS); The Arc of Connecticut; Mary Ann Langton; Mary Louise Reardon; and Robert James Payne. For a 
full list of supporters of earlier drafts of the bill, see id. 
320 See id.
321 Id. (emphasis added). 
322 Id. Although neither S.B. 315, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2010), nor S.B. 918, 2011 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Conn. 2011), passed the Connecticut House of Representatives, the bills were not met with substantial 
resistance when  proposed. The  official  statement  released  by  the  Permanent Commission  on  the  Status  of 
Women on the legislative history of proposed changes to Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71 (regarding 
sexual assault in the second degree) notes, oFFiCial Statement, supra note 317, that both S.B. 315 and S.B. 
918 were voted through by the Joint Committee on Judiciary and then passed in the Connecticut State Senate. 
Based on the limited details provided by the PCSW, S.B. 315 failed to pass because the House did not act on 
it after it passed the Senate, and S.B. 918 failed to pass because it died on the House calendar. Whether these 
failures to act on the proposed bills were the result of legislative inertia or silent resistance remains unclear; 
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limited than in previous years, altered only Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2). 
Perpetrators would be found guilty of sexual assault if “the ability of [the victim] to consent 
or to communicate lack of consent to such sexual intercourse is substantially impaired 
because of mental disability.”323 The  final  bill  passed  in  the  2013 Connecticut General 
Assembly legislative session, signaling a win for the sexual assault and disability advocates 
who had supported the change.324 
This victory, though, seems limited at best and superficial at worst. Although catalyzed 
by Richard Fourtin’s acquittal, the statutory revisions approved in 2012 would likely not 
have changed the Fourtin ruling. Since S.B. 247 (2013) did not include any changes to 
Connecticut General Statute § 53–73a(a)(3), the same phraseology and standard of “physical 
helplessness” remain in Connecticut sexual assault law.325 Legislators only changed the 
language of Connecticut General Statute § 53a–71(a)(2), by replacing “mentally defective” 
with “mental incapacitation.” They also implemented a scienter requirement.326 
We worry that the facial change to the statute reflects a discomfort among policymakers 
with the ableist and archaic language of “mentally defective,” rather than a more substantial 
investment in the flourishing (sexual and otherwise) of mentally and physically disabled 
people. If the amended statute assuages policymakers’ distress over unseemly language 
better than it protects victims of sexual assault, then the statute has not meaningfully 
changed at all.
however, that the bill was then substantially pared down in 2012, see infra notes 286–287 and accompanying 
text, is somewhat surprising.
323 S.B. 247, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013) (emphasis added). 
324 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–71(a)(4) (2013); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(C). 
325 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–73a.
326 S.B. 247 proposed the following revision to Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2): 
[A] person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in 
sexual intercourse with another person and . . . the ability of such other person to consent 
of to communicate lack of consent to such sexual intercourse is substantially impaired 
because of mental disability and the actor knows or has reasonable cause to know that 
the ability of such other person to consent or to communicate lack of consent to such 
intercourse is so impaired.
Conn. S.B. 247. For the original text of Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2), see supra note 312.
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C. Metacritique: Helpless to “Helplessness” 
In interviews about the proposed statutory revisions, Connecticut State Representative 
Gerald Fox III noted that drafters had worked diligently to tailor the language so as not to be 
“overly broad,” and thus “ban[] handicapped people from consenting to sexual activity.”327 
We share this concern. Like feminist, anti-violence, and disability activists, we are troubled 
by the verdict issued in State v. Fourtin and troubled too that the threshold requirements for 
“physically helpless” and “mentally incapacitated” do not protect persons with disabilities 
from sexual assault. But like other theorists of disability, sexuality, and the law, 328 and 
like some persons with disabilities and their service providers,329 we are troubled that the 
expansion of blanket protections for disabled victims of sexual assault may render mentally 
and/or physically disabled adults legally unable to consent to any wanted sexual contact.
 
It seems, perversely, that the reduction of sexual autonomy to sexual consent may 
render  larger  classes  of  persons  unfit  and  ineligible  for  either.  While  many  Fourtin 
commentators were disturbed that L.K. did not qualify as “physically helpless,” only a few 
such critics registered concern with the potential consequences of expanding the coverage 
of “physically helpless” to include all adults whose mental and/or physical disabilities 
327 Michelle Golladay, Legislation Would Close ‘Gap’ in Sex Assault Law Involving Disabled, Conn. law 
tribune (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/PubArticleCT.jsp?id=1202594133927 [http://perma.cc/ 
S9YY-HQWJ]. 
328 For a meticulously crafted, measured argument against overbroad statutory proscriptions on the sexual 
conduct of persons with intellectual disabilities, see generally Denno, supra note 316; see also Jacob M. Appel, 
Sex Rights for the Disabled?, 36 J. med. ethiCS 152 (2010); infra notes 337–341 and accompanying text. From 
one historical vantage point, extending the capture of the “physically helpless” and “mentally incapacitated” 
statutory  subclauses  reflects  and  reignites  the  socio-legal  “asexual  objectification  of  disabled  individuals.” 
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law, 4 S. Cal. rev. l. & women’S Stud. 97, 
100 (1994). 
329 On more generalized concern regarding the juridical will-to-protection over disabled persons’ sexuality, 
see, for instance, Anne Finger, Forbidden Fruit, 233 new internationaliSt (July 1992), http://newint.org/
features/1992/07/05/fruit [http://perma.cc/D4PK-5MMJ]; Siebers, supra note 27; Mark O’Brien, On Seeing 
a Sex Surrogate, Sun, May 1990, http://thesunmagazine.org/issues/174/on_seeing_a_sex_surrogate [http://
perma.cc/2Q6C-QQH4]; see also sources cited in Denno, supra note 316, at 380–93; infra note 446 and 
accompanying text. 
The distinction between “disability theorists” and “people with disabilities” is analytic, the referent 
populations overlapping. From herein, as the Article becomes prescriptive, we amplify the voices and forefront 
the experiences of persons with significant disabilities. 
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present similarly to L.K.’s.330 That “no one would dispute that the victim is physically 
helpless in the ordinary sense of that term” suggests a perpetual, widespread, and “ordinary” 
conflation of disability, helplessness, and (thus) asexuality.331
If, for example, we stretch the parameters of “physically helpless” so that any disabled 
adult  with  similar  restrictions  to  L.K.  automatically  qualifies  as  “physically  helpless,” 
despite a documented ability to communicate nonverbally, we may delegitimize or 
derealize hir sexual (and non-sexual) agency, and the possibility of hir sexual flourishing, 
whatever form that might take. 332   Many scholars have cautioned against the (often forcible) 
desexualization of disabled individuals.333 In a variety of vernaculars and (inter)disciplines, 
these authors have advocated for the sexual autonomy of disabled persons—for the right 
to co-determine sexual relations and for that codetermination-capability to be fostered.334 
This position contravenes the one held by progressive activists and legislators in the wake 
of Fourtin, but from a crip theoretic perspective, the expansion of “physically helpless” to 
include all adults with severe mental and/or physical disabilities risks codifying the stifling 
norms of ableism.335 
330 See, e.g., Golladay, supra note 327 (“State Representative Gerald Fox III . . . said, ‘we’ve had to be 
extremely careful with the language that we use,’ in part so that the measure doesn’t end up banning handicapped 
people from consenting to sexual activity.”).
331 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 682 (Conn. 2012).
332 On “derealization” as an idiom and upshot of unjust sociolegal formations, see Judith butler, PreCariouS 
liFe: the PowerS oF mourninG and violenCe 34 (2006). For a critique of Butler’s framing of gendered and 
sexual violence as rendering subjects unthinkable, but not also subordinated, see supra note 250. The gender-
neutral pronoun “hir” may be jarring, but its usage aligns with the normative aspiration of this Article. We 
carry a brief for a reconstructed sexual autonomy right, a right that privileges the codetermination, rather than 
the sovereign ascription, of social and sexual identification. See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling 
Gender, 18 berKeley women’S l.J. 15, 17 n.7 (2003). 
333 See, e.g., Clare, supra note 304, at 108–09; Hahn, supra note 328, at 121–24; Shakespeare, supra 
note 14, at 161 (“The barriers to the sexual expression of disabled people are primarily to do with the society 
in which we live, not the bodies with which we are endowed.”); Siebers, supra note 27; Holly Ann Wade, 
Discrimination, Sexuality and People with Significant Disabilities: Issues of Access and the Right to Sexual 
Expression in the United States, 22 diSability Stud. Q. 9 (2002); infra notes 394–401 and accompanying text. 
Resonantly, Rosemarie Garland-Thompson flags the connection between the coercive sterilization of disabled 
persons and elective prenatal testing for genetic disabilities. Rosemarie Garland-Thompson, Integrating 
Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory, 14 nat’l women’S Stud. aSS’n  J. 1, 16 (2002) (“The practices 
of genetic and prenatal testing as well as physician-administered euthanasia then become potentially eugenic 
practices within the context of a culture deeply intolerant of disability.”). 
334 See infra note 332.
335 We understand the reclaimed pejorative “crip” to signal practices and theories that put pressure on, while 
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Our metacritique echoes the argument law professor Deborah Denno put forth roughly 
two decades ago, which protests that “mentally retarded individuals” are preemptively 
disqualified from sex by the statutory codifications and judicial determinations of “mentally 
defective.”336 Denno describes how expansive interpretations of and determinative factors 
for “mentally defective” and “mental incapacity” have hastily rendered persons with 
intellectual disabilities unable to consent to sex, by raising the consent standard unreachably 
high.337 She claims that consent inquiries excessively emphasize the IQ and “mental age” 
of persons with intellectual disabilities, thereby wrongly assuming intellectual (dis)ability 
is static, permanent, and unaltered by context.338 Moreover, such consent inquiries have 
also countenancing the power effects of, the norms, determinants, and identity formations that orbit ability 
and disability. See robert mCruer, CriP theory: Cultural SiGnS oF QueerneSS and diSability 33–76 (2006) 
[hereinafter mCruer, CriP]; see also supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
336 Denno, supra note 316, at 341–55; see also Gill, supra note 13, at 192–93. In this Article, we use the 
now more acceptable language of “intellectual disability” in reference to the same or similar populations as 
Denno, aware that all such ascriptive and identitarian terms, including our own, are subject to changing and 
competing cultural norms. Of course, sensitive terminology has no necessary correspondence to just policy. See 
KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 37.
What we will present in this book . . . is the example of a country [Denmark] where wildly 
politically incorrect language about disability coexists with policies and practices that 
are both politically radical (for what they mean for the rights of people with disabilities 
as citizens) and ethically progressive (for what they imply about how disabled and 
nondisabled people might imagine and engage with one another). This contrasts starkly 
with Denmark’s neighbor, Sweden. There, language about disability is constantly 
monitored and uncompromisingly judged. But policies and practices relating to the sexual 
lives of people with disabilities are politically retrogressive and ethically arrested.
Id.
337 Denno, supra note 316, at 349 (“Most striking is that all [court] tests appear to judge mentally retarded 
victims under a higher consent standard than nonretarded victims.”) (internal citation omitted). 
338 Id. at 342, 355–56.
Courts nearly always refer to a victim’s IQ when the crime charged is rape or an assault 
against a mentally retarded person. Although IQ is a convenient clinical and administrative 
tool, alone it has limited predictive value and may mischaracterize an individual’s adaptive 
abilities, particularly when it used by inexperienced evaluators. Although courts also 
typically refer to a victim’s “mental age,” it too is considered misleading and controversial.
Id. at 366 (internal citations omitted). For another trenchant criticism of “mental age,” see Gill, supra note 13, 
at 38 (“Mental age is an ableist notion that can actively discredit individual choice and perpetuate assumptions 
about incompetence, childhood, and necessity for protection by prioritizing professional medical authority at 
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historically provided cover for the moralistic containment of women’s sexuality (say, to 
prevent disabled women from reproducing or to punish adultery or fornication).339
 
Denno counteroffers a “contextual approach” to consent determinations,340 one which 
would relieve persons with intellectual disabilities from “statutory isolation.”341 Denno’s 
approach, dissolving categorical exceptions like “physically helpless” or “mentally 
incapacitated,”342 would instruct judges and juries to examine the many situational and 
circumstantial factors around a sexual encounter in order to determine consent. In Denno’s 
scheme, mental ability, more accurately assessed,343 might be one such factor, but neither 
primary nor summary.344 For example, in the case of a gang rape of an intellectually 
disabled girl by a group of teenage boys, Denno soundly suggests that the boys’ deception, 
manipulation, coercion, and threats of retaliation take judicial priority over locating 
(impossibly) an exact measurement or age equivalency of the girl’s intellectual ability.345
Like Denno then, we argue that feminist, anti-violence, and disability advocates and 
policymakers must consider more fully what consequences extended-capture reforms 
(broadening the reach of “physically helpless” or “mentally incapacitated”) would have on 
the sexual autonomy of persons with intellectual disabilities. In the next Part, and building 
off of Denno’s earlier proposals,346 we suggest reforms to sexual assault law that might 
the expense of individual desire and epistemology.”). 
339 Denno, supra note 316, at 349–52. Of course, medical authorities have not always required the pretense 
of consent to intervene on the reproductive and sexual lives of women with disabilities. Sexual unruliness and 
“improvement” of the human population have long justified sterilization and other eugenic policies. See, e.g., 
Block, supra note 304, at 245; see also infra notes 441–446 and accompanying text. 
340 Denno, supra note 316, at 355–59. 
341 Id. at 343. 
342 Id. at  394–95  (“By  excluding  from  statutory  specification  the  term mental  retardation  or  any  other 
pejorative label currently encompassing it, state legislatures would appropriately foster the presumption that 
most mentally retarded individuals are able to consent to sexual relations under most circumstances.”). 
343 Id. at 342–43 (arguing that legal terms for and jury instructions regarding intellectual disability are 
outdated and do not reflect current medical consensus and research findings). 
344 Id. at 394.
345 Denno, supra note 316, at 360–76 (criticizing the prosecution and defense strategies in the “Glen Ridge 
Rape Case,” both of which emphasized victim’s IQ and “mental age”); see In re B.G., 589 A.2d 637 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
346 Denno, supra note 316, at 394–95. 
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better protect vulnerable and disabled persons while still promoting sexual autonomy across 
the spectrum of ability. Our reforms, like Denno’s, excise disability as a special category 
of sexual assault law, stressing instead relational conditions and constraints.347 Yet—and 
perhaps because our reforms are principled not on the notion of universal human dignity 
but rather on relational autonomy348—we also canvass ways the state might facilitate the 
sexuality and intimacy opportunities for persons with significant disabilities in particular.349 
IV. Disabling Consent: Notes for a New Statutory Scheme of Sexual Regulation
Why do rehabilitation hospitals teach disabled people how to sew wallets and 
cook from a wheelchair but not deal with a person’s damaged self-image? Why 
don’t these hospitals teach disabled people how to love and be loved through sex 
or how to love our unusual bodies? I fantasized running a hospital that allowed 
patients the chance to see a surrogate, and that offered hope for a future richer 
than daytime tv, chess, and wheelchair basketball.350
A. Are “Sexual Autonomy” and “Disability” Incompatible? 
Political philosophers of the social contract tradition explicitly exclude persons with 
severe disabilities from autonomy’s domain. They are subjects of charity, not justice.351 
Presumptively unable to sufficiently reason or cooperate, persons with severe disabilities, 
especially intellectual disabilities, are largely excluded from political conceptions of the 
person. (In)famously, the heteronomy and dependence of persons with severe disabilities 
has been leveraged to advocate for the better treatment of nonhuman animals, since such 
347 See infra Parts IV.C, IV.D. 
348 Denno, supra note 316, at 359. Denno references Wolf Wolfensberger’s “dignity of risk,” which 
posits “a certain ‘dignity’ in allowing mentally retarded individuals to assume the same risks as nonretarded 
individuals.” Id. at 359 n.277. Dignity, framed as such, lends itself to a presumption of noninterference and 
thus dedifferentiation regarding the legal treatment of persons with disabilities. Sexual autonomy, as a human 
capability,  demands positive provisions  for flourishing,  and  thus differentiation  compensating  extant  social 
inequalities, asymmetric opportunities, and accidents of birth. See nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 
186–95. 
349 See infra Part IV.E. 
350 O’Brien, supra note 329. 
351 See CarlSon, supra note 158, at 131–37 (documenting philosophers’ analogizing of persons with 
intellectual disabilities to nonhuman animals); see also supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 255–258 and accompanying text. 
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animals may have greater cognitive function (thus more autonomous-like) than persons 
with severe intellectual disabilities.352 
From the other direction, several disability scholars and feminist theorists have posited 
that autonomy is a mistaken aspiration, devaluing or disavowing our dependence on others 
and the relational constitution of our selves and identities.353 
However, as we have shown, a concept of autonomy that thins the character requirements 
and thickens the choice and choice structure requirements invites some persons with 
disabilities back into autonomy’s domain. Sexual autonomy as an aspiration—the capability 
to codetermine sexual relations—is normatively and descriptively discrete from autonomy 
postulated as a presocial trait of the human. This sexual autonomy is inclusive of people 
across a wider spectrum of ability. 
B. Reforming Sexual Assault Law (for Persons with Disabilities): 
Three Possibilities
Below we offer three statutory reforms to protect and promote the sexual autonomy of 
persons (with disabilities): the interjection of affirmative consent into Connecticut sexual  
assault law; the expansion of proscribed sex across certain status relations; and sociopolitical 
accommodations—access, education, and assistance—to facilitate sex. 
1. Furbishing Consent
The controversy surrounding Fourtin and the defanged legislative reform that followed 
revealed that the “physical helplessness” and “mentally defective” subsections of the 
352 For a critique of the comparison between animality and disability, see CarlSon, supra note 158, at 
137–61; see also Peter SinGer, animal liberation (2009).
353 See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 169; KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 281; Garland-Thompson, 
supra note 333, at 21 (“An equality model of feminist theory sometimes prizes individualistic autonomy as 
the key to women’s liberation. A feminist disability theory, however, suggests that we are better off learning 
to individually and collectively accommodate bodily limits and evolutions than trying to eliminate or deny 
them.”); Russell Shuttleworth, Critical Research and Policy Debates in Disability and Sexuality Studies, 
4 Sexuality reS. & SoC. Pol’y 1, 5 (2007); Siebers, supra note 27, at 38 (“[D]isabled people experience 
sexual repression, possess little or no sexual autonomy, and tolerate institutional and legal restrictions on their 
intimate conduct.”); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique 
of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 wiS. women’S l.J. 149, 159–61 (2000); see also nedelSKy, supra note 25, at 
118–27 (rehearsing and critiquing feminist interventions against autonomy).
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sexual assault statutes leave persons with disabilities virtually unprotected354 by law. Left 
unexamined, however, were the general sexual assault statutes historically reserved for 
able-bodied, able-minded, adult victims. These statutes retain a force (or threat of force) 
requirement. If the touchstone of sexual assault (in Connecticut and other states) were 
consent, not force, might Fourtin have been successfully convicted under the general 
statute? What if the law treated L.K. like a woman, not an (almost-but-not-quite) invalid? 
What if the law recognized unwanted sex, not just forced sex, as sexual assault? 
Pressured by feminist and liberal legal advocates since the 1970s, states have 
eliminated the most affrontingly sexist elements of conventional rape law (e.g., the “utmost 
resistance” requirement, the marital rape exemption, the corroboration requirement, and 
so forth).355 And since the 1980s, feminist legal activism and scholarship have helped shift 
the national conversation around sexual assault away from determinations of force and 
toward expressions of consent.356 In some jurisdictions, resistance and force requirements 
have been relaxed or excised, replaced by nonconsent requirements.357 However, as with 
the replacement of “mentally defective” with “mentally incapacitated” in Connecticut 
General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2),358 the statutory substitution of force with nonconsent may 
be a codified distinction without a material difference: juries and judges rely on evidence 
of resistance as proof of nonconsent.359 
Consent is all but nonexistent in the Connecticut Penal Code of sexual offenses. The 
only subsection that criminalizes sexual conduct solely on the basis of nonconsent is 
354 Or overprotected. See generally Denno, supra note 316. 
355 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text; see also Jennifer A. Bennice & Patricia A. Resick, 
Marital Rape: History, Research, and Practice, 4 trauma violenCe & abuSe 228 (2003); Chamallas, supra 
note 34; Falk, supra note 300; Anna Scheyett, Marriage is the Best Defense: Policy on Marital Rape, 3 aFFilia: 
J. women & SoC. worK 8 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 300.
356 See CarinGella, supra note 38, at 14–15. But see SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 29–32 (observing that 
some feminist legal activists focused on expanding the meaning of “force” in sexual assault offenses while 
others focused on eliminating or diminishing the force requirement). 
357 CarinGella, supra note 38, at 76. 
358 See supra notes 323–326 and accompanying text.
359 See CarinGella, supra note 38, at 106–07; see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of 
Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as Abuse of Power, 18 miCh. J. Gender & l. 147, 156–60 (2011). In 
Connecticut, while “lack of consent” has been read into the force element of sexual assault, see, e.g., State v. 
Smith, 554 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1989), the state court also made clear that, absent force, passiveness, id. at 718, 
and silence, id. at 717, register as consent. See infra note 362. 
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Connecticut General Statute § 53a-73a(a)(2): “a person is guilty of sexual assault in the 
fourth degree when: (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such 
other person’s consent.” This subsection is hardly exercised by the state; when it is, it is 
used to reach comparatively less serious assaults like an unsolicited grope at a bar. 360 Of 
the 175 sexual assault cases that reached the Connecticut Appellate Court from 2010–2015, 
only six involved sexual assault in the fourth degree for unconsented-to sexual contact.361
The statutes that “count”—first, second, and third degree sexual assault—criminalize 
sexual conduct that involves: the use and/or threat of force362 (including force involving 
weapons363),  the  infliction  of  bodily  injury,364 and victims deemed unable to consent365 
(including due to status restrictions).366 Inability to consent and nonconsent are non-
equivalent; the former focuses on a categorical distinction, the latter on relational conduct. 
Over the past couple of decades, liberal and feminist legal scholars and advocates 
have proposed an “affirmative consent” standard for sexual assault law (and for university 
sexual misconduct codes).367 An affirmative consent standard rejects force, resistance, and 
360 Interview with Susann E. Gill, supra note 316; see also supra note 314. 
361 Shefelbine v. Comm’r of Corr., 90 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014); State v. Jesse H., 78 A.3d 228 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2013); State v. White, 55 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); State v. McLaren, 15 A.3d 183 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2011); State v. McGee, 4 A.3d 837 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); State v. Calvin N., 998 A.2d 810 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2010). For our analysis of these 175 cases, see infra notes 405–413. 
362 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-70(a)(1) (West 2012), -70b(b) (West 2015), -72a(a)(1)(A)(B) (West 2012). 
In State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, the Connecticut Supreme Court held “lack of consent” to be an element of the 
crime of sexual assault in the first degree. However, while a “finding that a complainant had consented would 
implicitly negate a claim that the actor had compelled the complainant by force or threat to engage in sexual 
intercourse,” id. at 717, “it is clear that a defendant must either use force or threaten its use by words or conduct 
that would reasonably generate fear of physical injury,” id. at 718. Thus, in Smith, the gravamen is not the fact 
that the complainant “expressly declined [Smith’s] advances,” but that Smith made a “statement she could 
reasonably have regarded as a threat of physical injury.” Id. For clarification on the requisite mens rea regarding 
lack of consent for sexual assault offenses, see Efstathiadis v. Holder, 119 A.3d 522 (Conn. 2015). 
363 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-70a(a)(1) (West 2012), -72b(a) (West 2012).
364 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-70a(a)(2)(3) (West 2015). 
365 See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
366 See infra notes 398–402 and accompanying text. 
367 See SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 283; see also Catharine a. maCKinnon, women’S liveS, men’S lawS 
246–47 (2005) (“Requiring affirmative consent . . . is an improvement over existing law, but can be polluted by 
inequality . . . . If force were defined to include inequalities of power, meaning social hierarchies, and consent 
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nonconsent thresholds, and instead requires evidence—a verbal or nonverbal, non-coerced 
indication of agreement—in order for sexual activity to be rendered non-criminal (or not 
in violation of university policy).368 A nonconsent requirement, although preferable to 
proof of resistance or force, may render permissible sex which is unagreed to, acquiesced 
to, or pursued with persons that are silent and/or frozen in fear. Saying “no” is not as 
easy as one might think, 369 and many victims believe that expressed refusal will further 
endanger them.370 By requiring minimal evidence of positive agreement one degree above 
acquiescence, an affirmative consent standard may better track a subject’s participation in 
codetermining hir sexual relations.
How might the introduction of an affirmative consent standard impact the outcome of 
cases like Fourtin? When Fourtin was charged under statute subsections that required a 
finding of “physical helplessness” to demonstrate an inability to communicate nonconsent, 
the question of law became not whether L.K. consented to (let alone desired)371 sexual 
contact, but rather whether L.K.’s disabilities rendered her incompetent. If the gravamen of 
sexual assault were the absence of affirmative consent rather than the victim’s incapacity 
were replaced with a welcomeness standard, the law of rape would begin to approximate the reality of forced 
and unwanted sex.”); Joan McGregor, Why When She Says No She Doesn’t Mean Maybe and Doesn’t Mean 
Yes: A Critical Reconstruction on Consent, Sex, and the Law, 2 leGal theory 175 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 
300, at 592–95; see generally yeS meanS yeS! viSionS oF Female Sexual Power and a world without raPe 
(Jaclyn Friedman & Jessica Valenti eds., 2008).
368 SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 283; see, e.g., wiS. Stat. ann. § 940.225(4) (West 2013) (“‘Consent,’ 
as used in [the sexual assault offenses] means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give 
informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”); see also 
Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 va. J. SoC. Pol’y 
& l. 287, 329 (1997) (advocating an affirmative consent standard for sex with minors). On the insertion of 
affirmative  consent  in  university  sexual misconduct  codes,  see,  e.g., Melanie Boyd & Joseph Fischel, The 
Case for Affirmative Consent (Or, Why You Can Stop Worrying That Your Son Will Go To Prison For Having 
Sex When He Gets To College), huFFinGton PoSt (Dec. 17, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
melanie-boyd/the-case-for-affirmative-consent_b_6312476.html [http://perma.cc/BH5Z-2STD]. 
369 See, e.g., Celia Kitzinger & Hannah Frith, Just Say No? The Use of Conversation Analysis in Developing 
a Feminist Perspective on Sexual Refusal, 10 diSCourSe & SoC’y 293, 295–99 (1999).
370 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 300, at 566–82. But see Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: 
A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in FeminiStS theorize the PolitiCal 385, 385 (Judith Butler & Joan 
W. Scott eds., 1992) (arguing that feminist rehearsals of rape trauma may re-inscribe the injuries they are 
deployed to offset). 
371 Some feminist law scholars reject consent as a legal metric for adjudicating sexual harm. For an eloquent 
if ultimately authoritarian defense of “pleasure” as the organizing principle for feminist legal advocacy, see 
West, supra note 353. 
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to communicate nonconsent, Fourtin’s misconduct might have been more readily 
recognizable. No party, at any proceeding, ever claimed the sex was consensual, or that 
L.K. expressed interest in the sex (although at trial Fourtin initially claimed never to have 
had sexual contact with L.K.).372
Many debate373—and some lampoon374—the legal criteria for affirmative consent. We 
will not rehearse that debate here, but note that in sexual scenarios involving persons with 
intellectual disabilities, affirmative consent may register more precisely under law than in 
(garden-variety) sexual scenarios involving persons without disabilities. L.K. after all, has 
a message board with the words “Yes” and “No” imprinted on it.375 In their monograph on 
disability and sexual assistance, Don Kulick and Jens Rydström document “plan of action” 
contracts caretakers draft to help their disabled clients masturbate (the placing of sex aids, 
the positioning of pillows, duration of time to leave client alone, and other variables to 
be determined in medias res).376 These contracts specify in advance the sexual activities 
disabled clients wish to pursue and set parameters for caretaker assistance.377 Designated 
to facilitate masturbation, such plans of actions are adaptable to sexual contact between 
372 Interview with Susann E. Gill, supra note 316.
373 See, e.g., CarinGella, supra note 38, at 75–95; David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 buFF. Crim. l. 
rev. 317, 400–11 (2000); Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, n.y. timeS, Jun. 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/P2F6-NHBE]. 
374 See, e.g., Chappelle’s Show, Love Contract, Comedy Central (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.cc.com/
video-clips/jwmvxd/chappelle-s-show-love-contract [http://perma.cc/5PAS-HWX8]; see also Jed Rubenfeld, 
Mishandling Rape, n.y. timeS, Nov. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/
mishandling-rape.html  [http://perma.cc/B4ZY-PM8K]  (“Under  this  definition  [of  sexual  consent  at  Yale 
University], a person who voluntarily gets undressed, gets into bed and has sex with someone, without clearly 
communicating either yes or no, can later say—correctly—that he or she was raped. This is not a law school 
hypothetical. The unambiguous consent standard requires this conclusion.”). Rubenfeld’s assertions here are 
plainly wrong, not least because a violation of a university’s sexual misconduct code and a violation of state 
criminal code (rape) are nonequivalent. Moreover, Rubenfeld’s adverbial “voluntarily” seems to token the 
affirmative consent he decries. See Boyd & Fischel, supra note 368.
375 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 691 n.7 (Conn. 2012) (Norcott., J., dissenting) (“The communication board 
utilized by the victim contains numerous words, such as emotions, persons’ names, ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ and icons 
to which she can point in order to express her needs and desires, such as hunger, thirst and the need to use 
the toilet.”). An affirmative consent standard sounds with the first prong of Boni-Saenz’ three-pronged test to 
determine the sexual decision-making ability of persons with cognitive impairments: “the capacity to express 
volition.” Boni-Saenz, supra note 15, at 1234. 
376 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 105–08. For a more detailed discussion of Kulick and Rydstrom’s 
brief for sexual assistance for persons with disabilities, see infra Part IV.E.3. 
377 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 107.
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disabled persons or between disabled and nondisabled persons, and could be criterial for, if 
not dispositive of, affirmative consent. 
An  affirmative  consent  standard  for  sexual  assault  also  resonates  with  Denno’s 
“contextual approach” for determining consent, as well as with her suggestion to 
dedifferentiate sexual assault law for persons with disabilities.378 The contextual approach 
accounts for various situational and circumstantial criteria of the sexual encounter;379 so too, 
what will count as “affirmative consent” will depend on particularities. A “yes” procured 
through threats is not affirmative consent.380 If a person with intellectual disabilities smiles 
in  response  to all  social  interactions, however  injurious,  surely affirmative consent will 
require more than a smile.381 Because the “affirmative” component of affirmative consent 
can and should be tailored, the standard reaches persons with intellectual disabilities who 
thus no longer need be outcast into “statutory isolation.”382 Dedifferentiating disability 
in sexual assault law minimizes the potential for under-protection (not helpless enough) 
and over-protection (always already incapable of consent), while remedying the codified 
entrenchment of social stigma and marginality.383
However, an affirmative consent standard—in combination with greater restrictions on 
sex in relations of dependence and trust, delineated below—may better hedge against the 
moralistic, gendered policing Denno admonishes than Denno’s own contextual approach.384 
Her “situational factors,” for example, include “the number of men” involved in the 
sexual encounter.385 But if “number of men” is a legitimate factor in judges’ and juries’ 
considerations of consent, then perhaps roughness or kink might be legitimate factors too, 
378 Denno, supra note 316, at 355–58; see supra notes 336–349 and accompanying text. 
379 Denno, supra note 316, at 355–59. 
380 See Fischel, supra note 267, at 324; SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 114–36. 
381 See Denno, supra note 316, at 387–89; see also Appel, supra note 328, at 153 (“All smiles, of course, 
do not betoken consent. Yet rather than enforcing a restriction that is over-inclusive . . . caregivers of 
institutionalised individuals should evaluate smiles and other forms of non-verbal and indirect assent in the 
context of the patient’s life.”). 
382 Denno, supra note 316, at 343. 
383 Id. at 376; see also nanCy mairS, waiSt-hiGh in the world: a liFe amonG the nondiSabled 59 (1997) 
(discussing ways persons with disabilities are literally, not just figuratively, marginalized from society). 
384 Denno, supra note 316, at 355–60.
385 Id. at 374 (enumerating an appellate court’s criteria to determine the victim’s capacity in the “Glen Ridge 
Rape Case”). 
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and juries could well end up terming non-normative sex nonconsensual, repeating the very 
one-over Denno exposes as too often governing inquiries of “mental defectiveness.”386 
“Situational factors” may too easily slip into ableist/erotophobic societal mores, while 
affirmative consent may just as effectively regulate coercive or unwanted sex.387
A last note on the irony of “furbishing consent” in an Article titled “Disabling Consent”: 
By speculating on the injection of an affirmative consent standard into the general sexual 
assault statutes of the Connecticut Sex Offenses, we do not equate sexual autonomy with 
sexual consent.388 As discussed above, sexual autonomy, relationally reconceived, is 
attentive to broader social and material opportunities for the realization of intimate and 
sexual choices, and thus irreducible to first person present active consent, no matter how 
freely given, affirmative, or enthusiastic. Furbishing consent in sexual assault law is but 
one possible reform for better protecting and encouraging the sexual autonomy of persons 
across the spectrum of ability. Below are two more. 
2. Capturing Status 
No matter how (re)furbished, consent is not synonymous with nor solely constitutive 
of sexual autonomy, now relationally defined and inclusive of persons historically ejected 
from autonomy’s ambit. 
Another compensatory reform, then, to the gap in sexual assault protections for 
severely disabled persons is the expansion of laws to regulate or criminalize sexual conduct 
within certain relationships of dependence unaddressed by extant status restrictions. Status 
restrictions are, for the most part, strict liability offenses unconcerned with intent, scienter, 
consent, etc. Sex otherwise consensual may nonetheless be impermissible under per se 
proscriptions.
 
Status restrictions on sexual relations are neither unprecedented nor uncommon: 
assault laws frequently contain provisions restricting or prohibiting sexual contact within 
386 Id. at 350 (“[C]ourts’ pretense of a societal moral consensus [recognition of which may serve as the metric 
for an intellectually disabled person’s mental capacity] encourages judges and juries to determine consent not 
on the basis of facts and law but rather on the basis of their moral view of the world.”).
387 For a similar criticism of Denno’s remedy, see Boni-Saenz, supra note 15, at 1221, 1244.  However, 
under our reconstructed principle of sexual autonomy, not all consensual kinky or rough sex may be legally 
permissible. See supra notes 266–268 and accompanying text; infra note 417 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra Part i.C. 
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particular relationships.389 These status restrictions include provisions restricting sexual 
conduct between parents and their children, teachers and their students, employers and 
their employees, and/or doctors and their patients.390 Laws regulating sex within family 
relationships  (often  codified  as  “incest”)  commonly  target  consanguinity  or  biological 
relation over power inequality.391 Laws regulating sex between teachers and students are 
premised on both the alleged immaturity of minors392 and the likelihood of coercion or 
manipulation.393 Age of consent statutes, perhaps the most widespread example of status 
restriction codifications, are generally understood to concern both the uneven social power 
dynamics between adults and minors as well as the presumptively limited developmental 





391 See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-1901 (2013) (“If any person in the District related to another person within 
and not including the fourth degree of consanguinity . . . shall marry or cohabit with or have sexual intercourse 
with such other so-related person, knowing him or her to be within said degree of relationship, the person so 
offending shall be deemed guilty of incest.”); ind. Code § 35-46-1-3 (2013) (“A person eighteen (18) years 
of age or older who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with another person, when the 
person knows that the other person is related to the person biologically . . . commits incest.”). Some states, 
like Connecticut, also criminalize sexual contact between certain family members unrelated by blood, like 
stepparents and stepchildren. Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(4) (West 2012), -73a(a)(1)(A)(B) (West 
2012). See infra notes 396–404 and accompanying text. 
392 In Connecticut, status restrictions on employer-employee sex release when the employee is eighteen or 
older. Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-71(a)(10) (West 2012). Some (but not all) restrictions on teacher-student 
and coach-student relations release when the student reaches the age of majority. Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. 
§ 53a-71(a)(9) (West 2012) (“A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person 
engages in sexual intercourse with another person and . . . the actor is a coach in an athletic activity or a person 
who provides intensive, ongoing instruction and such other person is a recipient of coaching or instructions 
from the actor and . . . is a secondary school students and receives such coaching or instruction in a secondary 
school setting, or . . . is under eighteen years of age.”). 
393 See, e.g., SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 195–201; see also infra note 395.
394 See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory 
Rape, 48 buFF. l. rev. 703 (2000). Oberman also argues that age of consent laws are necessary to check peer 
coercive or unwanted sex. Id. at 717–28, 775–78. For less paternalistic proposals to reach peer coercive or 
unwanted sex, see, for instance, Fischel, supra note 267, at 300–31; Phipps, supra note 75, at 438–40. 
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negotiation due to acute dependence and/or inequality (e.g., psychotherapists, high school 
coaches, aunts, and uncles).395
Like other states, Connecticut criminalizes sex not only between adults and minors396 
(and between older adolescents and younger adolescents/children),397 but also within speci-
fied relations of dependence. Connecticut currently imposes restrictions of differing degrees 
of severity on relationships between parents/guardians and their children,398 custodial super-
visors (in the justice system, hospitals, and other institutions) and their charges,399 psycho-
therapists and their patients,400 school employees and students,401 coaches and players at the 
secondary school level,402 and employers and employees—if the employer is twenty-years-
old or older, and the employee is under eighteen.403 Sexual contact is also limited among 
familial relatives, along kinship lines stipulated in Connecticut General Statute § 46b-21.404 
But  are  these  restrictions  sufficient?  Or  to  put  this  differently:  how  often  do 
perpetrators of sexual assault “look” like Richard Fourtin—the mother’s boyfriend, an 
informal caretaker, a person of trust? Might prevalence of sexual abuse within heretofore 
unregulated relations of dependence be grounds for proscription?
395 On what sorts of relations of dependence might be reasonably subject to heightened regulations on sex, 
and why, see SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 168–253; see also Fischel, supra note 267, at 318.
396 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-70(a)(2) (West 2015).
397 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(1), -73a(a)(1)(E) (West 2012).
398 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(4), -73a(a)(1)(A)(B) (West 2012).
399 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(5), -73a(a)(1)(F) (West 2012).
400 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(6), -73a(a)(4) (West 2012).
401 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(8), -73a(a)(6) (West 2012).
402 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(9), -73a(a)(7) (West 2012).
403 Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. §§ 53a-71(a)(10), -73a(a)(8) (West 2012).
404 Connecticut General Statute § 53a-72a(a)(2) prohibits sexual intercourse between persons who know that 
they are related within any of the following degrees: parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, parent’s 
sibling, sibling’s child, stepparent, or stepchild. Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-72a(a)(2) (West 2012).
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a. Capturing Status by the Numbers
 
To track patterns of sexual violence within relations of dependence, we reviewed, coded, 
and analyzed all sexual assault cases heard by the Connecticut Appellate Court between 
January 1, 2010, and March 1, 2015: a dataset of 175 cases and 205 unique victims.405 
The results confirm research on sexual assault incidence more generally, which suggests 
that about 80% of sexual assaults are committed by someone known to the victim406—a 
number that rises to over 90% for victims who are minors when assaulted.407 Of all victims 
whose connection to the perpetrator is described in the respective case (n = 161), 87.0% 
had a prior, established relationship with the perpetrator, and 72.0% had a relationship that 
could  be  classified  as  involving  significant  dependence  and/or  power  imbalance.408 Sex 
within some of these relationships is already prohibited in Connecticut—for example, sex 
between fathers and their children, or sex between a teacher or coach and their students.409 
In other relationships, though, manipulations of power and dependence may go unchecked.
405 Cases were extracted from a LexisNexis search on March 1, 2015. An initial search yielded 214 unique 
cases heard by the Connecticut Appellate Court between January 1, 2010 and March 1, 2015, all of which 
contained the phrase “sexual assault.” Of these, 39 appeals were excluded from analysis: they were duplicate 
cases or appeals of jury trials that referenced “sexual assault” but sexual assault was immaterial to the issue of 
law. The remaining 175 cases were coded and analyzed. 9.1% of cases involved multiple victims, resulting in a 
total victim count of 207. For a more extensive overview of case data, see infra Appendix.
406 miChael Planty et al., u.S. deP’t oF JuStiCe, Female viCtimS oF Sexual violenCe, 1994–2010 4 (2013).
407 howard n. Snyder, Sexual aSSault oF younG Children aS rePorted to law enForCement: viCtim, 
inCident, and oFFender CharaCteriStiCS, nat’l Ctr. For Juvenile JuStiCe 10 (2000).
408  The following relationships were classified as “involving significant dependence and/or power imbalance” 
for this analysis: intimate relationships (spouse, former spouse, partner, former partner), familial and semi-
familial relationships (father, uncle, grandfather, other family member, other legal guardian, stepfather, 
mother’s boyfriend/intimate partner), caretaking relationships (babysitter, teacher or coach, other caretaker), 
coworker/employer, and client (for sex workers). 
409 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. ann. § 53a-73a (West 2012).
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Table 1: Most Common Perpetrator/Victim Relationships,  
Connecticut Appellate Court Sexual Assault Cases, 2010–2015410
 # % of total  (n = 205)
% of total, excl. “relationship  
not specified” (n = 161)
Father 28 13.7% 17.4%
Mother’s boyfriend/partner 24 11.7% 14.9%
Stranger 15 7.3% 9.3%
Uncle 11 5.4% 6.8%
Stepfather 9 4.4% 5.6%
Family friend 8 3.9% 5.0%
Other personal acquaintance 8 3.9% 5.0%
Grandfather 7 3.4% 4.3%
Spouse 6 2.9% 3.7%
Other family member 5 2.4% 3.1%
Other known adult 5 2.4% 3.1%
Although fathers—the most common perpetrators in this set—are prohibited by status 
restriction from engaging in sexual contact with their children, mothers’ boyfriends, and 
unmarried partners of parents generally, are not (our dataset contained only one female 
perpetrator).411 The statutory focus on fathers rather than unmarried parents’ partners as 
potential perpetrators (even when the partner cohabits with the mother and maintains a 
parental household role)412 seems, superficially, commonsensical: the relationship involves 
410 See infra Appendix, Tbl.A.3 for a complete review of all relationships between perpetrators and victims. 
411 See State v. Lanasa, 62 A.3d 572 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (involving the assault of a fifteen-year-old boy 
by his high school classmate’s mother); supra note 404. There are limited data on the prevalence of female 
perpetration of sexual assault. Research indicates that female perpetration of sexual assault is underreported, 
in part due to gendered stereotypes that construe perpetration as male and victimhood as female, and in part 
due to the legacy of rape laws that required penetrative, heterosexual intercourse as an element of the crime. 
See, e.g., Ctr. For Sex oFFender mGmt., u.S. deP’t oF JuStiCe, Female Sex oFFenderS (2007). Despite our 
highlighting the frequent offending of fathers and mothers’ boyfriends, the expanded status restrictions that we 
propose would apply to perpetrators and victims of all genders. 
412 Cohabitation with an unmarried intimate partner is increasingly common in the United States, where 
the rates of unmarried parenthood (24% in 2013, compared to less than 10% in 1960) have increased as rates 
of marriage have fallen (close to 70% in 1960, compared to 50.5% in 2012). See Andrew L. Yarrow, Falling 
Marriage Rates Reveal Economic Fault Lines, n.y. timeS, Feb. 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/
fashion/weddings/falling-marriage-rates-reveal-economic-fault-lines.html [http://perma.cc/KL75-Z8J7]; 
Emily Badger, The Unbelievable Rise of Single Motherhood in America over the Last 50 Years, waSh. PoSt, 
Dec. 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/18/the-unbelievable-rise-of-single-
motherhood-in-america-over-the-last-50-years/ [http://perma.cc/36RU-4ARV]. Given this trend—whereby 
mothers’ boyfriends may inhabit transient or permanent paternal roles, cohabiting in ways that involve financial 
and emotional resource-sharing similar to marital cohabitation—the incongruity in status restrictions between 
mothers’ boyfriends (unmarried parents’ partners) and spouses/parents is anachronistic.
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neither consanguinity nor a formal, legal relationship of dependence. As shown in Table 
1, though, mothers’ boyfriends may perpetrate sexual assault at close to the same rate as 
fathers: they are the second most common perpetrators in our case review (accounting 
for 14.9% of assaults across appellate cases in which the relationship between victim and 
perpetrator is specified, compared to 17.4% for fathers). Uncles, also common perpetrators 
(6.8%), are prohibited from sexual contact with their nephews and nieces, but only by 
consanguinity.413 An uncle by blood faces status restrictions on sexual contact with his 
niece or nephew, but an uncle by marriage (or an aunt’s live-in boyfriend) does not.414 
These legal discrepancies—or what we might crudely call “the green light” for mother’s 
boyfriends and uncles—demonstrate the failure of existing status restrictions to capture 
common manipulations of relational dependence.
If, in the interest of protecting and promoting sexual autonomy, we shift from a model 
of status restrictions based on age and consanguinity (or legal affinity, e.g. relatives “by 
marriage” rather than “by blood”) to a model based on significant dependence and inequality, 
other relationships may be regulable. Sexual autonomy might provide normative grounds to 
restrict, for example, sexual contact between a young woman and her mother’s boyfriend, 
as the young woman may be unduly impeded from codetermining (in the Fourtin scenario, 
exiting) the relation despite the absence of a formal (legal or consanguine) relationship. 
Recall Rubenfeld’s second seventeen-year-old (pressured into sex with the high 
school principal)415 and Spindelman’s cannibalistic sex.416 We are inclined to think of sex 
in heretofore legally unregulated relations of dependence (namely, the child of a parent 
and the parent’s intimate partner) like sex between a teenage student and a high school 
teacher, or, strange-sounding as  it first seems, sex that entails killing, eating, or causing 
severe and irreversible injury to one’s partner. Under a relationally reconstructed sexual 
autonomy sensor, sex with your mother’s boyfriend, sex with your high school principal, 
and sex that involves irreversible injury may be impermissible because of the permanent 
constraints they level on an individual’s (sexual) future, and therefore hir ongoing ability 
to codetermine sexual relations.417 Relational sexual autonomy protects not just the sexual 
413 See supra note 404. 
414 Id.
415 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
417 See supra notes 264–269 and accompanying text. But see Downing, supra note 268. In a similar vein, 
Sarah Conly argues that the state ought to prevent persons from engaging in forms of conduct that contravene 
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present but the possibility of a sexual future. And capturing status relations, as opposed to 
extending the reach of “physical helplessness” or “mental incapacity,” renders sex between 
Richard Fourtin and L.K. impermissible, without the risk of criminalizing all sex with 
persons with disabilities. 
Viewed alongside our appellate case review, Fourtin appears both exceptional and 
typical. Exceptional, because the statutes under which Fourtin was charged—those 
that reference physical helplessness—are so infrequently exercised by the state418 and 
because  reported  assault  cases  rarely  involve  victims  with  identified  disabilities.419 
Typical, though, because the relationship between Richard Fourtin and L.K. was one of 
significant dependence and power imbalance due to Fourtin’s dual roles as L.K.’s mother’s 
boyfriend and one of L.K.’s informal caretakers.420 A recurring theme across witness and 
expert testimonies in and preceding Fourtin  is  L.K.’s  significant  dependence  on  others 
in her day-to-day life, including on Fourtin himself.421 As disabled persons living in a 
their own best interests. However, she claims her advocacy for (selective, consequentially justified) coercive 
paternalism counters the normative and cultural primacy of autonomy. But insofar as “a coercive action 
might protect an individual’s freedom in the long run,” her critique against the conventional understanding 
of autonomy might buttress our reconstruction. Sarah Conly, aGainSt autonomy: JuStiFyinG CoerCive 
PaternaliSm 151 (2013).  
418 Only one of the 175 appellate cases we surveyed involves a charge under Connecticut General Statute 
§ 53a-71(a)(3), the “physically helpless” standard. See State v. Joseph, 93 A.3d 1174 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). 
Another involves Connecticut General Statute § 53a-71(a)(2), the former “mentally defective ” standard, now 
the “impaired because of mental disability or disease” standard. See State v. Dickerson, 97 A.3d 15 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2014).
419 Only three of the 175 appellate cases we surveyed involve a victim whose disability is referenced in court 
documents. In all three cases, the perpetrator was aware of the victim’s disability. See State v. Carolina, 69 A.3d 
341 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (involving the assault of a teenage girl with unidentified “cognitive disabilities” by 
her non-biological uncle); State v. Dearing, 34 A.3d 1031 (Conn. App. 2012) (involving the assault of a nine-
year-old girl with “pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified” by an adult family friend); Di 
Teresi v. Stamford Health Sys., Inc., 63 A.3d 1011 (Conn. App. 2013) (involving the assault of a ninety-two-
year-old woman with “dementia, advanced Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and other ailments” by a 
nurse’s assistant while the victim was hospitalized at Stamford Hospital).
420 See State v. Fourtin, 982 A.2d 261, 263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (“The defendant, who was the boyfriend 
of the complainant’s mother, lived nearby. He frequently assisted the mother in caring for the complainant. The 
complainant got along with him.”).
421 Id. at 264 (“She cannot walk and needs assistance in performing the daily activities of living.”). See also 
Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 679 (“[T]he prosecutor argued that the jurors could find that she was [physically helpless] 
because, like an infant, ‘[s]he is totally dependent on others.’”); id. at 678 (noting that S, L.K.’s mother, “took 
her to the shower”). The Court cites similar testimony from the caregivers and supervisors at L.K.’s adult 
day care program, on whom she is dependent when not at home with her mother. Id. at 695–96 (Norcott, J., 
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world compulsorily captivated by and structurally designed for the able-bodied,422 L.K. 
and similarly-situated adults are often “radically dependent” on the assistance of those 
around them in order to complete tasks necessary for both survival and flourishing.423 This 
dependence places severely disabled persons at substantially higher risk of victimization, 
sexual and otherwise. Research suggests that women with disabilities are approximately 
four times more likely than women without disabilities to experience sexual assault.424 For 
persons with intellectual disabilities (ranging from mild to severe), risk of victimization 
may be even greater, approximately ten times higher than for persons without intellectual 
disabilities.425 Comparative rates of lifetime risk of sexual assault do not capture the 
heightened risk of repeated victimization: in one study of persons with diverse disabilities 
who had experienced sexual assault, nearly half (49.6%) had experienced ten or more 
sexually abusive incidents in their lifetimes.426 
Especially instructive are the rates at which disabled people are sexually assaulted 
within the context of relationships of intimacy and dependence. Dick Sobsey and Tanis 
Doe found that 37.5% of perpetrators held supervisory positions over their victims, 
contracted on the basis of the victims’ disability.427 Another 28.8% of perpetrators had other 
dissenting). 
422 See Robert McRuer, Compulsory Able-Bodiedness and Queer/Disabled Existence, in diSability StudieS: 
enablinG the humanitieS 88, 88 (Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann & Rosemarie Garland-Thompson 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter McRuer, Compulsory]; European Disability Forum, “A world made for disabilities,” 
youtube (Jan. 30, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsuKxY_9f_8 [http://perma.cc/2WZ7-AMK5]. 
423 ChriStian Smith, to FlouriSh or deStruCt: a PerSonaliSt theory oF human GoodS, motivationS, 
Failure, and evil 248 (2015). 
424 Sandra L. Martin et al., Physical and Sexual Assault of Women with Disabilities, 12 violenCe aGainSt 
women 823, 834 (2006); see also Carri Casteel et al., National Study of Physical and Sexual Assault among 
Women with Disabilities, 14 inJury Prevention 87, 90 (2008). For a meta-analysis of studies comparing rates 
of abuse among disabled and nondisabled women, see Sara-Beth Plummer & Patricia A. Findley, Women with 
Disabilities’ Experience with Physical and Sexual Abuse: A Review of the Literature and Implications for the 
Field, 13 trauma violenCe & abuSe 15 (2012).
425 Carlene Wilson & Neil Brewer, The Incidence of Criminal Victimisation of Individuals with an Intellectual 
Disability, 27 auStralian PSyCholoGiSt 114, 115 (1992).
426 Dick Sobsey & Tanis Doe, Patterns of Sexual Abuse and Assault, 9 Sexuality & diSability 243, 247 
(1991).
427 Id. at 248. For example, disability service providers (e.g., personal care attendants, psychiatrists, 
residential care staff) comprised 27.7% of perpetrators, specialized transportation providers 5.4%, and 
specialized foster parents 4.3%.
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supervisory positions over the victims.428 Evidence also suggests that factors associated 
with increased dependence, including decreased mobility and increased social isolation, 
are strongly predictive of experiencing sexual violence as a disabled person.429 Like Anne 
Finger, we recognize that the trope of sexual victimization itself can be oppressive, if that 
trope is leveraged to categorically ban sex with, or withhold sexual information from, 
persons with disabilities.430 Far from pointing toward a general prohibition, however, these 
data support expanding status restrictions to restrict or prohibit sexual conduct across 
relationships of dependence.
We  find  a  host  of  compelling  reasons,  then,  for  expanding  status  restrictions  in 
Connecticut (and beyond) to capture certain relationships of dependence for both disabled 
and nondisabled persons alike. However, we concede that categorical restrictions on sex 
between disabled persons and their caretakers could, like overextending the “physically 
helpless” or “mentally defective” subsections of Connecticut sexual assault law, impede 
the sexual autonomy of persons like L.K.431 Caretakers may be the ones best equipped to 
act as sexual assistants for their severely disabled clients. The conundrum is this: those 
best able to sexually gratify persons with severe disabilities are those best positioned to 
abuse them (hence our proposal for expanded status restrictions).432 One possible way to 
circumvent this conundrum is to render affirmative consent an affirmative defense within 
certain status relations.433 
A last note on capturing status: expanding the universe of status relations in which 
sex  is  legally  impermissible,  like  injecting  an  affirmative  consent  standard  into  sexual 
428 Id. For example, family members comprised 16.8%, paid service providers (e.g., babysitters) comprised 
9.8%, and step-family members comprised 2.2%.
429 Margaret A. Nosek et al., Disability, Psychosocial, and Demographic Characteristics of Abused Women 
with Physical Disabilities, 12 violenCe aGainSt women 838, 846 (2006); see also Gill, supra note 13, at 
33–34. 
430 Finger, supra note 329. 
431 See infra Part III.C. 
432 See supra note 427.
433  For  a  similar  argument  regarding  sex  between minors  (for which  affirmative  consent would  provide 
an affirmative defense), see Heidi Kitrosser, supra note 368, at 330–31. Of course, this solution would not 
solve the problem if the caretaker accused of sexual assault is the person facilitating the alleged victim’s 
affirmative consent. See Daniel Engber, The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, n.y. timeS maG., Oct. 20, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-anna-stubblefield.html?_r=0 [http://perma. 
cc/RM2J-K4RG]; see also Boni-Saenz, supra note 15, at 1239, 1245. 
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assault law, also sounds with Denno’s “contextual approach” to determinations of sexual 
consent.434 A critical factor under her contextual approach is “defendant’s knowledge in 
relation to the victim’s ability to consent.”435  Defendant’s knowledge is better grounds 
for determining consent than, say, the “[intellectually disabled] victim’s actual physical 
appearance while testifying,” which invites prejudicial, decontextualized interpretations.436 
“More appropriate,” advises Denno, “is a court’s consideration of the victim’s relationship to 
the defendant. Although the factor is important in all rape cases, it becomes a major issue in 
cases involving a mentally retarded victim because it bears on whether the defendant knew 
or should have known that the victim was capable of consent in a particular situation.”437 
Our Appellate case analysis suggests that Denno is right to be concerned: in the few cases 
we reviewed that involved a disabled victim, the perpetrator was unambiguously aware of 
his victim’s communicative limitations.438 Richard Fourtin, like many a mother’s boyfriend, 
knew about his girlfriend’s child. At the very least, he knew L.K. was intellectually disabled, 
nonverbal, in a wheelchair, and isolated.439 That this sort of information is more readily 
434 Denno, supra note 316, at 355–59; see also supra notes 340–345 and accompanying text; supra notes 
378–387 and accompanying text. 
435 Denno, supra note 316, at 371 (internal citation omitted). 
436 Id. at 372. 
437 Id. (emphases added) (internal citation omitted). In State v. Dearing, 34 A.3d 1031 (Conn. App. 2012), 
the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the nine-year-old victim to testify, on 
the grounds that she was incompetent (due to her “pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified”). 
The  trial  court  judgment  was  affirmed,  and  Dearing’s  claims  rejected.  The  very  “incompetence”  Dearing 
exploited sexually, he then attempted to exploit legally. 
438 See supra note 419. Expanding status restrictions (to reach parents’ partners, or disabled persons’ 
professional caretakers) and rendering affirmative consent an affirmative defense to sexual activity between a 
caretaker and a disabled client both become rather complicated—or perhaps rather uncomplicated—when the 
caretaker is already a long-term intimate partner (such as a spouse) of the disabled client. In these scenarios, 
a “contextual approach” would be presumptively favorable toward, say, the husband of the alleged victim and 
presumptively unfavorable toward, say, the alleged victim’s mother’s boyfriend. In the spring of 2015, an Iowa 
jury found a man not guilty of sexually assaulting his wife, an Alzheimer’s patient. The jury rejected both of the 
prosecutor’s claims: that the couple had sexual contact on the date in question and that the defendant’s wife was 
mentally incapable of consenting to sexual activity. See Pam Belluck, Iowa Man Found Not Guilty of Sexually 
Abusing Wife with Alzheimer’s, n.y. timeS, Apr. 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/health/iowa-
man-found-not-guilty-of-sexually-abusing-wife-with-alzheimers.html [http://perma.cc/8FSS-SJ3S]; Tony 
Leys & Grant Rogers, Rayhons: ‘Truth finally came out’ with not guilty verdict, deS moineS reG., Apr. 22, 
2015, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/04/22/henry-rayhons-acquitted-
sexual-abuse/26105699 [http://perma.cc/Y7S6-UB6U]. 
439 State v. Fourtin, 982 A.2d 261, 263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (“The defendant, who was the boyfriend of 
the complainant’s mother, lived nearby. He frequently assisted the mother in caring for the complainant. The 
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ascertainable in relations of dependence and trust provides further normative ammunition 
for proscribing sex in those relations.
3. Accommodating Sex 
 
Sexual autonomy as a universal human capability portends the following policy 
recommendations,440 but so does ableism, and the ugly history of the wide-scale denigration 
or outright denial of the sexuality of persons with disabilities, particularly intellectual 
disabilities.441 Persons with disabilities have been figured—by medical experts, scientists, 
journalists, and cultural workers—as sexually predatory or, more often, as childlike and 
innocent.442 Both constructs, predator and child, have authorized the refusal of sexual 
information to, and impeded the sexual opportunities for, persons with disabilities.443 
Women with disabilities have and continue to suffer disproportionate suppression of their 
complainant got along with him.”). However, perspicacity to the spectrum of ability troubles any certitude of 
the Fourtin facts: “Although the defendant was arrested in 2006, his trial was postponed because he was found 
incompetent to stand trial at that time. The trial commenced two years later, when he was found to have been 
restored to competency after a period of commitment to Connecticut Valley Hospital.” Id. at 263. 
440 A non-policy recommendation that we do not consider but strenuously support is a shift in cultural 
representation. Too often, persons with disabilities are represented as either asexual or as a fetishistic 
subgenre. See Mollow, supra note 27, at 286. But see the SeSSionS (Fox Searchlight 2012). The available 
representational trope for persons with disabilities is almost always what the late disability rights activist 
Stella Young termed “inspiration porn”: motivation for the rest of us (if she can do it, I have no excuse. . . .). 
Stella Young, I’m not your inspiration, thank you very much, tedxSydney (Apr. 2014), http://www.ted.com/
talks/stella_young_i_m_not_your_inspiration_thank_you_very_much?language=en#t-7303 [http://perma.cc/ 
ETJ6-PGX3]. Were sexual activity and intimacies across the ability spectrum represented benignly, or were 
the sexual skills of quadriplegics or persons with tracheotomies celebrated in mass media, we imagine sexual 
culture would be far more hospitable, creative, and pleasurable. See Siebers, supra note 27, at 48–50. Certainly 
too, transformations in material relations and institutional practices (base) would expand repertoires of 
representation (superstructure). See Charlton, supra note 218, at 27.
441 See, e.g., Appel, supra note 328; Block, supra note 304; Denno, supra note 316, at 332–59. But see 
Michel Desjardins, The Sexualized Body of the Child: Parents and the Politics of ‘Voluntary’ Sterilization of 
People Labeled Intellectually Disabled, in Sex and diSability, supra note 27, at 69, 73 (observing that the 
parents of persons with disabilities whom the author interviewed did not “asexualize” their children but were 
instead concerned with their children producing offspring). 
442 See Mollow, supra note 27, at 286. 
443 Id.; see also Denno, supra note 316, at 33–34; Finger, supra note 329. In one study, forty percent of 
intellectually disabled women surveyed had never received any education regarding gynecologic and/or 
reproductive health. C.A. Kopac, J. Fritz & R.A. Holt, Gynecologic and Reproductive Services for Women with 
Developmental Disabilities, 2 Clin. exCell. nurSe PraCt. 88 (1998). 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law504 30.2
sexuality.444 In the past, medical and political authorities sterilized women or otherwise 
curbed their sexuality, motivated by eugenic fears of social degradation.445 In the present, 
medical and political authorities restrict the sexual lives of women with disabilities out 
of  concern  for  the  caretaking  responsibilities  and  financial  burdens  of  their  potential 
offspring.446
Meanwhile, the modern disability rights movement, which has justifiably centralized 
discrimination and accommodation in notionally public vectors of housing, employment, 
and education, has paid scant attention to ostensibly private vectors of sex and intimacy 
(which are hardly private in so many scenarios involving severe disability).447 And 
while the silence around sexuality and disability has broken in recent years, journalistic, 
documentarian, pornographic, scholarly, and autobiographic accounts of sex and disability 
generally feature persons with physical disabilities, sidestepping what might be thornier 
 
 
444 See CarlSon, supra note 158, at 53–83; Denno, supra note 316, at 334; see also KuliCK & rydStröm, 
supra note 27, at 164–73; Finger, supra note 329.
445 See Denno, supra note 316, at 333–34. 
446 See KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 164–71. This concern also manifests in “menstrual manipul-
ation”—the use of clinical methods, like contraceptives, to alter the symptoms and experiences associated 
with menstruation or suppress menstruation altogether in young people with disabilities. In some cases, the 
young person may desire relief from menstrual inconveniences, general (such as dysmenorrhea, painful 
cramps, or muscle pains) and/or associated with one’s disability (such as heavy or irregular bleeding associated 
with  certain  developmental  disabilities  or  difficulty  utilizing  conventional  sanitary  products  with  physical 
mobility limitations). However, clinical guidelines released by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada suggest that caretakers’ and 
parents’ anxieties about the complications of menstruation and disability more commonly motivate menstrual 
manipulation. See Y.A. Kirkham et al., SOGC Clinical Practice Guideline: Menstrual Suppression in Special 
Circumstances, 36 J. obStetriC GynaeColoGy Can. 915 (2014); Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
Menstrual Manipulation for Adolescents with Disabilities, 448 aCoG Committee oPinion 1 (2009); I. Savasi 
et al., Menstrual Suppression for Adolescents with Developmental Disabilities, 22 J. PediatriC adoleSCent 
GyneColoGy 143 (2009).
  In a study conducted in Quebec, Michel Desjardins finds that parents of teenagers and young adults with 
intellectual disabilities persuade their children, through a host of strategies, to “elect” sterilization as the trade-
off for sexual activity. Parents are foremost concerned that their children are not “capable of carrying out the 
role of parent.” Desjardins, supra note 441, at 77. In these scenarios, it is the semblance of consent, rather than 
incapacity to consent, that is morally (and legally) transformative. Id. at 80–81. 
447 See KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 120–34; Finger, supra note 329; Siebers, supra note 27, at 
43–46. 
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moral and philosophical questions regarding sexual flourishing for L.K. and others with 
intellectual disabilities.448 
Reconstructing sexual autonomy as a universal human capability, avowing the nearly 
ubiquitous historical suppression of the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities, and 
integrating recent contributions of feminist and queer disability scholarship and activism, 
our suggested institutional reforms constellate around three components: greater access for 
sexual information and opportunities, far more comprehensive, variably tailored sexuality 
education, and substantive provisions for sexual assistance. 
Such reforms, it should be noted, are some steps removed from the moral urgency of 
L.K.’s sexual assault and the legal lacuna made manifest in Fourtin. Rather, these policy 
proposals point toward broader structural and social change that foster sexual autonomy 
across the spectrum of ability, while at once better equipping disabled persons in particular 
with sexual self-confidence and sexual decision-making capabilities. 
a. Sexual Access
In “A Sexual Culture for Disabled People,” Toby Siebers convincingly argues that our 
dominant understandings of the sexual good life are shot through with ableist 
assumptions.449 From “great sex” to beauty standards to personal and social determinants 
of intimacy to the propriety of “the private” for sexual conduct, our macro social norms 
and everyday expectations regarding sex prefigure able-bodied,  rational, and reasonable 
persons inhabiting the amatory couple form.450 It is because this concept of a “sex life”—
individualized, domesticated, privatized, and oriented around a presumptively proper 
physicality, ability, and genital-directedness—is so tightly wound to normative ability 
standards that Siebers opts instead to carry a brief for “sexual culture.”451 “Sexual culture” 
448 See, e.g., mairS, supra note 383; O’Brien, supra note 329; murderball (ThinkFilm 2005); Tim Dean, 
Stumped, in the Porn arChiveS 420 (Tim Dean, Steven Ruszczycky & David Squires eds., 2014). As Kulick 
and Rydström put it bluntly, persons with severe disabilities, often but not always intellectual, “write no 
poems” (primarily referencing Mark O’Brien) and “throw no balls” (primarily referencing the rugby players 
of murderball, id.). KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 16. “These kinds of significantly disabled adults,” 
they insist, “are the ones who need the most help in exploring their sexuality.” Id. at 3. 
449 Siebers, supra note 27, at 38–43. 
450 See generally id.
451 Id. at 39. 
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is not simply a synonym for sex in public.452 As Siebers explains, “the distinction between 
sex  life  and  sexual  culture  relies  not  on  privacy  but  access  as  defined  in  a  disability 
context: sexual culture increases access for disabled people not only by breaking down 
the barriers restricting them from sexual locations but also by bringing sexual rights to 
where they live.”453 For Siebers, a critical element of expanding sexual culture for persons 
with disabilities is broadening access, which means, in part, remapping zones of sexual 
permissibility and impermissibility so that the erotic worlds of persons with disabilities 
are not so “obnoxiously cramped.”454 Access entails: affording more privacy rights to 
disabled persons in group homes; eliminating the “‘no sex’ policies that exist in American 
nursing facilities, mental hospitals, and group homes”;455 providing more (or as is often 
the case, any) opportunities to meet sexual partners, to masturbate, and to read erotic and 
pornographic  literature  or  view  erotic  or  pornographic  films;456 delivering “information 
about sexuality[; and] . . . addressing sexual needs and desires as part of health care.”457 
Finally, access to sexual culture entails a right to choose what one does not want, to refuse 
sexual advances from caretakers.458 
Making sexual culture more realizable for persons with disabilities entails approaching 
disability from a social welfare perspective and not simply from an antidiscrimination 
perspective.459 If we are to guarantee a right to sexual culture, that guarantee cannot be 
secured through a “reasonable accommodation” particularized to one sector of social life.460 




Sex in Public, 24 CritiCal inQuiry 547 (1998). 
453 Siebers, supra note 27, at 39–40. 
454 Berlant & Warner, supra note 452, at 557.
455 Appel, supra note 328, at 153; Gill, supra note 13, at 39. 
456 Siebers, supra note 27, at 45. 
457 Id. at 47; see also KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 293 (approving group home policies and 
practices that make sex a “legitimate and welcome topic of discussion and concern”). 
458 Siebers, supra note 27, at 45–46; see also SChulhoFer, supra note 24, at 99. 
459 See Satz, supra note 27, at 554–68. 
460 On the importance of cross-sectorial accommodation reforms for persons with (and without) disabilities, 
see Satz, supra note 27, at 541–50.
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with contraception, abortion, and family planning, and in providing information about 
varieties of sexual conduct and intimacy arrangements. 
So too, transforming sexual access entails more than minimizing physical barriers 
or amending group home policies. In his 1990 study of fourteen men with cerebral 
palsy, Russell Shuttleworth found that “the two issues that most often emerged in [his] 
discussions  .  .  . were  the difficulty [men] experienced in meeting social expectations of 
normative functioning and control and male gender role expectations.”461 Shuttleworth’s 
informants were perceived by themselves and others as undesirable on account of their 
restricted mobility, speech impairments, and limited bodily control.462 And his informants’ 
inability to fulfill “hegemonic expectations of masculinity” like “competitiveness, strength, 
control, endurance, and independence” rendered them unattractive and inadequate.463 These 
observations paired with Shuttleworth’s own normative priors lead him to call for a more 
capacious understanding of “barriers” to access, one that includes “parents’ negative or 
protective attitudes, a lack of sexual negotiation models for disabled people, unattainable 
ideals of desirability . . . poor body image . . . among other concerns.”464 Certainly, these 
barriers cannot be lowered or eradicated by policy changes and institutional reforms alone, 
but they should nonetheless be on our sexual justice radar as we seek to improve access.465 
461 Shuttleworth, supra note 158, at 185.
462 Id. at 185–88. 
463 Id. at 189–92. “Those men, however, who did not view hegemonic masculinity as a total index of their 
desirability . . . could better stand rejection and . . . were able to cultivate significantly more successful sexual 
relationships than those who could not.” Id. at 190–91. 
464 Id. at 178. Amy Swango-Wilson suggests that liberalizing parents’ and caretakers’ attitudes regarding 
sexuality and disability may improve the sexual lives and opportunities of their dependents. Amy Swango-
Wilson, Caregiver Perceptions and Implications for Sex Education for Individuals with Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities, 26 Sex & diSability 167, 172–74 (2008) [hereinafter Swango-Wilson, Caregiver 
Perceptions]. 
465 See Young, supra note 440. Kulick and Rydström criticize Shuttleworth and others for banking too 
much of their sexual rights agenda on access. Physical access to various sexualized spaces (e.g., dance clubs) 
is inadequate if not outright irrelevant for persons whose mobility and/or cognition is severely limited. And 
pressures of gender expectations and desirability norms endured by disabled persons may be different in degree, 
but not kind, from pressures endured by nondisabled persons. KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 19–22. 
While access, institutional or representational, is variably important across the spectrum of ability, surely 
lowering barriers should be componential of, even if not comprehensive for, fostering the sexual autonomy of 
persons with disabilities. Expanding access is necessary but not sufficient. 
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In addition to spatial and representational transformations, meaningful access to sexual 
culture also demands more comprehensive sexuality education for all persons, with or 
without physical or intellectual disabilities. 
b. Sexuality Education466 
A commitment to sexual autonomy—as a capability that needs to be cultivated—
requires a minimal level of publicly funded comprehensive sexuality education (CSE). 
Below, we sketch out briefly United States CSE in its fraught political context, describe 
what CSE could be, and then synthesize and speculate upon ways CSE might interface with 
disability. 
Comprehensive sexual education programs were all but rubbed out in the United States 
between 1981 and 2009.467 Until quite recently, Abstinence Only Until Marriage (AOUM) 
programs dominated public schools, especially those in poorer communities.468 AOUM 
programs were first federally funded under the Reagan Administration, and “funding for 
these unproven programs grew exponentially from 1996 until 2009, particularly during 
the years of the George W. Bush Administration, and to date Congress has funneled over 
one-and-a-half billion tax-payer dollars into abstinence-only-until-marriage programs.”469 
AOUM programs are both scientifically inaccurate and ineffective against their own success 
measures.470 They elide or demean queer sexualities, and reproduce presumptions of male 
 
466 Some of this subsection has been adapted from Joseph J. Fischel, A More Promiscuous Politics: LGBT 
Rights without the LGBT Rights, in aFter marriaGe eQuality: the Future oF lGbt PolitiCS (Carlos Ball ed., 
2016) (forthcoming).
467 See Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS), A Brief History of 
Federal Funding for Sex Education and Related Program, SIECUS (2011), http://www.siecus.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=1341&nodeID=1 [http://perma.cc/C8S9-4NPG]. 
468 Id.; see also Michelle Fine & Sara I. McClelland, Sexuality Education and Desire: Still Missing After All 
These Years, 76 harv. ed. rev. 297, 307 (2006). 
469 See SIECUS, supra note 467. 
470 Id.; see also Fine & McClelland, supra note 468, at 309–13; Patrick Malone & Monica Rodriguez, 
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aggression and female vulnerability.471 Such programs promote not sexual autonomy but 
sexual incompetence and ignorance. 
While the Obama Administration has relaxed the funding stranglehold of AOUM,472 
most publicly funded sexuality education programs remain abstinence-only or “abstinence-
plus,”473 and the great majority of United States teenagers either do not learn anything at all 
(in school) about sex or learn only that sex should be deferred.474 Comprehensive sexuality 
education, while certainly a major improvement from AOUM, does not extend broadly or 
deeply enough to foster the capability to codetermine sexual relations. Some CSE programs 
avow and respect minority sexual orientations and provide accurate information about 




471 See nanCy Kendall, the Sex eduCation debateS 151–223 (2013); Fine & McClelland, supra note 467, 
at 309–11; Rose Grace Grose, Shelly Grabe & Danielle Kohfeldt, Sexual Education, Gender Ideology, and 
Youth Sexual Empowerment, 51 J. Sex reS. 742, 749 (2014) (finding that “hegemonic masculinity ideology,” 
linked to “traditional attitudes toward women,” was significantly negatively associated with “safer contraceptive 
beliefs” among youth participating in a sex education program); infra note 430. But see also Sharon Lamb, 
Kelly Graling & Kara Lustig, Stereotypes in Four Current Sexuality Education Curricula: Good Girls, Good 
Boys, and the New Gender Equality, 6 am. J. Sexuality edu. 360, 373–74 (2011) (finding that stereotypes 
of male aggression and female passivity have remained but subsided in AOUM sexuality education curricula 
while stereotypes of girls as manipulators and temptresses have surfaced.). 
472 See SIECUS, supra note 467.  
473 Abstinence-plus education programs “aim to prevent, stop, or decrease sexual activity; however, 
programs also promote condom use and other safer-sex strategies as alternatives for sexually active 
participants. Abstinence-plus programs differ from abstinence-only interventions, which promote abstinence 
as the exclusive means of HIV prevention without encouraging safer sex.” K. Underhill, P. Montgomery & D. 
Operario, Abstinence-plus Programs for HIV Infection Prevention in High-Income Countries, 4 evid.-baSed 
Child health 400, 409 (2009). See also Kendall, supra note 471, at 7–8; Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Schools 
Can’t Teach Sex Ed, time (2014), http://time.com/why-schools-cant-teach-sex-ed [http://perma.cc/U2R8-
F2AF].
474 Sifferlin, supra note 473. 
475 See Kendall, supra note 471, at 6–7, 225–31; Sharon Lamb, The Place of Mutuality and Care in 
Democratic Sexuality Education: Incorporating the Other Person, in Sexuality & youth Culture 29, 31–33 
(Dennis Carlson & Donyell L. Roseboro eds., 2011). However, “[s]ex education that meaningfully incorporates 
a discussion of homosexuality, asexuality, and bisexuality is rare, especially in special education classrooms.” 
Gill, supra note 13, at 49. 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law510 30.2
“disaster prevention model”476 of sexuality education, emphasizing how to delay sex and 
avoid pregnancy and STIs.477 
Virtually nonexistent are sexuality education programs in which sexual desire is 
celebrated as a “force for good.”478 Rarely are sex acts—what they include, why they (should) 
feel good, how to refuse or initiate them, how to perform them well and safely—discussed 
plainly and positively.479 Infrequently too are the “plumbing” lessons of sexuality education 
taught alongside either critical interrogations of gender normativity, heteronormativity, and 
cultural valorizations of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness.480 Nor does comprehensive 
sexuality education typically entail less lofty but no less important lessons regarding how 
to start and end relationships, how to respectfully argue with intimate partners, and how to 
determine and revise one’s sexual and relational values.481 
CSE programs that extolled sexual pleasure and sexual safety, emphasized sexual and 
intimate decision-making, and assessed the force and ethicality of cultural norms would 
better foster sexual autonomy as a capability for all people. 
476 al vernaCChio, For GoodneSS Sex: ChanGinG the way we talK to teenS about Sexuality, valueS, 
and health x (2014). 
477 See Kendall, supra note 471, at 228–33; see generally JeSSiCa FieldS, riSKy leSSonS: Sex eduCation 
and SoCial ineQuality (2008). 
478 vernaCChio, supra note 476, at 10; see also Gill, supra note 13, at 81. 
479 See, e.g., Dannielle Owens-Reid & Kristin Russo, How to Talk to Your Gay Teen About Sex, time, 
http://time.com/why-schools-cant-teach-sex-ed/#how-to-talk-to-your-gay-teen-about-sex [http://perma.cc/ 
2WTH-YFJF]; Fine & McClelland, supra note 468, at 325–28. 
480 See generally vernaCChio, supra note 476; see also Fine & McClelland, supra note 468, at 326; Sharon 
Lamb & Zoë D. Peterson, Adolescent Girls’ Sexual Empowerment: Two Feminists Explore the Concept, 
66 Sex roleS 703, 710 (2012); McRuer, Disabling Sex, supra note 14. Recent research suggests that sex 
education programs which interrogate the impact (and intersection) of gender and power on sexuality and 
sexual experience are five times more likely than other programs to reduce rates of STIs (including HIV) and 
unintended pregnancy. See Nicole A. Haberland, The Case for Addressing Gender and Power in Sexuality 
and HIV Education: A Comprehensive Review of Evaluation Studies, 41 int’l PerSP. on Sexual & reProd. 
health 31 (2015); see also Editorial, To Prevent Sexual Assault, Start Early, n.y. timeS, Jul. 14, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/opinion/to-prevent-sexual-assault-start-early.html [http://perma.cc/
UB8G-UZ2L] (“Researchers are also studying whether teaching students about sexual health reduces the 
risk of assault. Some educators believe that it does and that students should learn not just about preventing 
pregnancy and diseases but also about how to decide when they want to have sex and how to respect other 
people’s decisions.”).
481 vernaCChio, supra note 476, at 71–102; see also Lamb, supra note 475. 
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Evidently, there is nothing about such programs that are “disability-specific.” But we 
might think of comprehensive sexuality education (what it could be, not just what it is) 
as a policy reform with universal objectives (e.g., sexual literacy; cognizance of physio-
logical development; familiarity with contraceptives, their use, and effectiveness; critical 
apprehension of cultural and media stereotypes around gender and sexuality; etc.) that 
should be differentially, sometimes individually tailored to persons across the spectrum 
of intellectual and physical abilities.482 While we may expect all students to reach some 
specified threshold of sexual literacy—a threshold that should no doubt be co-determined 
by persons with disabilities483—reaching such objectives may require customized teaching 
lessons and many more resources for persons with disabilities.484
 
Although over the past two decades sexuality education programs have been created 
for and targeted to disabled audiences, they tend, as with sexuality education programs 
for nondisabled adolescents, to emphasize ways to minimize risk of abuse, STIs and 
pregnancy, rather than ways to enhance decision-making skills, to interrogate gender and 
ableist norms, or to experience pleasure.485 And sex education, particularly for persons with 
intellectual disabilities, cannot be administered solely through decontextualized knowledge-
banking. Because a person’s intellectual disabilities wax and wane across different social 
settings (depending on comfort, anxiety, newness, etc.), those with such disabilities need 
482 See E. Dukes & B.E. McGuire, Enhancing Capacity to Make Sexuality-Related Decisions in People with 
an Intellectual Disability, 53 J. intelleCtual diSability reS. 727 (2009); Amy Swango-Wilson, Meaningful 
Sex Education Programs for Individuals with Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities, 29 Sex & diSability 113 
(2011) [hereinafter Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex]; see also nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 190–91. 
483 Swango-Wilson, Caregiver Perceptions, supra note 464, at 168–69 (“Current sex education courses do 
not utilize information identified by individuals with [intellectual disabilities] as helpful in the development 
of sex education programs.”); Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex, supra note 482, at 117–18 (finding that her 
intellectually disabled informants wished to learn about friendships, relationships and marriage, and “safe 
intimacy” from sexuality education programs. Her informants also proposed methods of knowledge acquisition, 
such as instructional videos and guest lecturers and insisted that caretakers receive tailored sexual education 
as well); Michelle A. Whitehouse & Marita P. McCabe, Sex Education Programs for People with Intellectual 
Disability: How Effective Are They?, 32 eduC. & traininG mental retardation & develoPmental diSabilitieS 
229, 230 (1997). 
484 See nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 188, 190–91, 202. 
485 See Gill, supra note 13, at 69–78; Poul Rohleder & Leslie Swartz, Providing Sex Education to Persons 
with Learning Disabilities in the Era of HIV/AIDS: Tensions between Discourses of Human Rights and 
Restriction, 14 J. health PSyCh. 601, 608 (2009) (arguing that because of educators’ preconceptions about 
persons’ with disabilities sexual unruliness and/or sexual vulnerability, “sexuality education . . . can be used as 
a means to prevent sexual expression in disabled people”); Whitehouse & McCabe, supra note 483, at 234–37 
(1997) (“Few programs have been concerned with the enhancements of positive attitudes toward sexuality.”).
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practice and experience communicating about sex and intimacy in different contexts.486 
For example, a study in Japan that administered specially tailored, social-situational sexual 
education to persons with intellectual disabilities found that the intervention improved the 
subject population’s skills in “communication,” “management,” and “problem-solving.”487 
And a small study in Ireland found that one-on-one sexual education interventions for 
persons with moderate intellectual disabilities not only improved the subjects’ knowledge 
of sex, sexuality, and sexual safety, but also “improve[d] capacity to make sexuality-related 
decisions” for persons with moderate intellectual disabilities.488 Both the Ireland and 
Japan studies demonstrate how sexuality education can better not simply sex, but sexual 
autonomy as a decision-making capability. 
Many researchers have argued too that the disproportionate dearth of sexual information 
and education among the disabled likely makes the population more susceptible to sexual 
exploitation and abuse.489 Some persons with disabilities neither know they can say “no” 
nor recognize themselves as decision-makers in matters of intimacy and sex.490 Sexuality 
education can de-stigmatize conversations about sex, sexual health, and sexual abuse. 
486 See, e.g., Mayumi Hayashi, Mikako Arakida & Kazutomo Ohashi, The Effectiveness of a Sex 
Education Program Facilitating Social Skills for People with Intellectual Disability in Japan, 36 J. intell. & 
develoPmental diSability 11, 17–18 (2011). 
487 Id. at 14–15.
488 Dukes & McGuire, supra note 482, at 727–32 (finding that three of four intellectually disabled participants 
maintained their knowledge of sexual safety practices six months after the researchers’ intervention; all four 
participants’ knowledge of physical/sexual functioning and of “choices and consequences in sexual matters”—
remained greater than when measured pre-intervention). 
489 See, e.g., Monica Cuskelly & Rachel Bryde, Attitudes towards the Sexuality of Adults with an Intellectual 
Disability: Parents, Support Staff, and a Community Sample, 29 J. intell. & develoPmental diSability 255, 
256 (2004); Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex, supra note 482, at 114. But see Whitehouse & McCabe, supra 
note 483, at 232, 235–36 (“[T]here is no evidence that sex education does in fact decrease the vulnerability to 
people [sic] with intellectual disabilities to sexual assault.”). 
490 See, e.g., Swango-Wilson, Meaningful Sex, supra note 482, at 114 (“Education has the potential to 
encourage positive sexuality, promote the decision-making capabilities about that sexuality and empower the 
individual with [intellectual/developmental disabilities] to act on their decisions.”) (emphasis added). 
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L.K. had no sex education whatsoever.491 When undergoing gynecological examinations, 
L.K. was noncommunicative.492 We have no direct knowledge of L.K.’s cognitive abilities, 
and expert testimony is too conflicting to be determinative493: perhaps she simply can neither 
receive nor remember information regarding sexual health, pleasure, and violence. But we 
wonder if perhaps she had no sex education because nobody ever thought to offer it and that 
nobody ever thought to offer it because of the presumptive asexuality/sexual disorderliness 
of disabled people.494 Richard Fourtin, a jury found, violated L.K. in the most affronting, 
brutal way. But might we, a culture of systemic “compulsory able-bodiedness” 495 and 
selective erotophobia,496 less perceptibly undermine her sexual autonomy by categorically 
withholding robust, comprehensive sexual educational opportunities?497
491 State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 695 (Conn. 2012) (Norcott., J., dissenting) (“[T]he victim had never 
received any kind of sex education—either from [her mother] or from any of her schools or care programs.”).
492 Id. at 678–79, 679 n.11. 
493 Id. at 691 n.8, 695 (Norcott, J., dissenting).
494 See Cuskelly & Bryde, supra note 489, at 256; Swango-Wilson, Caregiver Perceptions, supra note 464, 
at 167–68. 
495 McRuer, Compulsory, supra note 422. 
496 See, e.g., Fine & McClelland, supra note 468, at 300.
[Adolescent  desire]  has  been  splashed  all  over  MTV,  thoroughly  commodified  by  the 
market, and repetitively performed in popular culture. A caricature of desire itself is 
now displayed loudly, as it remains simultaneously silent . . . . Today we can “google” 
for information about the average young woman’s age of “sexual debut,” if she used a 
condom, got pregnant, the number of partners she had, if she aborted or gave birth, and 
what the baby weighed. However, we don’t know if she enjoyed it, wanted it, or if she was 
violently coerced. Little has actually been heard from young women who desire pleasure, 
an education, freedom from violence, a future, intimacy, an abortion, safe and affordable 
child care for their babies, or health care for their mothers. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
497 Our suggestion for more robust, feminist sexuality education for persons with or without disabilities is 
not naïve to the power relations and asymmetric identity formations produced through practices of schooling. 
For a Foucauldian historical analysis of the ways medical experts and institutions have arrogated power through 
variable constructions of the educable “idiot,” see CarlSon, supra note 158, at 36–45. If no social practice is 
purified of power, some practices are better than others; sexual autonomy is our ethical barometer.  
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c. Sexual Assistance
Finally, another way to promote the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities is 
to provide publicly funded sexual assistance. Compensated sexual assistants for persons 
with disabilities operate legally in countries like Germany, Switzerland and Denmark (all 
countries where prostitution is legal and regulated), and operate illegally in countries like 
Sweden and the United States (where purchasing sex is criminalized).498 While there has 
been some recent public debate and advocacy regarding the provision of commercial sexual 
services for persons with physical disabilities, commercial sexual services for persons with 
intellectual disabilities is hardly ever mentioned.499 Surely, we are aware that intellectual 
disabilities more seriously complicate questions of consent, wantedness, recognizable 
pleasure and pain, and cognizance, than do physical disabilities. But such difference is 
not a warrant for erasure. Rather, sexual assistance may facilitate the sexual autonomy of 
persons with intellectual disabilities, but such assistance must be carefully (and indeed, 
sometimes expensively) monitored and individually tailored. Nonetheless, we can make 
the generalizable assumption that in scenarios involving (publicly or privately) paid sexual 
assistants/assistance,  affirmative consent  should actualize  as  it might  in noncommercial 
encounters: through a message board,500 smiles,501 and/or written, detailed plans of action.502 
498 See Maïa de la Baume, Disabled People Say They, Too, Want a Sex Life and Seek Help in Attaining 
It, n.y. timeS, Jul. 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/europe/disabled-people-say-they-too-
want-a-sex-life-and-seek-help-in-attaining-it.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ZC5M-8F6E]. 
 Prostitution is illegal across the United States., save several counties in Nevada. Barbara G. Brents, 
Nevada’s Legal Brothels Make Workers Feel Safer, n.y. timeS, Jan. 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2012/04/19/is-legalized-prostitution-safer/nevadas-legal-brothels-make-workers-feel-safer 
[http://perma.cc/74QU-GU9A]. However, sexual assistants hired under the auspices of therapy or surrogacy 
makes  the  legality of such practices uncertain: “The  legal status of surrogate partners  is undefined  in most 
of the United States and most countries around the world. This means that there are generally no laws 
regulating the profession.” International Professional Surrogates Association, Legal Status, IPSA, http://www.
surrogatetherapy.org/legal-status [http://perma.cc/V32V-7CR7]. 
 Committed to a relationally reconstructed concept of sexual autonomy, and cognizant of the perils of 
black and grey market commercial sex, we support the decriminalization (and/or legalization) of sex work 
generally, not only the legalization of sexual assistance for individuals with disabilities. See infra notes 531–32 
and accompanying text.
499 See Appel, supra note 328, at 152. 
500 See supra note 375 and accompanying text. 
501 See Denno, supra note 316, at 387. But see Appel, supra note 328, at 153. 
502 See infra notes 512–516, 519–526, and accompanying text. 
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To dimensionalize sexual assistance, we turn to Don Kulick and Jens Rydström’s 
Loneliness and its Opposite: Sex, Disability and the Ethics of Engagement.503 The authors 
offer a stunning description of—and ethical defense for—publicly funded assistance for 
the erotic lives and sexual flourishing of persons with significant disabilities. Kulick and 
Rydström compare policies, practices, and public opinion regarding the sexuality of persons 
with disabilities in Sweden and Denmark. Utilizing ethnographic interviews, participant 
observation, archival research, and discourse analysis, they demonstrate that Sweden is 
resolutely hostile towards the sexuality of persons with disabilities while Denmark is 
consistently if not always facilitative.504 Swedish state and group home policies, as well as 
personal assistants themselves, generally contain, “discipline,” or “ignore” the sexuality 
of persons with disabilities,505 in large part because the specter of sexual abuse and 
victimization poisons progressive initiatives.506 Danish policies, as well as Danish personal 
assistants themselves, although highly attentive to risks of sexual abuse,507 creatively foster 
sexual possibilities for persons with disabilities. Explanations for the differences between 
these two countries are multiple, but particularly important is the fact that Danish social 
workers and caretakers may train to become “sexual advisers” who “assist people with 
disabilities perform activities like masturbate, have sex with a partner, or purchase sexual 
services from a sex worker.”508 These advisers undergo specialized training to assist not 
only persons with disabilities, but also caretakers and group home administrators.509 We 
rehearse some of the ways Danish sexual advisers help persons with disabilities masturbate, 
have sex, and seek out commercial sexual services. These modes of assistance, carefully 
chronicled by Kulick and Rydström, undoubtedly enhance sexual autonomy of persons 
with severe disabilities (if sexual autonomy is redefined as the capability to codetermine 
sexual relations). And while Kulick and Rydström’s field site is not the United States, some 
of the practices they observe could and should be integrated into United States state and 
group home policies regarding the sexuality of persons with disabilities.510 
503 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27. 
504 Id. at 4, 17–18.  
505 Id. at 79–80. 
506 Id. at 90, 232–40. 
507 Id. at 15–19. 
508 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 18.
509 Id. at 101–05. 
510  On the insufficiencies (or more precisely, nonexistence) of United States public and institutional policies 
regarding the sexuality of persons with disabilities, see Shuttleworth, supra note 353, at 4–6; see also Siebers, 
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i. Facilitating Masturbation 
We cite the following anecdote from Kulick and Rydström in full, as it so aptly 
captures how assistance with masturbation may facilitate sexual autonomy for persons 
with significant intellectual disabilities: 
One particularly inventive solution to a seemingly unmanageable problem 
involved a young man with intellectual impairments in Denmark who 
insisted on masturbating at the edge of a highway. Every day this young 
man managed to elude staff members at his group home, turning up by the 
side of the highway and prompting near accidents and outraged calls to 
the local police. Desperate, the staff called in a sexual advisor for advice. 
The woman who came to help managed to figure out that what the young 
man found exciting was the sound of traffic. At her suggestion, the staff 
recorded a video of the highway at the site where the young man liked to 
stand, and they gave that video to him, telling him that whenever he felt 
like looking at cars and touching himself, he could do so—in his room, 
with the sound up and the door closed. Problem solved.511 
What is ethically noteworthy about this incident is not that this young man can now 
masturbate  free  from  the  danger  of  oncoming  traffic.  Rather,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the 
solution to this problem was promotional, not punitive, of the man’s sexual autonomy. 
By recording the sounds of traffic instead of, say, unilaterally attempting to re-circuit the 
man’s desires toward more hetero-palatable materials, the group home staff permitted and 
encouraged the man to codetermine the contours of his sexuality. 
Kulick and Rydström also recount the case of Helle, a young woman in a group home 
who is nonverbal, suffers cerebral palsy, and uses a mechanism akin to a message board to 
communicate (thus Helle shares some classificatory similarities with L.K., but it is unclear 
if or to what extent she is intellectually impaired).512 A sexual advisor drafted a plan of 
supra note 27, at 45 (“Group homes and long-term care facilities purposefully destroy opportunities for disabled 
people to find sexual partners or to express their sexuality.”); infra note 525. 
511 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 126–27. However, Michael Gill cautions that prescribing 
masturbation for persons with disabilities may function to diminish or discredit possibilities for sex. If severed 
from an integrative, sex-positive approach, “[m]asturbation training becomes a disciplinary tool” exercised by 
caretakers to contain rather than promote intimacy and sexuality. Gill, supra note 13, at 95.  
512 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 106, 116. 
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action for Helle’s assistants in order to help Helle masturbate.513 The plan of action details 
how Helle should be laid on the bed and where mirrors and pillows should be placed.514 
The document directs assistants (although assistants are not mandated to facilitate sex for 
clients515) to “place the sex aid on [Helle’s] privates,” and to ask Helle for how long she 
would like to “lie alone.” When Helle finishes masturbating, the assistant is to wash the sex 
aid and make sure Helle is content.516
In  Helle’s  case,  as  in  the  case  with  the  young man masturbating  to  traffic,  sexual 
advisers and clients’ assistants collaborated with each other and with their patients to 
enable sexuality and sexual autonomy. The plan of action for Helle was codetermined 
by Helle, and practices of sexual codetermination themselves recursively strengthen the 
capability of (sexual) codetermination:517 the sexual advisor “had long conversations with 
Helle to determine what kind of sex aid she wanted, and she helped Helle try out several 
before they settled on the one Helle liked best.”518 
Figuring out how to facilitate the autoerotic lives of such persons with intellectual and/or 
physical disabilities evidently takes time, collaboration, and creativity, but it does not 
require seismic change. By approaching persons with disabilities as presumptively sexual, 
and presumptively capable of sexual autonomy, advisors and assistants make possible and 
then encourage their erotic flourishing. 
ii. Facilitating Sex 
Facilitating sex for persons with disabilities is not altogether different from facilitating 
masturbation, excepting of course the significant but generally surmountable problem of 
gauging wantedness or unwantedness of all sexual partners.519
513 Id. at 106.
514 Id. at 106. 
515 Id. at 104–05.
516 Id. at 106. 
517 See Dukes & McGuire, supra note 482, at 732. Perhaps sexual autonomy, relationally reconstructed, 
might be conceived as a “fertile functioning” that promotes other capabilities, like affiliation and imagination. 
On “fertile functioning,” see Jonathan wolF & avner de-Shalit, diSadvantaGe 133–54 (2007). 
518 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 116. 
519 See Denno, supra note 316, at 384–93 (chronicling several cases in which assistants and social workers 
intervened to help persons with significant intellectual disabilities have sex. Caretakers continually gauge—and 
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Kulick and Rydström tell the story of Marianne and Steen.520 Residing in separate 
group homes, they became a romantic couple after meeting in an activity center.521 Steen 
is nonverbal, “spastic,” autistic, and paralyzed from the neck down.522 Like Helle and 
L.K., Steen uses a message board to communicate to his assistants and group home staff. 
Marianne is intellectually disabled, deaf, and “nearly blind.”523
For Marianne and Steen to share intimacy and sex required great effort on the part 
of their assistants and group home social workers. Social workers collaborate with each 
other, rearranging schedules, coordinating transportation, and delegating supervisory 
responsibilities.524 They also prepare rooms, beds, pillows—as well as Steen’s body— 
in such a way that the couple may have and enjoy sex.525 Assistants constantly consult 
Marianne and Steen to make sure everything is alright.526
Evidently, facilitating sex for persons with significant disabilities requires more than 
assisting the sex act itself. Preparations must be made beforehand, and evaluations of 
wantedness recurring. In Danish group homes visited by Kulick, staff organized role-playing 
activities and discussion groups for persons with disabilities in order to familiarize them with 
modes of intimate communication and negotiation, to explain boundaries of permissible 
social/sexual behavior, to help them cope with the rejection of a love interest, and so forth.527 
sometimes instruct patients how to legibly express—wantedness and unwantedness.). 
520 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 97–112. 
521 Id. at 97. 
522 Id. 
523 Id. 
524 Id. at 98–101, 111. 
525 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 111.
526 Id. at 100. 
527 Id. at 108–09. For a closer-to-home example of facilitating sex for the elderly (with or without diagnosed 
disabilities), see robin deSSel & mildred ramirez, hebrew home at riverdale, PoliCieS and ProCedureS 
ConCerninG Sexual exPreSSion at the hebrew home at riverdale (1995), http://www.riverspringhealth.org/
files/sexualexpressionpolicy.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4SU-KVSK] (stipulating the sexual rights of Hebrew Home 
residents and the responsibilities of Hebrew Home staff to facilitate residents’ sexual expression); see also Pam 
Belluck, Sex, Dementia, and a Husband on Trial at Age 70, n.y. timeS, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/04/14/health/sex-dementia-and-a-husband-henry-rayhons-on-trial-at-age-78.html [http://perma.cc/ 
3J7J-AJ2M] (“Yet many nursing homes have no sexual intimacy policy . . . . An exception is the Hebrew Home, 
where staff members are asked to assess consent with nonverbal cues, to note a resident’s mood after sex, and 
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 These sessions are exemplary in their promotion of sexual autonomy, designed to enhance 
disabled persons’ capability to codetermine their sexual relations. 
  
iii. Facilitating the Purchase of Sexual Services 
The sexual facilitation we described in the above two subsections is publicly funded.528 
But sexual services can be and are purchased privately as well, directly by persons with 
disabilities.529
 
Kulick and Rydström repeatedly emphasize in their monograph that the population of 
persons with disabilities who directly purchase sexual services makes up a “tiny fragment” 
of all disabled people.530 The authors suggest that such services receive disproportionate 
media  and  academic  attention,  reflecting  a  prejudiced  presumption  that  the  only  way 
persons with significant disabilities could have sex is if they paid for it. This is untrue—
and beneath the surface of such doxa are the untenable presumptions that commercial sex 
is definitionally devoid of intimacy and exploitative.531
to pose questions like: ‘Do you enjoy sexual contact?,’ ‘Do you know what it means to have sex?,’ and ‘What 
would you do if you wanted it to stop?’”). 
528 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 4, 101–02, 202. 
529 Id. at 174–216.
530 Id. at 24, 179. 
531 Id. at 185. On the ways intimacy is mediated and brokered in contemporary commercial sex markets, 
see generally elizabeth bernStein, temPorarily yourS: intimaCy, authentiCity, and the CommerCe oF Sex 
(2007); see also JohnS, marKS, triCKS and ChiCKenhawKS: ProFeSSionalS & their ClientS writinG about 
eaCh other (David Henry Sterry & R.J. Martin, Jr. eds., 2013). Frequently, clients (mostly men) who purchase 
sexual services desire romantic and/or emotional connection in addition to (or instead of) sex. See, e.g., 
Christine Milrod & Ronald Weitzer, The Intimacy Prism: Emotion Management among the Clients of Escorts, 
15 men & maSCulinitieS 447 (2012); Teela Sanders, Male Sexual Scripts: Intimacy, Sexuality, and Pleasure in 
the Purchase of Commercial Sex, 42 SoCioloGy 400 (2008).
 Debates about commercial sex polarize around the question of whether sex work is (a) exploitative, 
patriarchal, and “bad” or (b) radical, world-making, and “good.” From the infamous Sex Wars of the 1980s 
to current global campaigns  to end human  trafficking,  these debates obscure  the diversity of experience  in 
the sex industry and are generally irrelevant to the development of laws and policies ensuring the safety and 
economic stability of sex workers. This dominant discourse “is disconcerting to those . . . who find themselves 
in sympathy with elements of both ‘sides’ of the debate, and yet also feel that it is the wrong debate to be having 
about prostitution.” Julia O’Connell Davidson, The Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution, 17 hyPatia 84 (2002); 
see also Julia O’Connell Davidson, Will the Real Sex Slave Please Stand Up?, 83 FeminiSt rev. 4 (2006). 
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Nonetheless, the private purchasing of sexual services occurs, and when done right, 
fosters the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities while also protecting the rights 
and bodily integrity of sex workers, sexual assistants, and disabled persons themselves.532
“The private purchase of sexual services” is not simply euphemistic for hiring a sex 
worker; it encompasses a wide variety of activities. The sorts of sexual services available 
for private purchase in Denmark are identical to those sometimes available in group 
homes: for example, hiring assistants to help with masturbation or to help arrange sex 
between partners.533 Handisex is a Danish organization “which puts adults with disabilities 
into contact with helpers who will assist them with sex without actually having sex with 
them.”534 Nor is it just men who purchase sexual services from women, despite popular 
assumptions to the contrary. Women with disabilities also purchase services to facilitate 
their masturbation and sexual activity, and they sometimes hire sex workers.535
If they wish to pay for sex directly, persons with disabilities may also need help finding 
sex workers willing to meet persons with disabilities;536 combing through websites and 
newspaper advertisements for such escorts; locating brothels that are accessible;537 and 
532 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 196–200. Existing criminal penalties for offenses related to sex 
work—e.g., prostitution, solicitation, “commercial vice”—tend to depress sex workers’ autonomy, sexual and 
otherwise. Criminalization impedes sex workers’ ability to control the conditions under which their work takes 
place, and, accordingly, their capability to codetermine the conditions of their relations with clients. Criminal 
penalties and state surveillance often prevent sex workers from mitigating their exposure to harm (e.g., carrying 
condoms, reporting abusive client behavior to authorities, and working with other sex workers rather than in 
isolation). See, e.g., Acacia Shields, Criminalizing Condoms: How Policing Practices Put Sex Workers and 
HIV Services at Risk in Kenya, Namibia, Russia, South Africa, the United States, and Zimbabwe, oPen SoC’y 
Found.  (2012),  http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminalizing-condoms-20120717.
pdf [http://perma.cc/3LBQ-KMR2]; Nicolé Fick, Enforcing Fear: Police Abuse of Sex Workers when Making 
Arrests, 16 S. aFr. Crime Q. 27 (2006); Jillian Keenan, Sex Workers Don’t Deserve to be Raped, daily beaSt, 
Sep. 27, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/27/sex-workers-deserve-protection-from-
rape-too.html [http://perma.cc/3756-N64P]; Michele R. Decker et al., Human Rights Violations Against Sex 
Workers: Burden and Effect on HIV, 385 lanCet 186 (2015); see also supra note 498 and accompanying text. 
533 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 182–83.
534 Id. at 287.
535 Id. at 180–84.
536 Id. at 207.
537 Id. at 195.
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navigating what can often be complicated and detailed menus of services and prices.538 
Particularly for persons who are nonverbal and/or intellectually disabled, caretakers are 
often needed as “translators” for hired sex workers, since caretakers are more familiar 
with their patients’ communication patterns and better suited to interpret the meanings of 
patients’ gestures, sounds, and so forth.539 In addition, persons with significant intellectual 
disabilities and/or mobility limitations may need to be bathed in advance of a sexual 
encounter, and their rooms properly prepared.540 
The private purchasing of sexual services, including the purchase of sex, provides 
some persons with disabilities opportunities for sexual pleasure that might otherwise be 
nonexistent or unduly difficult to obtain.541 Just as importantly, though, from the perspective 
of sexual autonomy, these sorts of paid-for sexual experiences can help boost the confidence 
of persons with disabilities; they can help persons with disabilities recognize themselves 
not only as sexual beings but also as capable of successfully “having sex,” whether or not 
such sex is penetrative.542 The purchase of sexual services allows one paraplegic man, as 
Kulick and Rydström put it, “the opportunity to engage with others in ways that extend 
his capacities.”543 Mark O’Brien, famed poet and journalist paralyzed from polio, writes 
of seeing a sex surrogate: “I knew I could change my perception of myself as a bumbling, 
indecisive clod, not just by having sex with someone, but by taking charge of my life and 
trusting myself enough to make decisions.”544 These kinds of experiences expand disabled 
persons’ erotic repertoire and, more generally, invite them to participate in navigating their 
life trajectories. 
Some critics express concern that permitting/facilitating the purchase of sexual 
services may further segregate disabled persons from society by removing them from the 
noncommercial marketplace of dating, intimacy, and love.545 Yet there is no necessary 
538 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 203. 
539 Id. at 203.
540 Id. at 198–99. 
541 But see supra notes 530–531 and accompanying text. 
542 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 209.
543 Id. at 211. 
544 O’Brien, supra note 329. 
545 See, e.g., Stefania Rousselle, Seeking Sexual Surrogates, n.y. timeS, Jul. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/07/05/world/europe/disabled-people-say-they-too-want-a-sex-life-and-seek-help-in-attaining-it.
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reason commercial sex (or intimacy) and noncommercial intimacy (and sex) must be 
mutually exclusive. 
Others express concern that commercial sex degrades sex workers (oftentimes but 
not always women) and their clients (oftentimes but not always men), and subordinates 
women.546 Yet there is no logical reason sexual services are any more or less degrading than 
the host of “bodily services”—often exhausting, often involving fluids and excretions—
provided by compensated caretakers for disabled persons.547 We suspect that the concern 
over degradation and subordination masks a moralistic opprobrium to sex for money.548 
 
We offer a last note on sexual assistance, sex work, and relationally reconceived sexual 
autonomy. Sex workers hired by disabled persons, as well as disabled persons themselves, 
attest that their “sex” often looks much different than able-bodied persons might assume.549 
This sex is not always penetrative, genitally directed, or orgasm-centered.550 “Sex” might be 
about touching bodies, extended physical contact, eroticizing and stimulating non-genital 
body parts, or even eroticizing wheelchairs551 and amputated limbs.552 One sex worker 
reports that for her paraplegic, impotent male clients, “the sexual sessions these men pay 
for consist mostly of conversation and the man licking her genitals.”553 Much disabled sex 
 
 
html [http://perma.cc/RK5A-FWEJ]. But see O’Brien, supra note 329 (“What if I ever did meet someone who 
wanted to make love with me? Wouldn’t I feel more secure if I had already had some sexual experience?”); 
supra note 531.
546 See, e.g., Sheila Jeffreys, Disability and the Male Sex Right, 31 women’S Stud. int’l Forum 327, 331–44 
(2008). But see KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 176–77; supra note 531.
547 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily 
Services, 27 J. leGal Stud. 693 (1997). 
548 Id. at 705–06; see supra notes 448, 478–479, and accompanying text; see also Mary Anne Case, Pets or 
Meat, 80 Chi.-Kent l. rev. 1129, 1146 (2005). 
549 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 205–07. 
550 Id. at 2; see also mairS, supra note 383, at 47–54; Siebers, supra note 27, at 39.
551 See, e.g., de la Baume, supra note 498 (“‘If someone is in a wheelchair, I start in the wheelchair,’ [a 
sexual surrogate] said. ‘I start playing the game of getting undressed on the wheelchair. It becomes a little like 
a game.’”). 
552 See, e.g., Dean, supra note 448. 
553 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 206. 
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manifests what queer theory has sought from its inception—a radical reorganizing of what 
sex and sexuality (and therefore sexual autonomy) are and might be.554 
Kulick and Rydström conceive of these modes of erotic facilitation—for masturbation, 
sex, and sexual services—as “ethical practices of awareness, engagement, and justice.”555 
This language sounds highfalutin for, say, fellating someone for a fee. But clearly sexual 
assistance for persons with disabilities entails more than simply enabling transactional, 
commercial sex. Our brief for sexual autonomy presupposes neither that humans are 
innately sexual nor that sex is necessarily special. For many people, though, disabled and 
not, sex, sexual pleasure, and intimacy make for a more complete, flourishing life. Because 
sex is or can be “interactional activity that develops and enriches social relationships,”556 
there is a recursive quality to sexual autonomy—opportunities for co-determined sex and 
intimacy are themselves manifestations of sexual autonomy, but such opportunities also 
cultivate persons’ capabilities for sexually autonomous actions. 
From the perspective of the Capabilities Approach, and from the normative presumption 
of sexual autonomy as a central capability, accommodating sex for persons with disabilities—
by broadening access, improving sexuality education, and facilitating sex practices—is 
“ethically superior” to inaction (and thus to extant social/sexual arrangements).557 
We advocate for the public funding of such forms of sexual assistance, at least to a 
minimum threshold, so that sexual autonomy is a right for many and not a privilege for 
the few.558 
554 See generally Mollow, supra note 27; eve KoSoFSKy SedGwiCK, ePiStemoloGy oF the CloSet 29 (1990).
But to the extent that, as Freud argued and Foucault assumed, the distinctively sexual nature 
of human sexuality has to do precisely with its excess over or potential difference from the 
bare choreographies of procreation, “sexuality” might be the very opposite of what we 
originally referred to as (chromosomal-based) sex: it could occupy, instead, even more 
than “gender” the polar position of the relational, the social/symbolic, the constructed, the 
variable, the representational.
Id. 
555 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 38. 
556 Id. at 263. 
557 Id. at 264. 
558 See nuSSbaum, FrontierS, supra note 25, at 193–95. 
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CONCLUSION: THE ORDINARINESS OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
A  feminist,  relationally  reconstructed  sexual  autonomy  defined  as  the  capability  to 
codetermine sexual relations rejects sexual autonomy as merely a synonym for sexual 
consent. As a human capability, and not simply human choice, sexual autonomy so conceived 
encourages us  to examine not only first person present active (or passive) consent—the 
preoccupations of Rubenfeld’s and Spindelman’s otherwise opposed critiques559—but also 
institutions, policies, and norms that foster or impede erotic creativity, co-participation, and 
flourishing. A panoramic perspective allows us to see that extant sexual regulations (like, 
say, some age of consent statutes,560 or some statutory determinations of mental incapacity 
or physical helplessness),561 and not just predatory persons, depress sexual autonomy. L.K. 
and those similarly situated need no longer anchor sexual autonomy as its constitutive 
outside (à la Stephen Schulhofer562 and Gerald Dworkin),563 but might instead be afforded 
a shot at erotic possibility. Our version of sexual autonomy—as dynamic, aspirational, 
achieved, and relational rather than binary and keyed to a rationality threshold—readmits 
certain subjects (like, say, some teenagers and persons with disabilities) historically ejected 
from its ambit.564
Once the reduction of sexual autonomy to sexual consent is refused, we can dispense 
with (or at least deprioritize) that equation’s characterological corollary: either/or 
classificatory determinations of capacity. In the case of disability (and disability as a case 
for sexual autonomy reconstructed writ large), sexual autonomy cautions against widening 
the statutory net to render larger disabled populations ineligible for sex. Instead, we have 
suggested a more ecological approach keyed to fostering sexual capability: the replacement 
of force and nonconsent  requirements of sexual assault  law with an affirmative consent 
standard; proscriptions against sex in heretofore unregulated relations of dependence (like 




559 See infra Part I. 
560 See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
561 See supra Part III.C. 
562 See supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text. 
563 See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text. 
564 See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text. 
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expanded access (material and discursive) and comprehensive, feminist-inflected sexuality 
education; and facilitation of masturbation, sex, and the purchase of sexual services.565
We conclude on a final note that our defense of sexual autonomy is, for the most part, 
a claim for the ordinariness, not the extraordinariness, of sex.566 “It is important not to 
dramatize sex too much.”567 Persons with disabilities receive publicly funded attendant 
care. Why should they not receive publicly funded sexual assistance?568  The  fictive 
difference between washing genitals and rubbing genitals is the presence and absence of 
patients’ sexual desire.569 Our national proscription against the latter and permission of 
the former singles out sexual desire as especially unworthy, because undignified, of state 
assistance. We accommodate—on paper if not in practice570—disabled persons’ heath, 
employment, housing and transportation. Why not accommodate sex? Why not cultivate 
sexual autonomy, the capability to codetermine sexual relations, more broadly and more 
deeply? Why not make sex a little more ordinary? 
565 See supra Part IV. 
566 For an early admonition against the queer theoretic spectacularizing of sex, see generally Biddy Martin, 
Extraordinary Homosexuals and the Fear of Being Ordinary, 6 diFFerenCeS 100 (1994). But see Berlant & 
Warner, supra note 452, at 556–77. For a recent casing of the (sociological) ordinariness of homosexuality, 
see generally Heather Love, Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary, 26 
diFFerenCeS 74 (2015). 
567 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 216. 
568 Id. at 295; see also Appel, supra note 328, at 153–54. 
569 KuliCK & rydStröm, supra note 27, at 118, 120, 122; see also Case, supra note 548, at 1146; nuSSbaum, 
Sex, supra note 142, at 706–07. 
570 For a critique of United States federal legislation regarding disability accommodations, see generally 
Satz, supra note 27. 
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aPPendix: ConneCtiCut aPPellate Court Sexual aSSault CaSeS, 2010–2015
The following tables overview data collected from a review of 2010–2015 Connecticut 
Appellate Court sexual assault cases. Cases were extracted from a LexisNexis search on March 1, 
2015. An initial search yielded 214 unique cases heard between January 1, 2010 and March 1, 2015, 
all of which contained the phrase “sexual assault.” Of these, 37 appeals referenced sexual assault but 
sexual assault was immaterial to the issue of law—these cases have been excluded from analysis. 
The remaining cases (175) were coded and analyzed.
Table A.1: Case Description
# % Variable Notes
Sexual assault 175 N/A Includes all cases involving one or more charges of sexual assault.
Unique victims 205 N/A 9.1% of cases involved multiple victims. 
Case Type # % Variable Notes
State of CT v. Defendant 132 75.4% “Appellant v. Commissioner of Correction” 
refers to cases involving an appellate plea 
for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant v. Commissioner of Correction 39 22.3%
Other 4 2.3%
# of Charges # % Variable Notes
Single 14 8.0% Not all charges under “Multiple” are sexual 
assault Multiple 161 92.0%
Specific Charges Involved # % Variable Notes
Sexual assault in the 1st degree 123 70.3%
Includes aggravated or attempt to commit. 
The category “Other charges” includes 
all non-sexual assault charges, e.g., 
burglary, kidnapping, possession of child 
pornography, etc.
Sexual assault in the 2nd degree 42 24.0%
Sexual assault in the 3rd degree 23 13.1%
Sexual assault in the 4th degree 31 17.7%
Sexual assault in a spousal/cohabiting 
relationship 6 3.4%
Risk of injury to a child 109 62.3%
Sexual assault, degree not specified 7 0.04%
Other charges 81 46.3%
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Table A.2: Ages of Perpetrators and Victims
Age of Perpetrator # % Variable Notes
Adult (18+) 35 20.0%
Perpetrators whose age is “not specified” in the appeal 
are likely over 18, given the other facts of these cases. 




Adult (18+) 4 2.0%
Victims whose age is “not specified” in the appeal are 
likely over 18, given the other facts of these cases. 
Minor (<18) 138 67.3%
Not specified 60 29.3%
Police officer posing 
as minor 3 1.5%
TOTAL 205 100.0%
Table A.3: Relationship between Perpetrators and Victims571
Relationship Classification # % Variable Notes
Intimate Relationship 15 7.3%
Spouse 6 2.9%
“Spouse” includes common-law spouse. 
“Former spouse” includes spouses that are 
separated, regardless of formal divorce.
Former Spouse 4 2.0%
Partner (excl. spouse) 2 1.0%
Former Partner (excl. spouse) 3 1.5%
Familial or Semi-Familial 
Relationship 86 42.0%
Father (***) 28 13.7%
“Father” includes biological and adoptive 
fathers.
“Uncle” includes uncles by marriage and 
aunts’ live-in boyfriends.
“Grandfather” includes step-grandfathers 
and grandmothers’ live-in boyfriends.
Uncle (*) 11 5.4%
Grandfather (***) 7 3.4%
Other family member (*) 5 2.4%
Other legal guardian (***) 1 0.5%
Stepfather (***) 9 4.4%
Mother’s boyfriend/intimate partner 24 11.7%
571  Relationship  classifications  marked  with  (***)  are  always  restricted  by  existing  Connecticut  law. 
Relationship classifications marked with (*) may be restricted by existing law, depending on additional details 
(e.g., whether the relationship involves consanguinity, whether the victim is under the age of eighteen, whether 
the relationship involves a legal contract, etc.). See supra notes 405–439 and accompanying text.
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Relationship Classification # % Variable Notes
Caretaking Relationship 8 3.9%
Babysitter (*) 2 1.0% “Other caretaker” includes: a child 
development caretaker in a junior residential 
treatment center where the victim was a 
resident; a nurse’s assistant at a hospital 
where the victim was a patient; and a dentist 
of whom the victim was a patient.
Teacher or Coach (*) 3 1.5%
Other Caretaker (*) 3 1.5%
Other Relationship 32 15.6%
Coworker or Employer (*) 4 2.0%
“Other known adult” includes any adult with 
whom a child is familiar, but who is not a 
family friend (e.g., a neighbor).
Family friend 8 3.9%
Parent of a friend 3 1.5%
Friend of a friend 4 2.0%
Other personal acquaintance 8 3.9%
Other known adult 5 2.4%
No Prior Relationship 21 10.2%
Client (for sex workers) 3 1.5%
Stranger 15 7.3%
Police Officer 
(posing as teen girl online) 3 1.5%
Relationship Not Specified 44 21.5%
TOTAL 205 100.0%
 
